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ABSTRACT 
 
Lucy Burgchardt: Attitudes Toward Antiquities: Rhetorical Enchantments, Preservation 
Advocacy, and the American Southwest 
(Under the direction of Carole Blair) 
 
 
My dissertation evaluates Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf of 
ancient indigenous places in the Southwestern United States, such as Mesa Verde, in 
southern Colorado, and Chaco Canyon, in northern New Mexico. My dissertation focuses on 
the rhetorical works of white adventurers, archaeologists, and advocates who were active in 
the American Southwest between the 1870s and the 1930s. It examines legislation that such 
social actors advanced during roughly the same historical period, and it also assesses four 
recent examples of preservation policy affecting Southwestern antiquities.  
Throughout this dissertation, I claim that the history and legacy of Anglo-American 
preservation advocacy on behalf of Southwestern antiquities demonstrate the communication 
patterns of rhetorical enchantment. I define rhetorical enchantment as an appeal to a cultural 
myth, often indicated or enhanced by the presence of poetic language. I develop the theory of 
rhetorical enchantment in relation to dramatism, finding evidence of the technological 
psychosis, frames of acceptance and rejection, and god terms alongside the myths that rhetors 
in my study expressed poetically. 
The main myths that rhetors in my dissertation prevailed upon were myths of 
modernity such as scientific rationality, the theory of cultural evolution, primitivism, and 
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white superiority. These appeared alongside more literary myths, in which rhetors painted the 
American Southwest as a magical landscape, while they depicted the ancient structures that 
they found there as New World ruins. While these poetic myths often articulated to the myths 
of modernity that I critique throughout this dissertation, they undermined rhetors’ pretensions 
to scientific objectivity. Although scientific authority always has characterized Anglo-
American engagement with ancient indigenous places in the Southwestern United States, this 
rhetorical history demonstrates that Anglo-American researchers, advocates, and 
policymakers always have exhibited a poetic attitude towards Southwestern antiquities. 
Unfortunately, these poetics typically translated into a fetishistic demeanor towards 
American Indian social actors, as well.  
Together, these rhetorical enchantments have naturalized Anglo-American 
involvement in the care of ancient indigenous places. Anthropological authority continues to 
dominate the federal management of indigenous heritage places. My dissertation historicizes 
and challenges this status quo, and the language that helped to constitute it.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In December 2016, President Barack Obama designated Bears Ears National 
Monument, redefining the management and use of 1.35 million acres of federally-owned land 
in southeastern Utah. The Bears Ears landscape was noteworthy for its variety of cultural, 
natural, recreational, archaeological, and paleontological resources. Supporters of the 
national monument designation considered it long overdue and celebrated it as “a victory for 
indigenous rights.”1 After all, Bears Ears was the first and only national monument ever to be 
requested by a coalition of Tribal governments, and the new national monument 
encompassed the ancestral homeland of several Native nations residing in the American 
Southwest, along with over 100,000 Ancestral Puebloan sites. At the same time that 
proponents called the Bears Ears designation a victory, Utah Congressman Jason Chaffetz 
called it a “slap in the face to the people of Utah, attempting to silence the voices of those 
who [would] bear the heavy burden it impose[d].”2 Chaffetz’ statement summarized well the 
conservative opposition to the new national monument, which soon became a symbol of 
executive overreach that the Trump administration was determined to exploit. 
                                                 
1 Julie Turkewitz and Lisa Friedman, “Interior Secretary Proposes Shrinking Four National 
Monuments,” The New York Times, August 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/us/bears-ears-utah-monument.html. 
2 Jason Chaffetz qtd. by Robinson Meyer, “Obama’s Environmental Legacy, in Two Buttes,” 
The Atlantic, December 30, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/12/obamas-enviromental-legacy-in-two-
buttes/511889. 
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In December 2017, President Donald Trump ordered a reduction of Bears Ears 
National Monument from 1.35 million acres to 201,876 acres. Those in favor of the eighty-
five percent cut called it “an unquestionable victory for Utah,” excluding those indigenous 
stakeholders living in Utah who had fought for Bears Ears to gain recognition in the first 
place.3 While Trump’s Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, took to Twitter to revel in the 
reduction of Bears Ears’ boundaries, opponents to Bears Ears’ reduction described it as “an 
attack on minorities,” and “an affront to the Native American tribes that actively petitioned 
against [the reduction].”4 The outdoor recreation company, Patagonia, began a web campaign 
declaring that the reduction was both unethical and illegal, and joined with environmental 
conservationists, archaeological researchers, and the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition to 
pursue legal action against the Trump administration.  
The conflict over Bears Ears’ boundaries demonstrates an irrefutable dimension of 
public memory places: Collectives invest differently in memory places, and express diverse 
values for them in their discourses. In the Bears Ears controversy, the value of the land 
ranged from its role in the protection and respect of indigenous identities, to its utility for 
recreational enjoyment, to its research opportunities and educational benefit, and to its 
potential for natural resource extraction. The latter valuation, of course, considered Bears 
                                                 
3 Orrin Hatch, qtd. by Robinson Meyer, “Obama Conserved 1.3 Million Acres in Utah - Can 
Trump Undo That?,” The Atlantic, June 14, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/obama-conserved-13-million-acres-in-
utahcan-trump-un-conserve-them/530265/. 
4 Eleanor Cummins, “Trump’s Cuts to National Monuments Hurt Native Americans Most,” 
Slate, 2017, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2017/12/trump_s_attack_on_natio
nal_monuments_is_also_an_attack_on_minorities.html. 
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Ears less as heritage and more as an economic prospect. That, too, bore on the identities and 
ethics of the players involved.  
The example of Bears Ears is of interest because it has to do with the ancient 
indigenous places present on the landscape, and the diverse publics who came together to 
advocate on behalf of the antiquities there. As a former archaeologist, a Westerner, and a 
historic preservation advocate, I was troubled by the reduction of Bears Ears’ boundaries. 
Yet, the discourse pertaining to the Bears Ears controversy demonstrated the stakes, 
constituencies, and worldviews that are made manifest in deliberations over the federal 
protection of ancient indigenous places. Historically, conservative stakeholders, industry, and 
states’ rights advocates have opposed large-scale federal interventions in land use. In the 
American Southwest, these conflicts have been particularly pronounced, due to the fact that 
so many of the states once were federal territories, and hence, much of their land remains 
under federal control. The fact that the heritage places situated on those lands have belonged 
primarily to American Indian history rather than Anglo-American history serves to intensify 
the conflicts pertaining to their status.5 The fact that these heritage places reflect Pre-
Columbian history, or rather, deep history, also contributes to their malleable roles in 
contemporary public life. Many contemporary Anglo-American social actors do not 
understand them, nor do they feel a personal connection to them. So, what use are they? 
Divergent valuations of places like Bears Ears can make their ongoing ethical care 
difficult, even when several parties who are in favor of their preservation unite to dedicate 
time, money, and other resources to that cause. This is not a recent phenomenon, but has 
                                                 
5 Throughout the dissertation, I use the term Anglo-American to refer to English-speaking 
Americans, rather than to refer exclusively to Americans of English descent. In the 
Southwest, the term “Anglo” is shorthand for a non-American Indian person.  
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been a persistent feature of Anglo-American engagement with indigenous heritage for as 
long as preservation has been a cultural concern in the United States. Non-American Indian 
tourists, scientists, and politicians historically have attributed a wide range of values to 
American antiquities, many of which have undermined the values attributed to ancient places 
by American Indian constituencies. Power dynamics established in the nineteenth century, 
favoring white researchers as the authorities on indigenous heritage, and utilitarian valuations 
of ancient places over cultural and religious ones, have endured into the present. These 
hierarchies continue to inform preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places, 
today. The prominent role of archaeologists and outdoor enthusiasts in the advocacy on 
behalf of Bears Ears, as well as within the rationale of Obama’s proclamation designating 
Bears Ears a national monument, illustrates the status quo.  
While the use of ancient indigenous heritage places for research and recreation may 
not be as damaging as the uranium mining and hydraulic fracturing that threaten heritage 
places most imminently today, it can be detrimental to the ongoing ethical care of ancient 
indigenous places. It also undermines the cohesion and integrity of the coalitions who might 
join together to counter such political moves as the Trump administration’s reduction of 
Bears Ears National Monument, and creates a hierarchy within preservation advocacy that 
diminishes the importance of indigenous worldviews. Anglo-American archaeologists often 
have advocated on behalf of places like Bears Ears because of the purported mysteries for 
science that these places possess, in addition to or instead of privileging their cultural 
importance for descendant populations. When non-indigenous archaeologists join American 
Indian social actors in coalitions on behalf of preservation, the archaeologists have a history 
of assuming leadership positions and dominating the discourses of the social movement. 
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Troublingly, the utilitarian valuations of indigenous heritage sites expressed by some 
archaeologists and archaeology “buffs” have much in common, rhetorically, with the very 
industrial and economic initiatives that allow for their destruction. All of these participate in 
a technological rationality. Whether extracting data or extracting oil, both mainstream 
comportments towards ancient indigenous places serve to subvert them as memory places. 
Both, therefore, play a part in colonizing them. 
This dissertation poses the question of how rhetoric has participated in the creation of 
the elliptical power dynamics that define preservation advocacy and the federal management 
of ancient indigenous heritage, and how rhetoric might contribute to a more equitable 
practice of preservation advocacy now and in the future. This project addresses the political 
lives of ancient indigenous places, so-called antiquities, because it is primarily the ancient 
places that have garnered Anglo-American affection over time. People with no hereditary 
link to ancient structures can feel compelled by them, and can become passionate advocates 
on their behalf. At times, these advocates also take part in their interpretations of indigenous 
rights movements, sometimes problematically, and sometimes with sensitivity. Certainly, the 
federal treatment of indigenous heritage places, no matter their age, demonstrates aspects of 
Anglo-American comportment towards contemporary American Indian peoples. When 
decisions about indigenous heritage places are made without the consent of descendant 
peoples, or when these places are not shielded from industry, or when they are identified 
primarily as scientific or recreational prospects, it is clear that Anglo-American interests have 
gained an upper hand. 
Given that challenges to indigenous heritage, sovereignty, and wellbeing remain 
conspicuous, it is appropriate to call for a change—particularly among those who would call 
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themselves allies. Typically, these allies are those like the researchers, recreationists, and 
environmental conservationists evident in the Bears Ears controversy. As my dissertation will 
illustrate, similar allies have intervened in the treatment of indigenous heritage places in the 
United States since the end of the nineteenth century, and have set precedents for 
preservation advocacy among Anglo-American publics. However, problematic features of 
early Anglo-American engagement with ancient indigenous places have persisted alongside 
the structures that these social actors sought to preserve. I focus in this dissertation on the 
establishing rhetorics of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient 
indigenous places in the American Southwest, attending in particular to discourses from the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition to its unique deep history, its more 
recent history shows that the American Southwest was one of the first places in the United 
States about which deliberations concerning the federal preservation of ancient indigenous 
places occurred, and these conversations are far from over.  
This project is about the history of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf 
of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest. I selected the Southwest for study 
because one of the most significant Pre-Columbian polities, the Ancestral Puebloans, built a 
thriving culture in that region of the country, most notable from roughly 800 CE to 1250 CE. 
Many of the buildings they created still stand today, and have been central to preservationist 
discourse since the mid-nineteenth century. Some of these Ancestral Puebloan places 
continue to play central roles in contemporary political conversations about indigenous 
rights, environmental conservation, states’ rights, and the status of science. The origins of 
these most recent controversies date back to the historical period I assess in this dissertation. 
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More specifically, this project interrogates two sets of historical texts, and examines 
the oeuvre of federal preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities. In looking at 
these three collections of texts, I chart the development and sedimentation of Anglo-
American preservationist attitudes. The first collection of texts is a set of documents written 
by white adventurers and researchers who encountered Mesa Verde, an exemplary 
Southwestern antiquity, and introduced it to the rest of the English-speaking world. The 
second collection of texts is comprised of the works of three influential preservation 
advocates, who began their work on behalf of Southwestern antiquities at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Some of these rhetors’ valuations of the past filtered into the first set of 
preservation policies passed by Congress, and helped form the precedent for contemporary 
preservation practices. Several of the federal preservation policies that I assess stemmed from 
concern over the Southwest, in particular, but affect the country at large. I examine policies 
from roughly a century of federal intervention on behalf of Southwestern antiquities, 
beginning with the institution of Casa Grande Ruins National Monument in 1892, and ending 
with Obama’s designation of Bears Ears National Monument. I also assess general policies 
such as the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 
1979. These texts reflect the people and policies that have urged the rest of the Anglo-
American public that it is in their interest to save ancient indigenous places.  
While it seems hyperbolic to suggest that people can save the past, preservation 
campaigns regularly described and describe the need to save objects or historic sites, and 
publics have rallied routinely to support these causes. Salvific descriptions of preservation 
work invite serious questions, however. Namely, from what, for what, and for whom should 
heritage places be saved? What about the past is worthy of saving, and to what ends? How 
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can the past ever really be saved? Furthermore, how is it that preservation advocates position 
themselves as protectors of the past, and what do they work to preserve, precisely, when they 
protect ancient places? In the specific context of Southwestern antiquities, what does it mean 
for white researchers and politicians to attempt to save the indigenous past? Can the past 
really belong to everyone?  
The manuscript that follows is an attempt to address these questions. As my analysis 
of early explorations, advocacy campaigns, and preservation policies will demonstrate, 
efforts to protect the past are linked invariably to the values and prerogatives of those who 
engage in research and preservation. While preservation advocacy, to date, has been effective 
at safeguarding the materials composing ancient indigenous heritage places, it also has 
perpetuated a number of Anglo-American cultural myths that have disadvantaged the people 
to whom these places most rightly belong. This, too, is a problem in preservation advocacy, 
to be raised throughout this dissertation. 
Significance 
In addition to analyzing the origins of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on 
behalf of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest, this project identifies 
parallels among the federal treatment of these public memory places, and broader attitudes 
towards indigeneity, environmental conservation, uses of public lands, the status of science, 
states’ rights, and national identity. Although it focuses on the American Southwest, it has a 
bearing on social issues writ large, on the nature of social movements involving both 
indigenous and non-indigenous social actors, and on the dynamics among rhetoric, 
enchantment, and myth. 
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Furthermore, this project will demonstrate how preservation efforts, in general, 
become politicized, how they influence and are influenced by memory institutions, and how 
they reveal the attachments of the people who work to safeguard parts of the past, while 
protecting their contemporary values and the visions of the future that they hold dear. In 
understanding better the investments that people can make in the materials of the past, we 
can begin to understand these rhetors’ often tacit attachments to ideal presents and futures, 
and to various forms of social engagement. In this way, perhaps we can understand better 
how to translate investments in things and fantasies into improved relationships amongst 
communities in the present. We also can examine the possibilities and limitations of invoking 
heritage places as a means of fostering coalitional politics, inspiring progressive change, and 
supporting improved material conditions for people living today.  
In terms of considering the significance of this project, this study will be of interest to 
those concerned with the interplay between reason and enchantment; modernity and myth; 
advocacy and self-advantage; poetics and politics; institutions and publics; and history and 
identity politics. This study contributes to the field of rhetoric by exploring the rhetorical 
potency of places of memory, which have experienced centuries of discursive uptake, helping 
to constitute a variety of publics. It also contributes to rhetoric by examining a particular 
form of social movement through advocacy campaigns and allyship. Conceptually, it 
contributes to the field by extending ongoing conversations about Kenneth Burke’s theory of 
dramatism, and by the development of the theme of rhetorical enchantment. Finally, this 
study hopes to offer the opportunity for reflexivity to all of the people who have ever found 
themselves enchanted by the past, without quite knowing why, nor how to verbalize that 
feeling appropriately. Heritage places signify many things to many people. It is necessary to 
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look through both their wonder and their intellectual worth, to see the political and ethical 
processes also at work.  
Prior to engaging in the rhetorical analysis of the adventurers, advocates, and 
policymakers who shaped the history and practice of preservation advocacy on behalf of 
ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest, more orientation is required. In the 
rest of this introductory chapter, then, I shall describe further the rationale for discussing 
Anglo-American preservation initiatives in the American Southwest, and I shall provide an 
overview of the federal government’s role in stewarding ancient indigenous places in the 
United States. I will comment more extensively on the general research design, and I will 
describe the theoretical emphasis and contribution of this work. Finally, I will outline the 
manuscript’s chapters, before reprising the project’s main themes and contributions.  
Ancient Indigenous Heritage and the American Southwest 
This project’s focus on the American Southwest has everything to do with the deep 
human history of the region. The Southwest, defined here as the area encompassing Arizona, 
New Mexico, southern Colorado, and southern Utah, has hosted human cultures for 
thousands of years.6 Between 800 CE and 1250 CE, there was a marked period of prosperity 
and growth in the area, signaled by the construction of large sandstone homes and public 
structures, as well as the emergence or transformation of several ceramic traditions and food 
ways. Today, we call the people who built these Great Houses of the Southwest the Ancestral 
Puebloan people, though this term elides the significant diversity of cultural practices evident 
                                                 
6 Boundaries of the Southwest suggested by David J. Weber and William DeBuys, First 
Impressions: A Reader’s Journey to Iconic Places of the American Southwest (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2017), 3. 
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throughout the region during this epoch. The contemporary Pueblo people share this diversity 
of identity with their ancestors, and they likely share some of their ancestors with a number 
of other affiliated Native nations still living in the Southwest, such as the Navajo nation.7 
Though the arid desert landscape of the Southwest strikes contemporary visitors as 
inhospitable, the Ancestral Puebloan people understood it and how to negotiate a livelihood 
in it, relying on rainy seasons, trade, and agriculture to build their communities. Researchers 
today tend to conclude that the overexploitation of the land over centuries may have rendered 
the northern territory less desirable over time, contributing, along with other factors, to the 
ultimate southerly migration of most of the population by the year 1300 CE.8 Some of those 
who moved south helped to found the Pueblos of Arizona and New Mexico, which remain 
vibrant communities today, though much changed from their original establishment. 
Ancestral Puebloan architects were skillful, and deserts are among the best climates 
for the preservation of material remains, including the mortar holding the sandstone 
structures of the Southwest together. For that reason, the Four Corners region of the United 
States still hosts many “iconic and conspicuous places,” set against the dramatic backdrops of 
mountains and plains.9 The current names of these places tend to exhibit the mélange of 
cultures who have interacted with them over the years, reflecting a mix of indigenous, 
Spanish, French, and English words, erroneous theories as to the origins of the places, as well 
as the surnames of predominantly white researchers and explorers who brought fame to the 
                                                 
7 Gregson Schachner, “Ancestral Pueblo Archaeology: The Value of Synthesis,” Journal of 
Archaeological Research 23, no. 1 (2015): 49–113, doi:10.1007/s10814-014-9078-4. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Weber and DeBuys, First Impressions: A Reader’s Journey to Iconic Places of the 
American Southwest, 3. 
12 
 
Southwest. Two ancient places in the Southwest have been particularly focal to this study: 
Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, which I shall describe in further detail. These are joined by 
other places key to the story of preservation advocacy in the Southwest, such as the Pecos 
Pueblo, Casa Grande, Canyon de Chelly, Montezuma Castle, Gila Cliff Dwellings, and 
Tonto. All of these sites, and others like them, came within the purview of white adventurers, 
researchers, advocates, and policymakers beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, and their 
fates have been tied together by regional socioenvironmental issues, as well as shared federal 
management practices. 
In addition to representing a variety of significant indigenous cultural traditions, the 
sandstone structures of the American Southwest posed a problem for public memory when 
they were encountered by Anglo-American parties migrating west in the nineteenth century. 
As these settlers journeyed inland, they encountered undeniable proof of the deep history of 
North America. The American Southwest, an unusually picturesque example of this deep 
history, served as a pronounced source of fascination for settlers. As one journalist wrote, 
that region of the country possessed “not merely traces but very well preserved ruins of the 
dwellings of a people who lived so long ago that not history or tradition, or even legend . . . 
kept even so much as the shadow of their memory. They were and are not, is all we know.”10 
Such was the prevailing sentiment among members of the Anglo-American public, who 
struggled to incorporate this new history into their national identity. It was not, and is not, the 
sentiment among the descendant peoples—but their stories were eclipsed, for the Anglo-
                                                 
10“The Cave Dwellers on the Cliffs of the Mancos Canon,” Colorado Springs Gazette, June 
23, 1877. 
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American public, by the astonishment of those who were encountering Southwestern 
antiquities for the very first time. 
The purported mystery shrouding Southwestern antiquities did not remain for long. In 
response to curiosity about newly-encountered ancient structures, a fleet of ethnologists and 
archaeologists deployed to seek new knowledge about America’s indigenous pasts. Not only 
did these early researchers bring American antiquities to public attention, but they often used 
their findings to advance racialized theories about American Indian contemporaries. In doing 
so, these researchers contributed directly to new national narratives, adapting the history of 
the land to suit its changing borders, occupants, and political climate, while maintaining their 
own place of prominence.  These early studies of Southwestern antiquities were influential in 
their day, and have had a lasting impact on research ethics, public policy, and indigenous 
rights.   
As already noted, this project begins its analysis by probing how that early cadre of 
white explorers conveyed their findings about a place called Mesa Verde to the rest of the 
Anglo-American public. These social actors failed to become preservation advocates in the 
sense that we might understand the term today. Even so, they described the value of this 
ancient place to their readership, while promoting their professional identities and the 
perceived mystique of the site. I selected historical descriptions of Mesa Verde for the second 
chapter’s analysis because Mesa Verde stands out as an unusually beautiful and well-
preserved site. The language used to describe and promote Mesa Verde was so exaggerated 
that this discourse called out for study, though more modest versions of the same linguistic 
tendencies reverberated throughout historical writings about Southwestern antiquities. 
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Mesa Verde is best known for its alcove dwellings, which I interpret as the primary 
reason for the heightened poetic engagement with the site. The alcove dwellings are 
extensive sandstone apartment complexes nestled into large, naturally-formed indentations—
visually similar to giant caves—along the sides of canyons. The first authors who wrote 
about these structures dubbed them cliff dwellings, and imagined them as castles, eagles’ 
eyries, and fortresses. These authors captivated the imaginations of other Anglo-Americans 
by showing pictures and replicas of these sites at events like the Philadelphia Centennial 
Exhibition of 1876.11 It was they who shrouded Mesa Verde in mystery, by grafting their 
preconceptions and wonder onto the site. For all that Mesa Verde is lovely and old, however, 
it was once home to at least hundreds of people, and quotidian in that respect. 
In antiquity, Mesa Verde was located towards the northeastern edge of the broad 
region occupied by Ancestral Puebloan people, and went through at least two “depopulation” 
periods, the second ending close to 1300 CE.12 The architects at Mesa Verde used the same 
building styles witnessed throughout the area, constructing modest domestic spaces as well 
as Great Houses of a few stories, with many agglutinated rooms. Among these Great House 
rooms were subterranean circular spaces that likely served multiple purposes, including 
hosting religious events, and perhaps serving as a recreational or community space. 
Interpreters of Mesa Verde typically call these circular rooms by the Hopi word kiva, though 
some eschew the term on the grounds that it is uncertain whether or not the rooms’ use by the 
Ancestral Puebloans was analogous to the current religious use of similar circular structures 
                                                 
11 Don D. Fowler, A Laboratory for Anthropology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 2000), 83. 
12 Schachner, “Ancestral Pueblo Archaeology: The Value of Synthesis,” 59. 
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among the Hopi people today. The term estufa sometimes stands in, instead, to indicate a 
more generic place of assembly, but not necessarily a religious space.13 
 The estufas all shared a variety of architectural features, including benches, storage 
surfaces, and hearths, and often looms were housed within them. Some speculate that foot 
drums made of stone and leather might have been present in the estufas and common 
courtyard areas. At Mesa Verde and at similar sites, researchers have recovered a wide 
variety of objects through excavation, including baskets, seashells, turquoise, and cotton. 
Many of these goods traveled great distances to appear in Mesa Verde, suggesting to 
archaeologists that they were extremely valuable to their owners.14 The ceramic decorations 
throughout the Ancestral Puebloan world included a distinctive black-on-white style, 
decorated with complex geometrical patterns. Petroglyphs and pictographs decorated many 
of the walls in and around neighborhoods. 
It is likely that, at some point, some commerce or migration occurred between Mesa 
Verde and another site highlighted here, Chaco Canyon, though the population size of each 
territory ebbed and flowed elliptically. Today, it is a two and a half hour car ride from Mesa 
Verde to Chaco Canyon. Many researchers and explorers in the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century also made the 135-mile trek between these two places, likely traveling along roads 
that the Chacoans built during their greatest period of cultural influence. Chaco Canyon was 
significantly more central to Ancestral Puebloan culture than Mesa Verde was, and 
                                                 
13 This information came from interviews with and public presentations made by NPS 
personnel of long tenure at both Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon. Both terms, kiva and estufa, 
appear throughout the literature on Ancestral Puebloan archaeology. I find the rationale 
behind the use of the term estufa compelling, and prefer to use this term when possible. 
14 Schachner, “Ancestral Pueblo Archaeology: The Value of Synthesis.” 
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archaeologists presume that it acted as something like a city hall or place of pilgrimage for 
those living throughout the region during the height of the Chaco phenomenon. Like Mesa 
Verde, Chaco Canyon continues to host remarkable structures. Chacoans built higher and 
broader than Mesa Verdeans, and there are few alcove dwellings in the Chaco area. Rather, 
the most famous sites at Chaco Canyon would have been visible for miles, coated in light-
colored plaster, imposing and bright on the desert landscape. In a testament to their good 
taste, the Chacoans imported chocolate (cacao, technically) from Mesoamerica.15  
One of the most influential preservation advocates of the twentieth century, Edgar 
Lee Hewett, dedicated the majority of his career in archaeology to understanding Chaco 
Canyon. Hewett pursued this research after conducting surveys of Mesa Verde, recording the 
vandalism committed on that site and others, completing a doctoral thesis in Geneva, and 
joining the antiquities bill alliance in Washington, DC, which led to the passage of the 
Antiquities Act of 1906. Like Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon has been involved in 
conversations about vandalism, preservation, and research for well over a century. Both of 
these sites are representative of the preservation history and challenges characteristic of the 
American Southwest, and hold a special place within the realm of archaeological research. 
Both are managed by the National Park Service, and also reflect the federal management of 
indigenous heritage places in the United States more generally. In fact, they represent the 
best of federal management of indigenous heritage places in the United States, and they are 
also a part of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s World 
Heritage List. 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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In spite of the high degree of protection offered to Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon, and 
other ancient places maintained on federal land, there remain problems in tending well to 
these sites. Mesa Verde routinely experiences wildfires, which are likely to intensify with 
ongoing climate change. One of the most photographed structures at Mesa Verde, Spruce 
Tree House, has been closed to tourists since 2015 due to the threat of rock fall—exacerbated 
by the traffic that tourism brought with it. A large portion of Chaco Canyon’s most famous 
structure, Pueblo Bonito, itself was crushed by a rock fall in 1941.16 Today, Chaco Canyon’s 
boundaries are adjacent to hydraulic fracturing, and advocates fear the contamination of the 
land, as well as quakes that might disturb the ancient structures. Graffiti and the theft of 
artifacts always have concerned those who care for Southwestern antiquities, and emerge 
routinely as further problems to the preservation of these sites. 
In addition to these physical impediments to the ongoing preservation of ancient 
indigenous places in the American Southwest, there are ideological challenges. Historically, 
entrepreneurs, land developers, and industry have opposed expansive preservation initiatives 
because of the loss of economic opportunity. Before the Antiquities Act of 1906, many 
individuals profited from pot-hunting and the sale of artifacts, activities that quickly became 
taboo. More recently, the protection of Bears Ears and Chaco Canyon has impeded uranium 
mining and hydraulic fracturing, respectively. Whereas pot-hunting has been criminalized, 
uranium mining has not, hinting at the malleable and classed values of antiquities when they 
appear to interfere with the livelihoods of those living in the present. Evidently, according to 
                                                 
16 Robert H. Lister and Florence C. Lister, Those Who Came Before, 2nd ed. (Albuquerque: 
The University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 128. The rock was called Threatening Rock for 
decades, and it lived up to its name.  
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current norms, one cannot profit from an antiquity, but one’s company can profit in spite of 
damage to it. 
Because ancient indigenous places so often lie in the path of environmentally-harmful 
business practices, they have fit fairly neatly into the rhetoric of environmental conservation, 
even becoming symbols of environmentalist movements, such as the ongoing anti-fracking 
campaigns near Chaco Canyon in New Mexico. Beginning in the 1970s, indigenous heritage 
places started to be taken as emblematic of the status of American Indian peoples, as well, 
thanks to the American Indian Movement and allied social movements. In the case of recent 
anti-fracking movements near Chaco Canyon, environmental justice and indigenous rights 
merged for the Navajo members of that coalition, who campaigned against the contamination 
of both indigenous heritage and indigenous bodies by the forces of industry.  
Whereas the federal government once regarded ancient indigenous places primarily 
for their aesthetic and scientific attributes, the government and the Anglo-American public 
increasingly recognize their status as identity markers, historic sites, and fora for cultural 
education among indigenous constituencies. Archaeologists retain positions of expertise in 
many decisions regarding the preservation and care of ancient indigenous places, but 
discourses pertaining to indigenous rights and the treatment of ancient indigenous places are 
showing a shift in attitudes among at least some of those who advocate on behalf of places 
like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon. 
It is at once strange and predictable that white social actors would have dominated the 
preservation and management of indigenous heritage places for so long, and that in many 
cases, they continue to do so. It is strange because heritage places bear most directly on the 
identities of the people whose narratives are represented by them. In the cases of Mesa Verde 
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and Chaco Canyon, the story told by the stones is that of the Ancestral Puebloans, whose 
descendants continue to relate to such places as a way of educating themselves and outsiders 
about their histories, and as a way of reaffirming their identities. Many social actors have a 
personal connection to Southwestern antiquities, but only among the affiliated Tribes and 
Pueblos is that connection also a matter of history, culture, and descent.  
Other stories are told at and about Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon, and other ancient 
indigenous places across the Southwestern landscape. These are the stories of Spanish monks 
and conquistadores who wondered at the strange buildings in the desert, and named them 
after places out of legend. These are the stories of ranchers losing cattle in a canyon, and 
stumbling upon ancient “palaces.” These are the stories of intrepid archaeologists, battling 
disbelief and the elements in order to contribute to knowledge. These are even the stories of 
the National Park Rangers who continue to live rough in order to conserve the nation’s 
patrimony. These stories, of the predominantly white social actors who have engaged with 
Ancestral Puebloan places over the centuries, have been shared more loudly and with more 
recognized authority than the ones that express being, identity, and deep history. These newer 
myths about Southwestern antiquities also have played a part in colonizing indigenous 
histories, and remain an insidious reminder of the normalization of colonization in this settler 
society. Indeed, some of these myths have incorporated ancient indigenous heritage within 
Anglo-American narratives of success, progress, or enlightenment—not as heritage, but as 
science. 
Settler societies, such as the Americas, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia, 
have complex heritage environments because of the history of colonialism each nation may 
be prompted to address within its representations of national identity. At contemporary 
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indigenous heritage places managed by federal governments, representations of indigeneity 
often place settler culture in relation to indigenous culture(s). For instance, New Zealand’s 
government established a new national museum to try to bring together Maori and Pakeha 
(non-Maori) perspectives, highlighting a number of historical tensions between Maori 
populations and the “largely white New Zealanders, the majority of whom [were] 
descendants of English, Welsh, Scots, and Irish settlers.”17 However, this well-intentioned 
effort to pay respect to multiple cultures and to address a history of systemic racism managed 
to decontextualize its representations of Maori history in such a way as to make the group 
seem timeless, and consequently, primitive. In place of problematic attempts to represent 
histories of colonialism, also it has been common for public representations of national 
identity in settler societies simply to gloss over the mistreatment of indigenous peoples as 
perpetrated by the settler communities who later occupied the land.18 Cultural appropriation 
of indigenous heritage as settler heritage also has been identified, for instance through 
remarks about the universal ownership of indigenous heritage places—that they “belong to 
everyone.”19  
                                                 
17 Charlotte J. Macdonald, “Two Peoples, One Museum,” in Contested Histories in Public 
Space: Memory, Race, and Nation, ed. Daniel J. Walkowitz and Lisa Maya Knauer (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 32. 
18 Miranda J. Brady, “Governmentality and the National Museum of the American Indian: 
Understanding the Indigenous Museum in a Settler Society,” Social Identities 14, no. 6 
(November 2008): 763–73, doi:10.1080/13504630802462885; James Clifford, “Four 
Northwest Coast Museums: Travel Reflections,” in Routes: Travel and Translation in the 
Late Twentieth Century (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), 138-39; Amy Lonetree, 
Decolonizing Museums: Representing Native America in National and Tribal Museums 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 
19 Julie Marcus, “The Journey Out to the Centre: The Cultural Appropriation of Ayers Rock,” 
in Race Matters: Indigenous Australians and “Our” Society, ed. Gillian Cowlishaw and 
Barry Morris (Canberra, ACT: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1997), 33. 
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 In the United States, ancient indigenous places invite reflection upon the fact that 
“we” white Anglo-Americans are new to this country. They should remind us of the history 
of colonization in this country, even if, due to their age, their inhabitants were spared from it. 
Ancient indigenous places should cause us to interrogate our own presence on the land, and 
our relationship to its first nations. Instead, it is often the case that archaeologists, advocates, 
and policymakers frame places like Mesa Verde or Chaco Canyon within appropriative 
discourses. These places are the “nation’s” history, and the “nation’s” heritage. We can learn 
so much about “all” of humanity by examining them. These are “our” sites. There is much to 
be lost, and much to be gained, by narratives like these, especially when so many 
preservation advocates were and are a part of the white majority. Temporal distance between 
the original construction of Southwestern antiquities, and their later incorporation into settler 
narratives about national patrimony, seems to make the universalizing interpretation of such 
places all the easier. Yet, it does not change the fact that such places remain indigenous 
history, and indigenous heritage, and that the settler government often controls these 
structures and manages them in ways that oppose the wishes of affiliated Tribes and Pueblos. 
Indeed, Anglo-American preservation advocates historically have fought for the federal 
government’s right to manage indigenous heritage. 
My analysis focuses on the white preservation advocates, adventurers, archaeologists, 
and policymakers who turned indigenous heritage places in the American Southwest into 
scientific artifacts and national patrimony. Note, however, that this is far from hagiography. 
It is time for these historical figures to be rendered strange, since so much of what they did in 
their lives was to render others Other. These social actors helped to colonize indigenous 
heritage through their actions and their rhetoric, while exerting a substantial influence on 
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public attitudes. At the same time, they largely secured the ongoing care of ancient 
indigenous places—to the extent that they understood what that care entailed. These figures 
did harm and good, and we are left with their legacy regardless of our opinion of them.  
Before scrutinizing the preservation advocacy of the adventurers, archaeologists, and 
policymakers whose works have left a lasting impression on the ancient indigenous places of 
the American Southwest, I offer an overview of some of their most significant actions, and 
their bearing on the institutional structure of federal heritage management in the United 
States, today.   
The Federal Management of Indigenous Heritage in the United States 
As the third and fourth chapters of this dissertation will discuss, one of the most 
significant outcomes of preservation advocacy at the turn of the twentieth century was the 
passage of the Antiquities Act of 1906. That bill enabled the president of the United States to 
establish new national monuments of the “smallest area compatible” with the proper care and 
management of objects of scientific interest.20 Southwestern antiquities fell into this category 
at the time, as they were the domain in which archaeologists studied humanity, civilization, 
and the deep past of the New World. The Antiquities Act also established as a crime the 
vandalism or unpermitted excavation of American antiquities, with fines or imprisonment 
listed as possible punishments for those who might diminish the value of any ancient or 
historic site housed on federal land. While the punitive aspect of the Antiquities Act has been 
replaced by the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979, the president’s 
                                                 
20 The Antiquities Act of 1906 (Pub.L. 59–209, 34 Stat. 225, 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303). 
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right to declare new national monuments under the auspices of the Antiquities Act persists to 
this day. 
Ten years after the passage of the Antiquities Act, Congress passed the Organic Act. 
The Organic Act established the National Park Service (NPS) in 1916, and helped streamline 
the method by which the federal government managed new national parks and monuments. 
Other preservation policies followed the Organic Act, resulting in things like the National 
Register of Historic Places, and more stringent protections for a wide variety of heritage 
places in the United States. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act (1979), the Native 
American Religious Freedom Act (1978) and the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (1990), increasingly embedded in the law the obligation for researchers, the 
NPS, and other federal agencies to consult with American Indian constituencies in 
management decisions at indigenous heritage places.21  
Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon are the two Southwestern antiquities that have 
garnered the most significant degree of federal protection, and their histories chart the 
development of federal heritage institutions at almost every key moment. Government 
expeditions identified both Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon during the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century, and members of those expeditions recognized both sites as unique immediately. 
Mesa Verde became a national park in 1906, according to a standalone park bill put forth for 
its protection and passed by Congress. Mesa Verde’s park designation followed years of 
deliberation over whether it would fall under state or federal control, foreshadowing many 
other debates that would take place in the context of Southwestern antiquities. A year later, in 
1907, Theodore Roosevelt established Chaco Canyon as a national monument through the 
                                                 
21 Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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authority of the Antiquities Act, joining several other Southwestern heritage places that he set 
aside during his presidency. These park and monument designations recognized Mesa Verde 
and Chaco Canyon as representative sites of the ancient American world, which held special 
interest for American archaeologists who were attempting to professionalize their field. Both 
sites had experienced graffiti and vandalism during the late nineteenth century, as tourism in 
the Southwest increased, and both earned government protection.  
Archaeological inquiry continued at Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon throughout the 
early twentieth century. During the Great Depression, both were work sites for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps. Excavations of the central structures in both districts tapered off by the 
mid-twentieth century. In 1966, both joined the National Register of Historic Places. In 1978, 
Mesa Verde joined UNESCO’s World Heritage List, as the first cultural heritage site in the 
United States to receive that designation. Two years later, Chaco Canyon was relisted as a 
national historical park, rather than a national monument. In 1987, it joined Mesa Verde on 
the World Heritage List, and its boundaries later expanded to include other ancient structures 
in the surrounding region. Both Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon are managed by the National 
Park Service (NPS), and have been managed by the NPS since its establishment in 1916. 
The NPS manages the 417 parks and monuments within the National Park System—
including Mesa Verde National Park and Chaco Culture National Historical Park.22 The NPS 
is a part of the United States Department of the Interior, and in addition to managing national 
parks and national monuments, it tends to a variety of other properties, as well as managing 
                                                 
22 National Park Service, “Frequently Asked Questions,” n.p., accessed February 22, 2018, 
https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/faqs.htm. The National Park Service oversees the management 
of many types of sites within the United States, including its parks, monuments, historic sites, 
scenic byways, and other natural environments. The NPS does not manage National Forests; 
that is the domain of the National Forest Service. 
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the National Register of Historic Places. The NPS also is responsible for administering 
United States nominations to UNESCO’s World Heritage List. The World Heritage List is a 
register of significant natural and cultural sites across the globe that have been judged by a 
World Heritage Committee to possess “Outstanding Universal Value.”23 Nomination to the 
list requires a lengthy dossier defending the importance of each entry, and maintenance of 
World Heritage Status requires host countries to demonstrate a high level of care for each 
place listed.24 
Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon have experienced the highest degree of protection 
possible for cultural heritage places in the United States and have earned nearly every 
prestigious designation it is possible for a heritage site to have. Often, these new accolades 
have come at the behest of a new generation of preservation advocates, left dissatisfied by 
their predecessors’ work. Preservation seems like a perennial battle, in spite of the legislative 
assurances that Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon are safe already. These places are not wholly 
protected from the elements, or tourists, or inquiry. Nor are they free from enchantment. 
In the next section, I will define the enchantments that affect Southwestern antiquities 
and their ongoing, ethical care, as I understand them by way of dramatism. Following that, I 
will review the literature in rhetorical studies that influenced this study, as well as the manner 
by which other rhetorical scholars have attempted to understand the political lives of ancient 
                                                 
23 UNESCO, Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention, (Paris: World Heritage Centre, 2017), https://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/, 
accessed May 17, 2018, phrase appears repeatedly throughout document.  
24 Marc Askew, “The Magic List of Global Status: UNESCO, World Heritage and the 
Agendas of States,” in Heritage and Globalisation, ed. Sophia Labadi and Colin Long (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 19–44. 
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places, before clarifying a number of terminological ambiguities that will appear in the 
upcoming chapters. 
Critical Concepts 
I rely on the theories of dramatism, developed by American literary critic and social 
theorist Kenneth Burke, in my analyses of the adventurers and archaeologists who introduced 
Mesa Verde to the English-speaking public, the Anglo-American preservation advocates who 
first attempted to safeguard Southwestern antiquities, and the legislation that resulted from 
that preservation advocacy. Specifically, dramatism informs my analysis by way of key 
concepts, including the technological psychosis, frames of rejection and acceptance and their 
accompanying poetic categories, and god terms. All of these concepts contribute to the 
notion of rhetorical enchantment, which I develop over the course of this dissertation. I 
identify rhetorical enchantment in the myths of preservation advocacy, and I clarify this 
concept further on in this chapter. 
In the second chapter, I claim that the technological psychosis coincided with a poetic 
psychosis when white adventurers and archaeologists in the nineteenth century described 
Mesa Verde to their readership. According to Burke, the technological psychosis is a 
mentality that is most visible in the language of scientific rationality, and which encourages 
the transposition of scientific valuations into interpretations of other social conditions.25 The 
poetic psychosis, a term that I develop, is a counterpart to the technological psychosis. Even 
                                                 
25 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 212; Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 
61, 304. 
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as the researchers who first published about Mesa Verde classified and regimented that 
ancient indigenous site, they expressed a fixation with the site through poetic language. 
In the third chapter, I discuss dramatistic frames of acceptance and rejection, and the 
poetic categories that accompany both. Burke proposed that social actors adopt narrative 
styles particular to their historical situations, and that such poetic categories serve as 
equipment that helps people make sense of the world, and their role within it. Burke claimed 
that the epic, the tragedy, and the comedy are frames of acceptance that prepare people 
rhetorically for conflict, resignation, and reflexivity, respectively.26 In each case, these poetic 
categories encourage people to accept predominant features of their historical situation. 
Frames of rejection, such as the plaint, point out deficiencies in the historical situation, while 
naturalizing aspects of the situation nonetheless.  
 All of the preservation advocates whose works I analyze in chapter three rejected 
vandalism and the mistreatment of American Indian peoples in the Southwestern United 
States using the poetic category of the plaint. At the same time, through the poetic categories 
of the epic, the tragedy, and the comedy, preservation advocates at the beginning of the 
twentieth century rhetorically accepted the intercultural conflicts that accompanied settler 
colonialism during that era, the subjugation of American Indian peoples to white Americans, 
and radical difference between white Americans and American Indian peoples.  
In the fourth chapter of the dissertation, I rely on the theory of the god term in order 
to understand the main rationalizations present in federal preservation policy affecting 
Southwestern antiquities in the United States. I conclude that Science is the god term of 
                                                 
26 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1961); Kenneth 
Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955). 
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preservation policy, presenting a valuation of Southwestern antiquities that is consistent with 
the modern roots of Southwestern archaeology and Anglo-American preservation advocacy 
on behalf of Southwestern antiquities. Although Science has been the term-of-terms of 
federal preservation policy for over a century, the myths that appear in preservation policy 
have changed over time. Scientific rationality, cultural evolutionary theory, and primitivism 
were early myths in preservation policy. In recent years, these have been replaced by 
veneration for the landscape, universal humanism, and the wonder of scientific discovery.  
The concepts of the technological psychosis, poetic categories as frames of 
acceptance or rejection, and god terms, differ from one another significantly. I understand 
them as a cohesive collection of analytical concepts because of their shared basis in 
dramatism, and because each has to do with the ways in which the rhetors whom I study in 
this dissertation expressed myths. Indeed, I understand myths as rhetorical enchantments that 
characterize Anglo-American engagement with ancient indigenous places. 
Rhetorical Enchantments 
Dramatism informs my rhetorical analysis of the early archaeology, first advocacy, 
and enduring legislation affecting Southwestern antiquities. It also forms the basis of a 
critical concept that I develop over the course of this dissertation, which is rhetorical 
enchantment. 
When one thinks of enchantment colloquially, thoughts of magic or spells come to 
mind. To be enchanted is to be fascinated, struck, or seduced. To think of rhetoric as an 
enchantment is to emphasize the incantatory aspect of enchantment, or to consider rhetoric as 
an invocation, prayer, charm, or spell. Obviously, one cannot use rhetoric to change lead into 
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gold. Yet, rhetoric can and does change our perception of the world around us. Rhetoric 
enchants by changing attitudes, moods, and plans.  
The rhetors whose works I study in this dissertation demonstrated that they had an 
enchanted view of the world, and also enchanted their audiences with their words. Their use 
of rhetoric turned old walls into romantic ruins, convinced politicians that knowledge of the 
past was a treasure, and transformed landscapes into monuments. The rhetors whose works I 
study also exhibited their own infatuation with the places and people of the American 
Southwest, often with reference to prominent cultural myths, and often by way of poetic 
language. This concept helps us to understand the charged language and cultural narratives 
that archaeologists, advocates, and policymakers used when discussing—and sometimes 
deriding—the places and people of the American Southwest.   
I define rhetorical enchantment as the communication of myth, primarily through 
poetic language. Together, myths and poetics constitute the primary signs of rhetorical 
enchantment. Note, however, that myths and poetics did not always appear simultaneously in 
the texts that I assessed. The rhetors in my study appealed to a number of cultural myths 
without calling upon powerful imagery, for the myths themselves predicated the illusion of 
detachment. For instance, the myth of scientific rationality was prominent throughout the 
texts I analyze in this dissertation, but seldom did researchers present their findings 
poetically, though they often embellished the scene of their field work and their self-
portrayals with elaborate imagery. In any case, I view even the most clinical expression of a 
cultural myth as evidence of a rhetor’s enchantment, their expression of a cultural myth also 
being an expression of conviction in that myth. After all, even so-called clinical language is 
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connotative. I examine further the relationship between rhetoric and enchantment, prior to 
expanding upon my understanding of rhetorical enchantment as consistent with dramatism. 
Most modern definitions of rhetoric agree on one point: rhetoric is communication 
that takes place in public, for publics, or with public consequences.27 This form of publicity 
assumes a broad audience of potential participants in a political matter, where shared 
discourse has potential consequences for the livelihood, well-being, or organization of the 
collective concerned. It is rhetoric’s potential to influence publics and worldviews that 
categorizes it as an enchantment, for it can work a kind of social transformation. It changes 
minds and defines the world, often in lasting ways.  
Rhetoric long has been considered an enchantment. Sophists such as Gorgias 
regarded it as a powerful lord, akin to medicine or magic in its ability to sway its auditors. 
Aristotle later categorized this use of rhetoric to sway people in a visceral way as pathos, the 
emotional state called for by the rhetorical act. According to Aristotle, storytelling with 
detailed, sensory imagery, alongside other modes of appeal, could influence pathos and move 
audiences to agree with a speaker’s claims.28 As this discussion will show, stories told 
rhetorically—in public, with bias, with consequence—both encourage and illustrate various 
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modes of enchantment.29 As I have found, the phenomenon of enchantment is more readily-
identified when rhetors use language to craft mythic imagery. 
In this dissertation, I view rhetoric as an enchantment in the sense that it can define 
the world meaningfully while proposing particular social relationships, values, and actions. 
Specifically, the social actors whose works I analyze here used rhetoric to interpret 
Southwestern antiquities on behalf of their peers. They decreed that the American Indian 
people of the past and the present lived a certain way, and were motivated by certain things. 
They suggested that Southwestern antiquities had value for living people, and they named 
what those values were. Due to the rhetors’ social standing and authority, as well as the 
densely-connotative language by which they described their understandings of Southwestern 
antiquities, their definitions had the power to persuade. Given some of the outcomes of 
Anglo-American preservation advocacy, including the passage of the Antiquities Act of 
1906, this rhetoric moved at least some of its audience to adopt a protective demeanor 
towards Southwestern antiquities. 
Kenneth Burke never emphasized enchantment in his development of dramatism, 
though he theorized rhetoric extensively, alongside its magical, mythical, mysterious, 
religious, and poetic properties, all of which I understand within the parameters of rhetorical 
enchantment. For instance, drawing in part from the ancient Greek tradition, Burke suggested 
that language itself is a kind of magic. Burke posited that the “magical decree is implicit in 
all language; for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled 
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out as such-and-such rather than as something other.”30 Rhetoric helps to constitute values, 
relationships, and plans of action, through the act of defining the world and framing it within 
the symbolic register. Dramatism also depicted rhetoric as a means of producing social 
hierarchies. Through the “magic” of normalizing class divisions, for example, Burke claimed 
that rhetoric introduced mystery into social relationships, sometimes even encouraging 
individuals to act against their own best interests.31 As Burke interpreted Karl Marx, ideology 
was enacted in part by the “magic” of language and its divisive qualities. 
Rhetoric is an enchantment not just because of the suasory and compelling nature of 
language, but because it is the public conduit for cultural myths. Burke discussed myth in 
multiple capacities over the course of his career,32 and considered myth “a word that 
ambiguously embraces both ‘religion’ and ‘poetry’ (along with certain discarded bits of 
‘science’ now usually called ‘magic’).”33 On the whole, Burke considered myths to be broad 
cultural frames of reference that contextualized, legitimated, and accounted for lived 
experiences.34 While he viewed them as related to ideology, he considered myths to represent 
                                                 
30 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 3rd ed. 
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“motivation beyond ideas,” likely to depend upon powerful imagery in order to hold sway.35 
Myths were evocations of social patterns, which in dramatism always were grounded in 
symbolic action and organized according to hierarchies, identification, and division.36 The 
concept of the myth informs my critical analysis to a great degree.  
Dramatism’s engagement with mystery and religion also contributes to my 
understanding of rhetorical enchantment. Burke understood mystery as a consequence of 
division, which he claimed was a persistent human experience, and illustrated by language—
any form of representation being a selection, and partial. Burke viewed social mystery and 
mystification as products of estrangement, whether from one another, from our natural 
environment, or from our modes of production.37 The researchers, advocates, and 
policymakers whose rhetoric I assess in this dissertation illustrated the social mysteries of 
their era in several ways. They acknowledged estrangement from American Indian peoples, 
and even obsessed over how to understand that difference according to their own cultural 
beliefs. At the same time, they enhanced the mystique of the Other, striving to demystify 
through the myth of scientific rationality as they re-mystified the Other according to poetic 
interpretations of indigenous lifeways and Southwestern antiquities. They fixated on their 
estrangement from the Other, and this demonstrated enchantments that held them in sway. 
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In addition to mystery, religion offered Burke a template for understanding the poetry 
and magic that he determined were intrinsic to language. Like the authors whose texts I 
examine in this dissertation, Burke problematically contemplated magical symbolism and 
religious symbolism as patterns of thought that accompanied pre-industrial social formations, 
alleging that science with its frequent dearth of poetry had come to supplant both. At the 
same time, however, Burke considered language both a form of magic and a form of prayer, 
perhaps two words for similar kinds of symbolic action, and present in every realm of 
discourse, including scientific language. Similar to the manner in which he considered 
language both magical and prayerful, Burke merged his discussions of poetry and religion. 
He viewed them both as “mediating devices” that helped to bridge conflicts “symbolically.”38  
As for poetics, Burke viewed poetic meaning and semantic meaning to be partial 
representations of one another, but not opposites.39 To Burke, poetics filled out meanings, 
whereas semantic descriptions simplified them. Both were on the same semiotic spectrum, 
distinguished, as I interpret it, by their relative emphases on connotation and denotation. 
Throughout his works, Burke found that connotative language and tropes performed 
specialized rhetorical functions. He assigned new semiotic characteristics to metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, 40 and viewed literature as “equipment for living.”41 A 
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dramatistic poetics is one that appreciates the social relationships, incipient actions, and 
magical perspectives that language evokes. Drawing from such an interpretation of poetics, 
as well as from Burke’s perspectives on cultural myths, I extend my discussion of rhetorical 
enchantment to address the other key perspectives on myth, modernity, and enchantment that 
inform my analysis.  
Myths, Modernity, and Enchantment 
I augment my understanding of myths and the enchantments of language with 
reference to scholars aside from Burke. For instance, Roland Barthes’ thoughts on myth also 
contribute to this analysis. Barthes stated that “myth is a type of speech” that follows a set of 
particular conditions.42 Myths are second-order semiotics: symbolic activities that adopt 
familiar signs and connote ideological positions and cultural values. Myths naturalize new 
social patterns, even as they mimic existing ones. Barthes viewed myths at work in 
supporting and producing a variety of cultural norms, ranging from courtship to French 
imperialism. Barthes proposed that myths hid nothing, but had the capacity to distort what 
they represented. Furthermore, myths were a form of “interpellant speech,” insidious in their 
reification of cultural norms because of their quick legibility by those who encountered 
them.43 
Whereas Barthes viewed advertisements, photographs, words, and any other 
collection of symbols as possible loci of myth, the myths I identify in this dissertation come 
primarily through narratives, found in newspaper coverage, professional publications, and 
                                                 
42 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Lavers (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1957), 217. 
43 Ibid., 235. 
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popular magazines, as well as in federal policies. Each of these tells at least one story that 
implies values, desired social relationships, and desired futures, while naturalizing its own 
ethics. In this dissertation, specific iterations of broader cultural myths garner attention. 
While they are not necessarily proof of the prevalence of cultural attitudes, certainly they are 
examples of some of the discursive trends often identified as features of modernity. I also 
consider them evidence of the beliefs of those who expressed them. 
Modernity, itself, has come to be understood as a mythic narrative, with numerous 
other myths, worldviews, and assumptions coming to rest under its mantle. Ironically, the 
“monumental narrative” of modernity—modernity’s most powerful myth—is the 
“disenchantment of the world: the progressive control of nature through scientific procedures 
of technology; and the inexorable demystification of enchantments through powerful 
techniques of reason.”44 Many have been enchanted by the modern myth of disenchantment, 
which seems natural until it is troubled by detail.45 The adventurers, archaeologists, and 
advocates in my analysis all used rhetoric in a way that suggested their own belief in 
disenchantment, whether viewed positively or negatively.  
Likely the most noteworthy articulation of the disenchantment myth came from Max 
Weber. In view of the increasing industrialization of the Western world that he witnessed in 
the late nineteenth century, Weber concluded that the modern world was losing its 
connection to mystery. Weber interpreted increasing reliance on bureaucracies, reason, and 
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ordering structures as inevitable components of modern life, and remarked that such 
rationalization would result in the “disenchantment of the world,” borrowing the phrase from 
Friedrich Schiller.46 Weber felt that only so-called traditional societies still were capable of 
magical thinking, whereas industrialized societies would lose the capacity for such. For 
industrialized societies, every mystery would become known, and ritual would fade away. As 
Sara R. Farris and others have noted, “Weber’s perspective on religions and politics was 
closely intertwined with an Orientalist, or Westocentric, Weltanschauung [world view].”47 
Weber’s narrative has been challenged by many, but the narrative that modernity inspired an 
increased regimentation of the world remains prevalent, even in theoretical claims that also 
acknowledge the “enchanting effects of disenchantment itself,” on which the myths of 
modernity rely.48 
Weber was confident that the rationalization of the industrialized world would 
proceed unfettered, and that it would result in widespread disenchantment: a demystification 
of social life. While Weber was ambivalent about the processes of rationalization, Weber’s 
inheritors have turned to the notion of re-enchantment to understand how rationalization has 
been or might be combatted. Such scholars claim that in a world where all things have been 
categorized, people compensate in various capacities, forming affective attachments to the 
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materials that remain available to them.49 Secular rituals spring up to take the place of lost 
spiritual attachments. At times, critics have found capitalism to profit from this impulse, as 
individuals pursue enchantment through consumer activities. In such interpretations, 
individuals displaced by modernity’s rationalization choose to consume or possess something 
that has been marketed as more, or magical, or unique.50 
The re-enchantment literature tacitly accepts that disenchantment happened. It accepts 
the myth of disenchantment. Among the challenges to the myth of disenchantment, however, 
are narratives stemming from postcolonial studies, new vitalism, science and technology 
studies, and religious studies. Representing one viewpoint from postcolonial studies, Saurabh 
Dube has claimed that the grand narrative of modernity, inclusive of its insistence upon the 
rationalization of the world, has served to divert attention from the “concatenations of 
distinct, coeval temporalities and overlapping, heterogeneous histories that variously straddle 
and scramble the hierarchies and oppositions of modernity.”51 As a monumental narrative—a 
myth—modernity has prioritized the global north while reifying social hierarchies, 
naturalizing colonialism, and empowering scientific rationality at the expense of other ways 
of interpreting the world. This narrative certainly has not eliminated other formulations of the 
world, however. 
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Modernity comes with its own enchantments, as well. Dube identifies “novel 
mythologies of nation and empire” among modernity’s enchantments, alongside “hierarchical 
oppositions between myth and history, emotion and reason, ritual and rationality, East and 
West, and tradition and modernity.”52 Dube refers to these oppositions as the antinomies of 
modernity, which helped contribute to a prevailing assumption of rupture between past and 
present, and which worked to support derogatory assumptions about peoples who did not fit 
well within the Eurocentric model of history. Since the Eurocentric “movement of history . . . 
was primarily projected as the passage of progress,” Others were written into that narrative as 
though they were misplaced in time, or deviant from the norm and therefore in need of 
correction.53   
In the American context, many archaeologists and ethnologists made it their life’s 
work to classify American Indian peoples within an evolutionary framework, inevitably 
presuming that indigenous people were more primitive than their Anglo-American 
contemporaries.54 They based these claims in essentialist interpretations of European cultural 
development, which constituted a trajectory of “singular progress” from the Stone Age to the 
Industrial Age. Doreen Massey identified discourses of linear progress as a “characteristic 
manoeuvre of modernity,” in which any social actors who participated in temporal 
trajectories that contradicted the Western European experience were considered remnants of 
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another time.55 This heightened portrayal of cultural and ethnic difference, framed as a 
failure of progress among indigenous peoples, is part of what enabled the myths of modernity 
to maintain such a foothold. 
Myths like cultural evolution were part of the discursive framework that claimed that 
modernity represented a rupture with the past. This idea of a rupture with the past and 
lifeways figuratively placed in the past (i.e., so-called primitive cultures), can be seen in the 
works of Max Weber and Kenneth Burke, and many other places. Even in theorizing myth, 
Jean-Luc Nancy supposed that myth was a form of primordial discourse that people in 
industrialized societies experienced as if interrupted, due to conditions of modernity. 
Supposedly modern people had lost touch with myth, bereft of something that people in less-
industrialized cultures still possessed.56 I diverge from Nancy’s definition of myth, here, in 
understanding myth as a much more mundane and pervasive sort of discourse. Myths are and 
always have been as common in industrialized society as they have been in other social 
formations. Myths are narrative scaffolding, familiar patterns for describing the world around 
us. Because of their familiarity, they are powerful rhetorical commonplaces. It can be easy to 
ignore the ramifications of mythic narratives because the general storytelling pattern is such 
a familiar one. As familiar narrative frameworks, myths easily eclipse the specificities of the 
real situations that they represent.  
In specificities, the grand claims of modernity can come undone. Dube observed this 
in theorizing the enchantments of modernity, and remarking upon how the experiences of 
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subaltern peoples resisted incorporation into universalizing myths about progress and 
Empire. Bruno Latour also has rejected the idea of a major rupture with the past, such as that 
which has taken on mythic proportions in some conceptualizations of modernity. Rather, 
Latour has urged that there have been only minor differences between collectives, whether 
judged across time or space. As a corrective to accepting rupture as part of the mythic 
complex of modernity, Latour suggests that we view problems, change, and social 
relationality in terms of networks. For example, in challenging drastic narratives about 
Western technological developments, Latour claims: “When we see them as networks, 
Western innovations remain recognizable and important, but they no longer suffice as the 
stuff of saga, a vast saga of radical rupture, fatal destiny, irreversible good or bad fortune.”57 
Taking a cue from Dube and Latour, it is my intention in this work to examine myths through 
their texture and specificity. I focus on the locality of the Southwest because of the particular 
sets of relationships among discourses, peoples, and things/places, and their incremental 
changes over time. I believe that by showing the myths present in this locality as myths, other 
attributes of these networked relationships will become apparent. The paradoxes within them 
also will become clear.  
Within the texts I analyze in this dissertation, the predominant myths have to do with 
science, nationalism, and different modes of humanism. Even within the scientific narratives 
shared by the archaeologists and ethnologists whose rhetoric I study, there are mythic 
structures that act as “culturetypes.” Michael Osborn defines a culturetype as a form of 
repetitive rhetorical presentation, including common terms or themes that, over time, attract 
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resonant meanings within a cultural context. Osborne offers other names for such 
culturetypes, including:  
(1) icons, a name that suggests the secular sacredness such symbols can acquire, the 
awe and reverence they can inspire when employed in the communicative commerce 
of a people; (2) God-and-devil terms, which suggests both the sacredness and the 
sense of dialectical order carried by such symbols; and (3) ideographs, which 
suggests that at least some of these terms express an underlying ideology in which 
they are grounded and which they constantly express and promote.58  
 
Osborne also refers to culturetypes as “icons of culture” that “express complex sets of values 
. . . sustain us as a group, as a people, and reinforce our sense of community.”59 According to 
Osborne, stereotypes, metaphors, and familiar cultural figures and forms all may function as 
culturetypes. Mythic narratives also have that capacity.   
Drawing from Osborn, I consider the myths present in the history of Anglo-American 
preservation advocacy as familiar narrative frameworks, iconic in their legibility. Examples 
of such resonant and structured narratives varied across the texts that I analyzed in this 
dissertation. For example, the social actors whom I study sometimes presented themselves as 
if they were on a quest for knowledge. The hero’s journey also appeared in preservation 
policies, marking the American people as though they were fated for greatness. Progress 
narratives abounded, particularly in terms of interpreting the Ancestral Puebloan people 
along the spectrum of cultural evolution, and with claims that the American Indian peoples 
who lived contemporaneously with the authors whose works I study were, somehow, less 
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civilized. Clashes of cultures and cultural unity were also among the myths advanced by the 
rhetors in this study. These are familiar narrative frameworks, filled in with the details of 
Southwestern antiquities. 
The specificities of their context undermined some of the myths these rhetors told. 
Most strikingly, the astonishment expressed by the rhetors in this dissertation repeatedly 
challenged the myth of scientific rationality. In this way, the rhetors whose works I analyze 
are similar to those analyzed by scholar of religious studies, Jason Josephson-Storm, in his 
own challenge to the disenchantment myth. In examining the works of several Enlightenment 
thinkers, who were credited with bringing on an age of reason, Josephson-Storm identifies 
magical thinking coexisting with scientific rationality. Josephson-Storm defines their 
coexistence as a kind of bimodal thinking, in which, under the guise of rationality, social 
actors (dis)enchanted the world. They acted under the auspices of reason, but managed to 
categorize their own enchantment, as well, through practices such as alchemy and by 
charting the history of magic.60  
At its outset, societal modernization produced myths that claimed that reason held 
sway. Yet, cultural modernity found people searching for new experiences, and rejecting the 
myth of order.61 In this sense, wonder is a feature of modernity just as much as the 
assumption of rationality is. Rationalization does not eliminate awe, which is a form of 
enchantment that has been theorized somewhat apart from myth. For instance, Jane Bennett 
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theorizes enchantment as a state of wonder and sensory stimulation, resulting in a transfixed 
“state of interactive fascination.”62 Bennett associates this phenomenal enchantment with a 
feeling of being “carried away,” outside of a specific time and place following a surprising 
encounter: 
Contained within this surprise state are (1) a pleasurable feeling of being charmed by 
the novel and as yet unprocessed encounter and (2) a more unheimlich (uncanny) 
feeling of being disrupted or torn out of one’s default sensory-psychic-intellectual 
disposition. The overall effect of enchantment is a mood of fullness, plenitude, or 
liveliness, a sense of having had one’s nerves or circulation or concentration powers 
tuned up or recharged—a shot in the arm, a fleeting return to childlike excitement 
about life.63  
 
This wonder-filled enchantment, as Bennett describes it, can come about in many forms, not 
all of which need to be aesthetically pleasing, and many of which are fairly mundane, secular 
events. Bennett considers enchantment a prerequisite for ethical comportment towards others 
and towards alterity. Without feeling, there can be no care.  
However, it would be a mistake to think that feeling is equivalent to care, or to ethical 
comportment. The problem with enchantment, as identified by those who link it to fetishism, 
is that it can result in desire as well as affection. Objects of desire are always at risk. While 
Bennett remarks upon the risks of enchantment—namely, the desire to consume or possess 
the object of fascination—others who use similar reasoning to support humanitarian ethics in 
heritage contexts fail to comment on the appropriative potential of strong affective response. 
For example, Alison Landsberg and Jay Winter overstate the emotional impact of heritage 
sites in their treatments of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and World War I memorials, 
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respectively, indicating that such memory places produce empathy and heal grief.64 While 
memory places may transfix their audiences and give them a sense of ritualistic liminality,65 
such feelings of separation or emotional force may not necessarily bridge difference or 
console ruptured communities. Yet, according to Bennett, feeling something akin to wonder 
is a start in moving social narratives in more conscientious directions. At the very least, 
narratives positing that we live in an enchanted world strike Bennett as more optimistic than 
the assumption of disenchantment that has held sway. 
Contrary to the narrative advanced by Bennett, I do not find any particular 
relationship between expressions of affective enchantment (wonder) and ethical 
comportment towards the Other. Bennett self-consciously separates her project from those 
undertaken by postcolonial scholars. Yet, given the explicit context of settler colonialism in 
which my project takes place, the two schools of thought need to be blended, here. Poetic 
language suggests a state of wondrous enchantment. Enchantment with the Other can 
manifest as fetishism, primitivism, and Orientialism. Enchantment is not a certain path 
towards ethical comportment. 
Furthermore, it would be easy to treat rationalization and wonder as a binary pair, 
supported by disparate value systems. Yet, it is key to note that rationalization and affective 
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enchantment are intertwined. Bennett notes, for example, a number of scientific and secular 
sites in which a state of wonder can emerge. Phenomena such as the digital sublime, or the 
rush of scientific discovery, contradict any assumption that industrialized societies are devoid 
of enchanting potential, even in highly technical arenas. In light of this, I suggest that 
rationalization may be its own form of enchantment. One way of trying to tame the 
mysterious, or know the unknowable, is to study it and fit it within a paradigm that one does 
understand—within the paradigm of museum displays or tourism, for example, or within 
familiar cultural myths. When early archaeologists began digging through and cataloging the 
ancient places of the world, it was a way of being even more intimately entwined with the 
materials that spurred feelings of wonder in them. At times, these cataloging activities and 
others, such as tourism, have played out as a form of cultural consumption. As Bennett notes, 
this consumptive impulse is one of the primary risks of the mood of wonder.66 The feeling of 
enchantment that ancient places inspire can lead to the destruction or misappropriation of the 
very same sites because of the close relationship between enchantment and desire, and the 
regulating systems institutions make available for the classification and disciplining of the 
unknowable. 
Given that affective enchantment affects social actors as individuated subjects, and 
perhaps takes place at a remove from language, it may seem that the states of wonder 
identified by Bennett have a tenuous relationship to rhetoric. I argue that, just as language is 
a conduit for myth, so too can it express wonder. I identify wonder in utterances of poetic 
language. The interpretation of such densely-connotative language is subjective, as well. Yet, 
because many of the texts I study are research documents produced by archaeologists, or 
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legal documents, such as federal preservation policies, I entered this project with the 
expectation that such works would use relatively clinical language. At times, they do. At 
other times, they refer to things like ghosts, labyrinths, and spirit. Such surprisingly 
imaginative language demonstrates an enchanted demeanor towards whatever it is that the 
texts describe. For the explorers and scientists, this enchantment often had to do with 
knowledge. For one of the preservation advocates, this had to do with the perception of 
defeating the odds—an enchantment with the self, and the self’s heroism. In national 
preservation policies, symbolically-charged language usually has been reserved as an 
attribute of the American people. Though the enchantments differ from text to text, they can 
be identified consistently with reference to cultural myths and poetic language. 
Myths and wonder can both be part of everyday experiences. A risk comes in 
supposing that they are exceptional, or that they belong exclusively to non-industrialized 
societies, or to another era, or exclusively within the realm of the religious. While the 
archaeologists, adventurers, and advocates whose works I study described the ancient 
indigenous places that they saw within the framework of wonder, they often exoticized the 
people who had built those sites, or relegated their descendants to a place outside of time. 
They assumed that myths were a form of primitive religion, not acknowledging that the 
stories they were telling served the same social function as the older stories they heard from 
others. Enchantment appeared in these discourses in a fetishistic way, and emphasized 
difference as a spectacle.  
Not only does the magical thinking expressed through rhetorical enchantment help to 
explain the symbolic actions of the social actors within my study, but identifying that 
magical thinking helps to restore relativity to the historic record. The archaeologists and 
48 
 
ethnologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century caused great ideological harm 
in identifying myth and magical thinking only with the people whom they viewed as research 
subjects. There is a kind of harmony in identifying myth and magical thinking in those who 
failed to find it in themselves, yet who often denigrated those in whom they perceived such 
phenomena. 
Let it be said that the ancient places of the Southwest are enchanting. However, they 
need not be enchanting because they are treated as the stuff of legend, or because they seem 
exotic. They can be enchanting simply because they were built by people, and because they 
are beautiful. Through rhetorical enchantment, many people have come to consider 
Southwestern antiquities worthy of care. It is the kind of care that rhetorical enchantments 
induce that draws attention to the ethical and political implications of this study. I will 
discuss some of these implications in further detail in the upcoming description of chapters. 
Prior to doing so, I shall contextualize my project within the fields of rhetorical criticism, 
communication studies, public history, critical heritage studies, and archaeology, to highlight 
its interventions. 
Review of Literature 
My dissertation participates in ongoing conversations within the field of 
communication both conceptually and in terms of its topics of analysis. Conceptually, the 
influence of dramatistic theory on my dissertation extends a decades-long relationship 
between Kenneth Burke and rhetorical criticism. My dissertation also revisits mythic 
analysis, which has been a focus of rhetorical criticism periodically. After discussing the 
conceptual parallels between my dissertation and my field of study, I will outline a number of 
the works in rhetorical criticism that attend to similar topics. 
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Conceptual Connections 
Dramatism has left an indelible mark on the field of rhetorical criticism, and has 
inspired the field for well over half a century. Virginia Holland proposed “Burkeian 
Criticism” as a useful method for understanding rhetoric in 1953,67 a time during which 
Burke still was publishing new research and presented himself as a public intellectual. 
Rhetorical critics such as Marie Hochmuth, Jane Blankenship, Edward Murphy, and Marie 
Rosenwasser embraced Holland’s proposal and Burke’s literature increasingly as time went 
on.68 Since his introduction to rhetorical criticism, Burke’s influence has been celebrated and 
anthologized,69  and his wide array of concepts even has been organized into a concordance.70 
Dramatism has been linked to theoretical concerns such as the rhetoric of science,71 
embodiment,72 and postmodernity.73 Authors have found Burke helpful in understanding 
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such phenomena as social activism in Harlem during the 1920s and 1930s,74 religious 
fundamentalism,75 tourist landscapes,76 jazz and its social influence,77 scientific racism,78 and 
of course, speeches.79   
In my rhetorical analysis of the history of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on 
behalf of ancient indigenous places in the Southwestern United States, I refer to the 
dramatistic concepts of the technological psychosis, frames of rejection and acceptance and 
their poetic categories, and ultimate or god terms. Of the concepts that I draw from in my 
analysis, Burke’s frames of acceptance and rejection appear the most frequently within 
rhetorical criticism. Notable examples include Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki’s analysis of media 
coverage of Matthew Shepherd’s murder, in which the authors blended media frame analysis 
with Burke’s frames of rejection and acceptance to conclude that the tragic framing of the 
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event hindered meaningful political engagement.80 Whereas the tragic frame has appeared in 
multiple works of rhetorical criticism,81 most rhetorical critics who have engaged with 
Burke’s frames of acceptance or rejection have adopted either the burlesque frame or the 
comic frame as their primary theoretical apparatus. Burke viewed the burlesque as a 
hyperbolic frame of rejection, which mocked what it represented. Drawing from dramatism, 
rhetorical scholars have identified public ridicule as the burlesque in political events and 
popular culture.82 Most rhetorical critics who engage with the comic frame hold it up as a 
                                                 
80 Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki, “The Politics of Negotiating Public Tragedy: Media Framing 
of the Matthew Shepard Murder,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5, no. 3 (2002): 483–505, 
doi:10.1353/rap.2002.0060. 
81 Edward C. Appel, “The Rhetoric of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: Comedy and Context in 
Tragic Collision,” Western Journal of Communication 61, no. 4 (1997): 376–402; Michael L. 
Butterworth, “The Passion of the Tebow: Sports Media and Heroic Language in the Tragic 
Frame,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 30, no. 1 (March 2013): 17–33, 
doi:10.1080/15295036.2012.701010; Ross Singer, “Framing of Elite Corruption and 
Rhetorical Containment of Reform in the Boeing-Air Force Tanker Controversy,” Southern 
Communication Journal 76, no. 2 (2011): 97–119, 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10417940903180167. 
82 Edward C. Appel, “Burlesque Drama as a Rhetorical Genre: The Hudibrastic Ridicule of 
William F. Buckley, Jr.,” Western Journal of Communication 60, no. 3 (1996): 269–84, 
doi:https://doi-org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1080/10570319609374547; Edward C. Appel, 
“Rush to Judgment: Burlesque, Tragedy, and Hierarchal Alchemy in the Rhetoric of 
America’s Foremost Political Talkshow Host,” Southern Communication Journal 68, no. 3 
(2003): 217–30, doi:https://doi-org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1080/10417940309373262; Beth 
E. Bonnstetter, “Mel Brooks Meets Kenneth Burke (and Mikhail Bakhtin): Comedy and 
Burlesque in Satiric Film,” Journal of Film and Video 63, no. 1 (2011): 18–31, 
doi:10.5406/jfilmvideo.63.1.0018.; Mark P. Moore, “‘The Quayle Quagmire’: Political 
Campaigns in the Poetic Form of Burlesque,” Western Journal of Communication 56, no. 2 
(1992): 108–24, doi:https://doi-org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1080/10570319209374406; 
Stephen Gencarella Olbrys, “Disciplining the Carnivalesque: Chris Farley’s Exotic Dance,” 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, no. 3 (2006): 240–59; Gary Steven Selby, 
“Scoffing at the Enemy: The Burlesque Frame in the Rhetoric of Ralph David Abernathy,” 
Southern Communication Journal 70, no. 2 (2005): 134–45, doi:https://doi-
org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/10.1080/10417940509373319. 
52 
 
nuanced form of political engagement, for Burke interpreted it as a humanizing mode of 
discourse. Sometimes, rhetorical critics who read texts through the comic frame discuss 
comedy, itself, as a form of political rhetoric.83 Its applications are much broader, but usually 
coincide with discussion of other frames also at work. I have been able to identify only one 
instance of rhetorical criticism that engages with the epic poetic category as a frame of 
acceptance. Its authors claim that it is an under-acknowledged category.84 
In reviewing Burke’s appearances within contemporary rhetorical criticism, I have 
observed that most critics who refer to him make use of the ambivalence of his theories, and 
often find several of his observations bundled within the same text. For instance, many of the 
aforementioned pieces of rhetorical criticism that referred to frames of acceptance or 
rejection found multiples frames operating at once within the same texts. In Chapter Three, I 
also identify multiple frames coexisting within the same historical situation, and the 
precedent that other rhetorical critics have set in comparing poetic categories supports my 
critical approach in that chapter. One other conceptual parallel appears between my 
dissertation and rhetorical criticism that adopts dramatism, and that has to do with magic, 
myths, and mystery. Burkean scholars regularly acknowledge the significance of myth and 
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mystery within Burke’s works.85 Of note, dramatism also makes an appearance in the 
majority of mythic criticism.  
Mythic criticism emphasizes both social psychology and the presence of ideology 
within specific iterations of myths. The two emphases overlap considerably within the 
literature,86 and authors drawing from both refer routinely to dramatism as a touchstone for 
their theories. Authors of psychological-mythic criticism typically cite the influence of Jung 
and Freud, as well as archetypal features of storytelling and the collective unconscious.87 
Those who are more explicitly concerned with the ways in which myths constitute political 
collectives tend to emphasize the ways in which myths relate to ideologies, instead.88 Burke 
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expressed interest in both types of thinking, and so his appearance in both modes of mythic 
criticism is unsurprising, as is the intermingling of psychological and ideological theory 
within mythic criticism.  
Among the best-known practitioners of mythic criticism are Janice Rushing and 
Thomas Frentz, who coauthored a series of analyses in this line of rhetorical scholarship.89 
Rushing and Frentz developed a style of rhetorical analysis that Bruce Gronbeck discusses as 
“criticism grounded in depth psychology.”90 Even so, they drew from dramatism in 
developing their mythic analyses. For instance, Rushing and Frentz referred to Burke’s 
“Definition of Man” while discussing “the god of modernism—the ‘rational, centered 
subject,’” whom they considered to be the “heroic ideal” of modernity.91 They identified 
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such a hero, though “rotten with perfection,”92 in science fiction films such as Blade Runner 
and The Terminator. Rushing and Frentz situated such heroes as myths and within frontier 
myths, while “interpreting . . . films as mythic signs of the American psyche.”93 Whereas 
Rushing and Frentz discussed “archetypes” in their analyses,94 emphasizing character 
transformations within epic frontier stories, I refer to myths in a more general way. Instead of 
theorizing a relationship among myths, psychology, and archetypes (as Rushing and Frentz 
did), I interpret myths as densely-connotative narratives with ideological components. To be 
sure, the narratives in my dissertation often referred both to the American frontier and to the 
modern hero. My analysis focuses more on the ideologies that underpin such mythic rhetoric, 
rather than on recurrent narrative forms, per se.  
Dramatism provides a substantial basis for understanding myth in relation to 
ideology. Of course, given that ideology pertains to collective consciousness, ideological-
mythic criticism has psychological dimensions. As an example of what I term ideological-
mythic criticism, Michael McGee considered dramatism, myth, and ideology together in his 
conceptualization of the myth of “the people” as a rhetorical commonplace. McGee posited 
that, though “the people” to whom speakers refer may never exist in fact, the rhetorical 
appeal to an idealized collective nevertheless serves a normative function, and also 
demonstrates or models collective values. McGee interpreted myths as partial expressions of 
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collective consciousness.95 In this dissertation, I also consider myths to be expressions of 
collective ideals. 
Drawing from dramatism and a number of other theoretical influences, Balthrop also 
developed the relationships among culture, ideology, and myth. Balthrop claimed that “myth 
provides the cultural image of perfection,” but that the image provides only “an abstract 
vision” that guides cultural activity.96 For Balthrop, myths are “ultimate patterns for 
attributing significance to human experience, are moralistic and provide guides for action.”97 
There are always disconnects between ideals and practice, however, and this circumstance 
necessitates a symbolic bridge between the two. Balthrop identified ideology as that “bridge 
between specific events and the cultural myth that seeks to establish order.”98 Ideology steps 
in to justify a cultural ideal, or a dominating myth. At the same time, it “offers an explanation 
for a culture’s illnesses, or strains, and provides the means by which a cure may be 
effected.”99 Balthrop’s concepts clarify a number of ambiguities that dramatism inherited 
from Burke, who stated that myth and ideology were “mutually exclusive.”100 For Burke, 
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ideology was akin to rhetoric, and emphasized ideas. Myth was akin to poetry, and 
emphasized images. Burke found myths to be pre-political, and separate from ideology; I 
disagree with both assessments. Balthrop’s own development of the concepts of myth and 
ideology helps to bridge the gap that dramatism presented. 
Dramatism has had a prevalent and lasting effect on mythic criticism. It is also 
beneficial to point out that myth has been a persistent feature of rhetorical criticism without 
full reliance on dramatism. Robert C. Rowland published a noteworthy article “On Mythic 
Criticism” in 1990, in which he cited Burke but looked to “anthropological research in order 
to explain the structure of mythic narratives,” and in which Rowland roundly critiqued 
mythic criticism.101 I can only imagine Rowland’s dismay at the way in which I have 
“stretched the definition of myth far beyond its traditional usage,” as developed by 
anthropologists studying “primitive and modern societies.”102 However, because my 
dissertation functions largely as a sustained critique of anthropological practice and its role in 
colonizing indigenous heritage, theorists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Bronislaw 
Malinowski seemed a poor fit with my analysis. I prefer works of mythic criticism such as 
Leroy G. Dorsey and Rachel M. Harlow’s analysis of Theodore Roosevelt’s texts, The 
Winning of the West.103 While those authors drew on a theoretical canon quite apart from 
Burke and from famous anthropologists, they nevertheless relied on myth in order to 
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interpret aggrandizing descriptions of the white American frontier experience, framed 
according to the narrative structure of the hero’s journey. 
Overall, my dissertation’s reliance on dramatism and theories of myth is consistent 
with a longstanding tradition within rhetorical criticism. I extend that tradition by developing 
the concept of rhetorical enchantment, and by applying that theory to the context of 
Southwestern antiquities and their history of Anglo-American preservation. While antiquities 
seldom have featured in rhetorical criticism, considerations of frontier myths have been part 
of rhetorical criticism for some time.104 Additionally, the rhetoric of science and indigenous 
rights have been ongoing concerns. 
Connections by Subject  
In terms of topics of rhetorical criticism, my dissertation connects most closely to 
research concerning the rhetoric of science and indigenous rights. Given its emphasis on 
places and their role in political life, it also relates to studies in material rhetoric and the 
rhetoric of space and place, in which two studies have examined ancient indigenous places, 
as well. While my research does not emphasize the contemporary interpretation of the 
ancient places in question, it takes seriously the premise that the places’ materiality has 
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influenced the discursive playing field, contributing directly to the enchantments experienced 
by and produced by the rhetors advocating for preservation. 
This project’s reference to the rhetoric of science comes from the close historical 
relationship between Anglo-American archaeologists and preservation advocacy. Most of the 
social actors whose rhetoric I study presented themselves as researchers, at least to some 
extent, and used academic authority to support their claims about the necessity of 
preservation. While archaeology typically has not come under the purview of rhetorical 
critics, archaeological research functions like other sciences that rhetorical critics have 
assessed. Like the hard sciences and other human sciences, archaeological research is vested 
with authority, and maintains a “privileged position” in interpretation and political 
influence.105  
Herbert Simons credits dramatism’s influence on rhetorical studies for expanding 
rhetoric’s purview to include the sciences.106 The main challenge for the rhetoric of science, 
traditionally, has been to demonstrate that the explication of scientific claims always has 
been rhetorical.107 Additionally, scholarship in the rhetoric of science has emphasized how 
scientists persuade other scientists about their claims, or how they might encourage one 
                                                 
105 Laurajane Smith, Archaeological Theory and the Politics of Cultural Heritage (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 9. Smith is not a rhetorical critic, but a critical heritage scholar and 
anthropological theorist. She has studied the scientific privilege of anthropology extensively. 
106 Herbert W. Simons, “Kenneth Burke and the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences,” in The 
Legacy of Kenneth Burke, eds. Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Media (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
107 Leah Ceccarelli, Shaping Science with Rhetoric: The Cases of Dobzhansky, Schrodinger, 
and Wilson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
60 
 
another to undertake new research agendas.108 Of key interest to my study, research in the 
rhetoric of science often has challenged the notion of scientific objectivity,109 which is among 
the most prevalent of the myths of modernity at play in this analysis.  
In a departure from many preceding works in the rhetoric of science, many of the 
texts in my study never were intended to persuade within the scientific community, but were 
designed for other audiences. While the rhetors whose texts I study certainly addressed 
themselves to audiences of peers, they also circulated their findings and values to the lay 
public, often making explicit attempts to influence public opinion and change policy. Just as 
archaeology blends attributes of the hard sciences and the humanities, so does archaeological 
rhetoric merge aspects of the technical and public spheres.110 
The rhetors in my dissertation often acted as academic authorities in one realm or 
another. Because they studied the deep history of the United States, the topics they studied 
inevitably concerned American Indian cultures, and archaeologists often transferred their 
hypotheses about past cultures to contemporary peoples. The conclusions that these rhetors 
drew had the potential to influence social relationships, biases, and Anglo-American 
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comportment towards indigenous peoples in the United States. I find that the archaeologists 
and ethnologists whom I study typically expressed either prejudicial or paternalistic attitudes 
towards their American Indian contemporaries, and did so backed by scientific authority. 
These were common attitudes for Anglo-American rhetors in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as rhetorical scholar Jason Edward Black has noted.111 My study 
augments an extensive body of literature that addresses representations of indigeneity and the 
American Indian experience, though it does so primarily by attending to historical Anglo-
American perspectives that influenced intercultural communication and the federal 
management of indigenous heritage.  
Most rhetorical studies that pertain to indigenous rights examine rhetoric produced by 
indigenous social actors. Rhetorical critics have studied the American Indian Movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s extensively,112 and have offered more recent analyses of American 
Indian social movement rhetoric, as well.113 For example, Catherine Helen Palczewski 
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examines Native opposition to Columbus Day celebrations in the 1990s, as well as Ward 
Churchill’s rhetorical interventions in that moment.114 Danielle Endres considers Native 
resistance to the siting of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in the early 2000s.115 Additional 
topics pertaining to indigenous rights, rather than Native rhetorics, include the problematic 
representations of indigenous people in Anglo-American discourses, as caricatured by 
mascot designs, distorted in documentary filmmaking, or fetishized in museum spaces.116  
Much of the literature that concerns Native rhetorics examines court cases in which 
American Indian social actors challenged federal infringements on Native sovereignty. 
Rhetorical critics invested in the decolonizing project also critique federal policies as 
colonizing instruments of the United States government.117 As an example, Jason Edward 
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Black’s analysis of the nineteenth-century American Indian removal policy and its Native 
resistance compares rhetoric produced by federal institutions with the decolonizing rhetorics 
of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.118  Black’s case study highlights 
Native resistance to the federal mistreatment of American Indian peoples during the same 
historical era that I study.  
A final parallel between my analysis and rhetorical criticism pertaining to indigenous 
rights comes in the link between myth and indigeneity that sometimes appears in rhetorical 
criticism. Randall A. Lake uses the concept of the myth to emphasize different reckonings of 
time, history, and temporality in Native rhetorics and Euro-American rhetorics. Lake 
concludes that rhetors of the American Indian Movement referred to a mythic time, whereas 
white social actors and United States federal institutions measured time in discrete historical 
units. While I agree with Lake’s observation of differential representations of time in many 
Native discourses as opposed to many Euro-American discourses, I find that his use of myth 
in this instance risks depicting American Indian social actors in some sort of primeval past.119 
As postcolonial theorists such as Partha Chatterjee note, we all live in the same “dense and 
heterogeneous time,” even if our portrayals of it differ from collective to collective.120 I have 
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no interest in portraying Native rhetorics as mythic, but rather, I critique the Anglo-American 
myths that portray indigeneity as mysterious. 
Using a much different tone, Greg Dickinson, Brian L. Ott, and Eric Aoki portray 
“national (his)tories” as myth in their analysis of the Buffalo Bill Museum in Cody, 
Wyoming.121 Considering myth as a form of “master narrative,” the authors examine Bill 
Cody’s persona, Buffalo Bill, as represented in the museum that honors him.122 The Buffalo 
Bill Museum relies on the myth of the American frontier in order to celebrate the Buffalo Bill 
figure, and in so doing depicts conflict between Native nations and white settlers in a 
carnivalesque manner. The authors critique the stereotypes that mythic portrayals of a 
historic situation encourage, in this case. In some ways, the issue of heritage relies on just the 
confluence of myth and history that Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki outline. Foundational 
narratives and representations of the past are intrinsic to heritage practices, and all contribute 
to contemporary understandings of collective identity. I discuss my dissertation’s connection 
to critical heritage studies, public history, and archaeology, next. 
Critical Heritage Studies, Public History, and Archaeology 
Because of its attention to heritage places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, my 
project aligns with a number of studies within the realm of critical heritage studies, public 
history, and archaeology. These fields have interrogated the production of heritage, the 
formation of national identities, and occupational cultures within the heritage industry, as 
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well as the deep history of the United States. They also often emphasize the policies that 
govern professional heritage management; this is a topic about which archaeological theorists 
and critical heritage theorists both publish extensively.  
Key texts in public history include Richard Handler and Eric Gable’s study of 
workers’ experiences in Colonial Williamsburg, in which the authors compare interviews 
with workers with their public performances in order to assess the extent of commercial 
infiltration at that historic site.123 In an ethnography of heritage practice in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, Cathy Stanton examines the institutional production of heritage from the 
insider role, and contrasts heritage practitioners’ goals against the public displays produced 
in Lowell.124 Writing about archaeological heritage management, specifically, Lisa Breglia 
examines World Heritage status in Mesoamerican archaeological sites; she emphasizes the 
role of international and federal regulations and their impacts on worker experiences.125 
Each of these studies illustrates the relationship between what Erving Goffman would 
call the backstage and frontstage institutional practice in heritage contexts, with an eye to the 
economic and legislative constraints that dictate heritage practice.126 My project intervenes in 
this conversation by attending to the preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities, 
and through the methodological practice of interviewing current heritage practitioners within 
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the NPS and non-profit organizations in the Southwest to gain a better understanding of the 
influence of policies on practice. The method of interviewing heritage practitioners about 
their resources derives from critical heritage studies and public history. Primarily, my 
dissertation questions how indigenous heritage became a scientific resource in the late 
nineteenth century, though the lasting implications of that transformation were addressed 
primarily in “backstage” conversations. I refer to remarks that my interview participants 
made periodically over the course of this dissertation, and at length in the dissertation’s 
conclusion. Their perspectives informed my analysis of contemporary attitudes toward 
antiquities, and serve as a counterpoint to the historical attitudes that are the focus of 
Chapters Two and Three. 
In addition to aligning with public history and critical heritage studies by discussing 
the preservation context with current practitioners and analyzing the policies concerning 
Southwestern antiquities, my dissertation has a bearing on archaeological research and ethics. 
Indeed, recent trends in archaeological and anthropological theory influenced a number of 
the decisions that I made when designing this project, and intersect with critical heritage 
studies, history, and public history.  
Archaeology, which we can understand here as the study of ancient human practices, 
has varied dramatically over the years. The rhetors whose works I study in Chapters Two and 
Three of this dissertation all practiced an early form of archaeology, and appealed to myths 
of scientific objectivity while perpetuating scientific racism and the fetishization of American 
Indian peoples. Their actions were consistent with those of a number of other Anglo-
American and European social actors all across the world, who used archaeology in order to 
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perpetuate a belief in cultural evolution—among other deleterious ideologies.127 Much of the 
evidence that these social actors used to support their harmful conclusions came from 
specious sources, and their intellectual inheritors have attempted to understand and correct 
their legacy for decades.  
Not long after the social actors from Chapters Two and Three ended their careers in 
archaeology and ethnology in the early 1900s, practitioners in the fields of anthropology and 
archaeology began to recognize serious problems with turn-of-the-twentieth century 
scholarship. Archaeology began to develop more properly into a field that prided itself on its 
attention to empirical research, devoting itself to measuring, categorizing, and classifying 
ancient materials meticulously—in a departure from the purported classificatory systems 
advanced by early archaeologists. There was a period after World War II during which a 
detached mode of technological rationality dominated the discipline; this trend in 
archaeology was dubbed processual archaeology, and was most popular during the 1950s and 
1960s.  
Following the cultural upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, archaeologists, like 
researchers in most other parts of the academy, began to interrogate the assumptions 
underlying their field. In the case of archaeology, a new post-processual trend led to extended 
questioning of the colonial past of archaeological practices, and undermined the field’s prior 
pretensions to scientific objectivity. While some archaeologists today continue to consider 
themselves processual archaeologists, deliberation over the most appropriate approaches to 
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archaeological research continues in all parts of the field.128 The field’s commitment to the 
technological rationality has been tempered by growing ethical concerns about the history 
and practice of archaeology. 
The post-processual effort to correct archaeology’s harmful legacies appears in both 
methodological and theoretical decisions that contemporary archaeologists make. For 
example, during my own training as an archaeologist, I participated in an archaeological field 
school that was designed to promote feminist archaeology. The field director employed 
members of the local Aymara community in southern Peru to work on the excavation, and 
she hired indigenous women preferentially. As it happened, all of the students in the field 
school during the two seasons that I spent working on Proyecto Cerro Mejía were women, as 
well. In addition to highlighting community engagement, the field director chose to study 
vernacular lifeways instead of elite ones, attempted to identify gendered labor in the 
archaeological record, and otherwise worked to democratize the record of the deep past.129 
Because I trained under a post-processual archaeologist, I became interested in the politics 
and ethics of archaeological practice. This interest eventually resulted in my decision to leave 
the field in order to examine the contemporary political lives of ancient places through 
rhetorical studies.  
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As elements of my own archaeological experiences have demonstrated, changes to 
the discipline of archaeology in the last fifty years have been consistent with the “reflexive 
turn” that the academy experienced, at large, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s.130 In addition 
to promoting some of the diversifying approaches to archaeological research that I have 
described, archaeologists have attempted to attend more carefully to the needs of the local 
communities alongside whom (and often about whom) they conduct their research.131 One 
manifestation of this ethic appears in the field’s increasing support for indigenous 
archaeology.  
George P. Nicholas notes that indigenous archaeology shares parallels with various 
post-processual or reflexive approaches to archaeological practice, though he observes that 
indigenous archaeology differs from other archaeological methods in key ways.132 For 
instance, while archaeological practitioners are increasingly diverse, and while indigenous 
participation in archaeological research is growing, there remain differences between the 
dominant Eurocentric or Western paradigm for conducting research and American Indian 
epistemologies.133 Nicholas argues that both paradigms deserve places of prominence within 
archaeological practice, and that indigenous archaeology should never be relegated to a sub-
disciplinary status. 
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 Archaeologists, historians, and anthropologists all have worked to identify and 
challenge the prejudicial norms that historical practices in those fields produced, and which 
contemporary practices in archaeology, historiography, and heritage management may 
perpetuate (whether intentionally or not). I join the “many non-Indigenous scholars” who 
aspire to make heritage discourses more “representative of . . . Indigenous peoples by 
challenging the power inequities and other issues that persist” in the realm of archaeological 
practice, and elsewhere.134 Sonya Atalay considers such challenges to the discipline of 
archaeology to be essential, stating:  
It is necessary that contemporary practitioners of the discipline [archaeology] not 
ignore the effect of past practices by placing the acts in a historical context that works 
to excuse them. Rather, archaeologists might take a more reflexive approach and 
contextualize the present situation by tracing archaeologists’ . . . current position of 
power to both colonization and the historical reality of the egregious acts that led to 
the collections held by museums, universities, and historical societies internationally. 
The colonial past is not distinct from today’s realities and practices, as the precedents 
that were set continue to define structures for heritage management practices and 
have powerful continuing implications for Indigenous peoples in North America and 
elsewhere precisely because they disrupted the self-determination and sovereignty of 
Indigenous populations with respect to their abilities to govern and practice their own 
traditional forms of cultural resource management.135 
Atalay considers a reflexive, critical, and historical approach to understanding archaeology 
and its colonial legacies vital in the effort to decolonize archaeological practices. My 
dissertation attempts to respond to much of what Atalay urges her archaeological peers to do, 
in its critiques of Western-centric discourses that privileged a mythic form of science, and in 
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its attention to the enduring consequences of that dominant discourse as it became embedded 
in law.  
In spite of archaeology’s efforts to increase indigenous perspectives and American 
Indian involvement in its practices, there is “conflict that exists between indigenous 
populations and archaeologists throughout the world.”136 This stems from the fact that 
“[r]epresentatives of indigenous populations often perceive archaeologists as people who dig 
up the cultural and human remains of minority populations out of an inherently racist 
attitude.”137 In spite of the tensions that remain between and among American Indian peoples 
and archaeologists who wish to excavate on ancestral indigenous lands, Joe Watson 
concludes that “American Indian groups and archaeologists share a desire to protect the 
cultural heritage (regardless of whose it is) from unnecessary or unwarranted destruction 
from all sources.”138 While the common desire to prevent unwarranted destruction of heritage 
materials forms an uneasy basis for coalitional politics, it is the basis that the advocates on 
behalf of Bears Ears had in common. It may also remain a core feature in preservation 
advocacy for the foreseeable future, given the intellectual and aesthetic attachments that non-
indigenous social actors harbor towards indigenous heritage places, and given the enduring 
authority of archaeologists in the federal management of indigenous heritage.  
In sum, my project owes an intellectual debt to archaeology, history, and critical 
heritage studies. It attends to historical texts outlining the introduction of Southwestern 
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antiquities within public discourses, and it problematizes the history of archaeology even as it 
draws inspiration from anthropological theory. Yet, my project differs from archaeology, 
history, and critical heritage studies in its emphasis on discourses. While all of these fields of 
research prioritize primary texts, for example, I analyze them for the sake of understanding 
the claims they make, and in order to identify lingering components of the narratives that 
they present as they appear within current practices. My rhetorical analysis attends to the 
stories and claims within the texts rather than constructing a historical narrative or attempting 
to correct archaeological practice. The rhetoric of place is another unique contribution of 
rhetorical studies, which influences my dissertation research. 
Rhetoric of Antiquities 
In addition to offering analytical tools that are uniquely suited to studying narratives, 
claims, and social movements, rhetoric offers some precedent for considering representations 
of indigeneity at ancient places in the United States. To my knowledge, there are just two 
studies that take on this challenge directly: Thomas Patin’s analysis of Chaco Culture 
National Historical Park (NHP), a place that appears periodically within my dissertation, and 
Casey Schmitt’s study of the effigy mounds throughout the Madison, Wisconsin area. 
Patin, an art historian who studies visual rhetoric, takes up Chaco Culture NHP in an 
examination of the poetics and politics of park design. In his analysis of Chaco Culture NHP, 
Patin observes that the road design, locations of parking lots, and positions of didactic signs 
in the park serve to structure the experience of the park in the style of museum displays. Patin 
suggests that the park conceals its museological paradigm by way of clever design features 
that mimic the natural and archaeological features of the park. For example, the on-site 
visitor center and entry signs to the park imitate the ancient masonry visible throughout the 
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ancient structures. Patin goes on to find that the park’s design encourages visitors to adopt a 
magisterial gaze over the ancient structures visible at Chaco Canyon. According to Patin, this 
magisterial gaze naturalizes dominion over nature and over indigenous culture, and produces 
Chaco Canyon as a seamless feature of American heritage. Finally, Patin discusses the 
manner in which the ancient walls of Chaco Canyon are kept in a liminal state between repair 
and “ruin,” producing a present absence that is made to appear inevitable.139 Patin concludes 
that Chaco Canyon serves to commemorate and normalize the absence of Chacoan culture. 
By making the absence of contemporary Chacoans appear inevitable, the park styles 
European American presence in the region as inevitable, too.   
Patin’s observations about the gaze cultivated through archaeological tourism are 
astute, insofar as the museological paradigm certainly structures the placement of observation 
points and signs. Visitors are meant to look, and visitors are meant to look in a somewhat 
orderly fashion. Patin draws his assumptions about the magisterial gaze from Albert Boime 
and Timothy Mitchell, and Patin pairs the magisterial gaze with a discussion of Benedict 
Anderson’s institutions of imperialism (the map, the museum, and the census).140 Patin 
claims that the park directs visitors’ perspectives towards domination of Pueblo Bonito, one 
of the park’s central structures, while erasing its absent Chacoan architects. Moreover, Patin 
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claims that the park masks the ways in which it directs visitors’ gazes, which makes its 
association with domination concerning. Unfortunately, Patin does little to explore the 
magisterial gaze’s counterpart: the reverential gaze, in which materials are looked upon as 
sacred. This decision on Patin’s part seems to contradict the central role of commemoration 
in other parts of Patin’s analysis. 
Another surprising feature of Patin’s interpretation of Pueblo Bonito comes in his 
fixation on the absent Chacoans, and the presumed rhetorical effect of what Patin views as a 
key feature of a site visit. Patin takes the NPS to task for failing to present a single cause for 
the supposedly missing Chacoans. Patin fails to entertain the idea that Chacoan diaspora is 
overdetermined, and he blames the Park Service for being evasive about the missing 
Chacoans. Based on the archaeological data available at this time, I find Patin’s consternation 
about the park’s ambiguous descriptions of Chacoan diaspora to be overwrought. People 
once lived and worked in Chaco Canyon. For various reasons, likely having to do with 
cultural shifts and resource availability, people moved away from Chaco Canyon. Their 
descendants still live in the Southwest and retain a relationship with the site today. For these 
members of the Chacoan culture’s descendant populations, the site is not at all the “ruin” that 
Patin calls it. It is a remarkable place that is continuing on a long journey. Chaco Canyon is 
not abandoned; it is in a different phase of its life. To call Chaco Canyon a ruin, or to suggest 
that its culture disappeared completely, disregards contemporary Puebloan interpretations of 
ancient landscape features, as expressed by members of Chaco’s descendant populations and 
acknowledged throughout the park.141 
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My position as a former archaeologist, and as a fellow observer of Chaco Culture 
NHP’s interpretive materials, is that the NPS does a fair job of representing an unclear set of 
findings. The NPS resists the temptation to oversimplify Chaco Canyon’s history for the sake 
of rendering a decisive narrative to visitors. Interpreters work with what they have. The 
representations at Chaco are partial, but they are hardly manipulative. Yet, throughout his 
analysis, Patin implies that much of what visitors experience at Chaco Canyon is artificial, 
grafted onto the original site for the sake of supporting a nationalistic agenda. Patin 
insinuates that the ancient structures, artifacts, petroglyphs and pictographs, all have been 
staged or falsified for visitor consumption through maintenance or “stabilization” work 
undertaken by the Park Service.142 Patin also portrays the NPS in a negative light through its 
use of a natural rockfall as an observation deck overlooking Pueblo Bonito. He asserts that 
ascending this large rock, which fell onto the archaeological site in 1941, produces the 
magisterial gaze and does so wittingly. Yet, turning a disaster for the site into an opportunity 
for rare perspective may not come with the political implications that Patin presumes. The 
NPS did not cause the rock to fall; it reacted opportunistically after the fact. 
As for falsification through stabilization, it is true that the NPS incorporates masonry 
repairs and structural supports into the ancient structures at Chaco Canyon and throughout 
the Southwest regularly,143 leaving the site in a partially-toppled state. Patin accuses the NPS 
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of producing the dereliction of the site for the sake of Chaco Canyon’s visitors. Again, I find 
that the state of quasi-repair at the site is more a reaction than a ploy, on the part of the NPS. 
After entrepreneurs and researchers excavated the site aggressively at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the NPS lost the opportunity to conserve the original fabric of Chaco 
Canyon’s structures. Today, there are limited alternatives to the masonry repairs that the NPS 
funds. Falsified reconstructions would be unacceptable to scholars and the Park Service’s 
mandates, alike. Allowing the exposed elements of the site to deteriorate organically could be 
construed as negligent, and certainly would close parts of the park to visitors once walls 
started to fall. Reburying the sites would protect them, but likely would cause uproar from 
tourists, as well.144 While we could—and perhaps should—debate whether or not broad 
audiences today have the right to visit the site, it is clear that the NPS perceives only limited 
options given its mission to keep the site open to the public. 
While Patin acknowledges that different visitors will interact with Chaco Canyon in 
divergent ways, I am skeptical of his stance that a visit to Chaco Canyon acts, predominantly, 
as a discursively and visually produced instrument of the state. Patin underestimates visitors’ 
ability to absorb complex and enigmatic histories. Patin further underestimates the powerful 
affect of the ancient place he describes, and the place’s ability to produce reverence and awe 
in its visitors. Museological installations or not, Chaco Canyon is remarkable. The place 
exerts itself on any person standing within it, regardless of the degree of verifiable 
authenticity we may find, regardless of the position from which we look, and regardless of 
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the discourses pertaining to it. The discourses presented at and by the site may politicize it in 
some of the ways that Patin suggests, and my own analysis certainly demonstrates a variety 
of political uses of these ancient materials. However, none of the discourses would exist if it 
were not for the enduring aesthetic magnetism of the site. 
Places act on persons. Received places, such as the ancient places I discuss, also act 
on the organizations that present them, playing a role in determining what can and cannot be 
said, and how or whether the materials will persist into the future. While Patin did not 
embrace this position in his analysis of Chaco Culture NHP, it is prevalent in research done 
in the domain of material rhetoric. In referring to received places, I describe those structures 
or sites that have been repurposed to serve the ends of organizations in the present-day, but 
which may exist where they exist largely by chance and historical circumstance. The heritage 
places addressed in this study are examples of received materials that have been taken up in 
the museological paradigm, but which had a different primary function than public 
educational display. Rhetorical critics have analyzed other received places, like historic home 
museums145 and landscapes, such as national parks or abandoned battlefields or 
cemeteries.146 Otherwise, most projects in material rhetoric have attended to structures that 
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were made-new, built for the specific purpose of commemorating or displaying some part of 
a national or regional event. Critics attending to new memorials and museums also attend to 
such places’ abilities to inflect visitors’ movements and moods.147 
To date, only one ancient indigenous place has been assessed through the lens of 
material rhetoric, in Casey Schmitt’s comparison of the rhetorical framing of several effigy 
mounds still standing in and around Madison, Wisconsin.148 As Schmitt describes them, the 
effigy mounds are hand-packed earthen structures built in the shape of clan animals. They 
were constructed originally by Late Woodland peoples hundreds of years ago, and can be 
found in several public areas throughout the Midwest today. In his analysis, Schmitt 
compares the appearance of effigy mounds in multi-use parks, nature preserves, and urban 
environments. In each of these three types of framing environments, Schmitt attends to the 
material arrangement and invited sensations of each place, as well as the presence or absence 
of explanatory placards, and the content of those placards. Schmitt focuses on the portrayals 
of the mounds’ ancient architects, as well as discussions or occlusions of contemporary 
American Indian culture and history. Like Patin, Schmitt identifies the museological 
paradigm as the prevalent mode of display for Wisconsin’s effigy mounds. However, 
contrary to Patin’s observation that the museological paradigm produces the magisterial gaze 
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in site participants, Schmitt finds that the museological framing of the effigy mounds 
cultivates reverence and distance, instead.  
Schmitt recognizes that symbolic distancing may be a component of any interpretive 
activity, but writes with concern about the potential consequences of relegating American 
Indian history to the deep past, or placing American Indian cultural artifacts in seamless 
conjunction with environmental areas. Schmitt concludes that the effigy mounds’ rhetorical 
framing devices tend to produce alienation for those contemporary social actors who come 
upon them today. Failing that perception of distance, the mounds may pass without notice, 
entirely. After all, they resemble natural hills, unless seen from above. Schmitt concludes his 
analysis by advocating for a more reflexive layering of history to be displayed in the 
rhetorical framing of ancient places, in order to subvert alienation and neglect, which Schmitt 
finds as the dominant modes of engaging with such sites. Schmitt observes this reflexive 
layering of past and present playing out most successfully in a memorial park that abuts an 
effigy mound, as the site visitors in attendance (at funerals, for example) are likely to enter 
the space of the effigy mound in an appropriately contemplative mood. This is in contrast to 
site participants at public parks, for instance, who may prefer to romp over the effigy mounds 
on their way to a picnic, not realizing what they are stepping upon. 
Whereas Patin’s primary theoretical inspiration is the gaze, Schmitt’s primary 
theoretical inspiration is Foucauldian regimes of truth. For Schmitt, the casual distancing of 
American Indian pasts is a part of an oppressive regime of truth, which an intentional, 
reflexive layering of past and present might interrupt. Schmitt also develops the notion of the 
“found” monument, to describe places and materials interpreted by later groups who have no 
clear way of ascertaining the primary use of the site. Schmitt suggests that the concept of the 
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“found” monument is applicable to the Wisconsin effigy mounds, as well as sites like Machu 
Picchu and Stonehenge.149 The key for Schmitt’s “found” monuments is that they are 
interpreted by modern individuals, hence reflecting modern regimes of truth.150 The present, 
looking at the past, turns ancient places into monuments, whether appropriate to their original 
use or not. Just as this is true in the present, so was it true over a hundred years ago, in the era 
during which the rhetors in my study were most active. 
I concur with Patin and Schmitt that the in situ rhetorical framing of ancient places 
works in a fashion similar to museological displays. Visitors to ancient places are directed to 
look at some things, and not others. This way of looking has unclear consequences, based on 
the interaction between different visitors and the materials they behold. Past and present 
interface at the ancient places addressed in my study. As Schmitt and Patin indicate, this 
fusion of horizons has the potential for estrangement. However, as Schmitt asserts, ancient 
places hold the power to invite reflexive layering and heightened awareness of the time-depth 
of the place in which one stands. Whether the rhetorical framing devices in these ancient 
places include American Indian history in a sensitive way, or relegate indigenous groups to 
nature and the far past, it is also clear that ancient indigenous sites raise questions about 
American Indian presence, displacement, and relations with members of the settler 
populations who now visit them. As the above discussion demonstrates, my project takes part 
in an ongoing conversation in visual and material rhetoric, engaging the material-symbolic 
production of presence, absence, institutional control, and representational hierarchies, in 
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addition to describing the relationship between preservationist discourses and the ancient 
sites themselves. 
Whether considering contemporary interpretations of ancient places, or the history of 
Anglo-American advocacy on behalf of indigenous heritage sites, rhetoric makes a unique 
contribution. Rhetoric is concerned, primarily, with modes of public communication that 
have the potential to alter political or social conditions. In attending to a variety of material-
discursive claims, through myth, didactic signs, public interpretations, or preservation 
policies, we may see how rhetors attempt to define and change the world around them. 
Preservation advocacy is a clear target for rhetorical criticism, as it is a realm of deliberation 
and argumentation, where social actors attempt to convince others that a course of action is 
necessary and desirable—that it is within the public interest. How these rhetors have gone 
about convincing others of the values of ancient places demonstrates social mores and 
hierarchies. My project also historicizes rhetorical tendencies in the realm of preservation 
advocacy that persist to this day. Through the careful analysis of these discursive tendencies, 
we may identify new strategies for coalitonal efforts to decolonize indigenous heritage 
management in the United States. 
Because rhetoric emphasizes language to such a great extent, I shall take a brief 
opportunity to clarify some of my own linguistic choices, as they will appear throughout the 
text. Thereafter, I will describe the forthcoming chapters in greater detail. 
Terminological Clarifications 
Throughout the dissertation, I refer to the act of preservation advocacy. In interviews 
with NPS personnel and participants in a non-profit organization in the American Southwest, 
my informants problematized both terms. As one archaeologist commented, the term 
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“preservation” sounds like one is attempting to pickle a place, or put it in formaldehyde. It is 
an imperfect term, but a legible one. Whereas those who engage in masonry repair refer to a 
very particular set of technical activities when they describe archaeological preservation,151 I 
refer only to the basic attempt to keep ancient places from experiencing fresh harm, caused 
by humans. In the late nineteenth century, advocates construed this type of harm fairly 
narrowly as vandalism or pot-hunting, which they defined as the unpermitted removal of 
artifacts from a site without using proper scientific methods. Most preservation advocates 
continue to view these types of harm as extremely undesirable, but have expanded 
preservation advocacy to include environmental concerns, including anti-fracking campaigns 
or opposition to other forms of mineral mining. NPS personnel whom I interviewed were 
particularly outspoken about the deleterious effects of climate change on the resources under 
their care. Tourism at ancient places has caused well over a century of harm at those sites, 
but typically is low on the list of ills to defeat—though some archaeologists and some Tribal 
representatives alike would prefer to keep traffic at these heritage sites to a minimum. 
By preservation advocacy, I describe the act of speaking on behalf of the issue of 
preservation, attempting to persuade others that the ongoing ethical care of ancient places is 
in the public interest. NPS personnel and other contacts within the heritage industry have 
indicated to me that the term advocacy is off-putting due to its connotation with activism. 
Because of job precarity and sometimes-hostile political environments, these social actors 
preferred to avoid any possible connection with a form of activism that might be considered 
unprofessional. This is somewhat ironic, given that much of the job of NPS interpretive staff 
is to persuade visitors to treat places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon respectfully. They 
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are the most obvious advocates of the material site, in some sense. Personnel at the non-profit 
organization, Crow Canyon Archaeological Center, were free from some of these concerns 
because they are not federal employees; this organization embraces its advocacy role, even 
intervening in the Bears Ears controversy in 2016-2017. 
I have made the conscious decision to refer to places like Mesa Verde and Chaco 
Canyon primarily as indigenous heritage sites, ancient indigenous places, or Southwestern 
antiquities. I have chosen these terms in lieu of calling them archaeological sites, which 
might seem like the more straightforward nomenclature. However, archaeological expertise 
in matters of indigenous heritage in the United States has been privileged historically, and 
continues to hold a place of prominence in the law. To emphasize these places as 
archaeological sites seems to me to perpetuate one of the power imbalances that I seek to 
alter through my research. By recalling that these places are part of the living cultures of the 
American Indian peoples of the Southwestern United States, I hope to remind readers that 
they are heritage, not data. 
To refer to Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon as ancient may raise questions, as well. 
They were certainly in their primary use as housing or administrative structures until the 
thirteenth century. According to a Eurocentric reckoning of history, this period would equate 
to the middle ages. It is not antiquity in the Greek sense, where we might date things two and 
a half millennia before the present. So, referring to Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon as if they 
are ancient or antiquities is a choice based on precedent, and based on limited options. 
American antiquities always have included these centuries-old structures in the Southwest, 
once the Anglo-American public knew about them. Other ways of designating them as old 
and no longer in use might include calling them prehistoric or Pre-Columbian, but both of 
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these methods suffer from the same Eurocentrism I attempt to avoid in other choices—
though reference to European contact as a major historical event is sometimes unavoidable. 
Prehistory is a term based on whether or not cultures had a written language, and it is not 
particularly helpful in talking about actual time depth, since many cultures living 
contemporaneously will have different ways of sharing their histories, not all of which are 
written down. To call the sites Pre-Columbian also places America’s deep history in the 
European reckoning of time, though it is technically true that they ceased to hold their 
primary cultural functions by the time of European contact. Finally, a number of people who 
are among the descendant populations of the Ancestral Puebloans, as well as journalists and 
researchers, call places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon “ancestral places.” Because these 
are not my ancestral places, I have not adopted the term—though it seems to avoid a number 
of the terminological complications that I have pointed out.152 
I had a conversation with one of my informants, an American Indian woman working 
alongside the NPS, in which she expressed frustration with the terminologies that non-
American Indian people use to talk about places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon. She 
felt that any charged language encouraged Anglo-American visitors to treat the sites in 
peculiar ways. Examples of that language included, in particular, calling these places sacred 
sites—though she felt calling them ancient or special had the same kind of connotation. 
Examples of mistreatment included spreading cremated remains at the antiquities, or 
depositing new age crystals as votive offerings. This is to say that charged terminology might 
be part of the framework that leads social actors unaware of the broader cultural and 
historical contexts of these places to use them in spiritual or religious ways that run counter 
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to the wishes of descendant populations. This is rhetorical enchantment at work! Although I 
have retained use of the word ancient, I try to avoid calling Southwestern antiquities sacred 
in light of this informant’s concern about the mistranslation of sanctity into Anglo-American 
practices. On site, her input sparked quite a lively discussion about better terminologies, and 
those present deliberated at length without reaching a consensus. 
The careful reader already will have observed that I have chosen to capitalize the 
words “American Indian” and “Native,” as well as “Anglo-American.” Yet, I have chosen 
not to capitalize the words “indigenous” “descendant,” and “white.” The literature is divided 
on whether or not one should capitalize “indigenous,” and I have followed the example of 
indigenous archaeologist Joe Watkins and others in leaving it lower-case.153 Other resources 
concede that “[t]here is no official consensus on when to capitalize certain terms . . . it may 
not be necessary to capitalize when using the term as an adjective and not in direct reference 
to a population.”154 As another resource noted, “[c]apitalization is always tricky.”155 As both 
indigeneity and whiteness are fairly vague identity markers that occur globally, I have not 
capitalized them; I consider them adjectives that may not refer to a population. By contrast, 
whenever I refer more specifically to regional or ethnic identity, I adopt capitalization (i.e., 
“American Indian”).  
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Whenever possible, I have attempted to acknowledge the nationality of Native 
individuals. However, in the interest of protecting the identities of interview participants, it 
was not always possible to include this information; moreover, sometimes they did not 
volunteer their nationality, though they did identify explicitly as American Indian. In such 
scenarios (including the anecdote about whether or not to call sites “sacred”), I used the 
greatest degree of specificity that it seemed ethical to use. The historical record also failed 
regularly in providing the nationalities of the American Indian people to whom white authors 
referred, resulting in further generic terminology in the body of the dissertation. 
As other terminological ambiguities appear throughout the remainder of the text, I 
shall address them on an ad hoc basis. In general, however, the vocabulary that I have 
selected has been selected for the sake of foregrounding the role of Southwestern antiquities 
within American Indian cultures, to decrease the emphasis on archaeological and Eurocentric 
value systems prevalent in the historical record, and to opt for the clearest terms available 
while avoiding other connotative pitfalls.  
Chapter Descriptions 
In the chapters to follow, I examine rhetoric produced by explorers, archaeologists, 
and advocates, as well as the preservation policies that were the outcome of advocacy 
campaigns that began in the late nineteenth century. The second chapter takes up the 
documents produced by a variety of researchers and journalists who partook in early 
investigations of Southwestern antiquities, from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries. None of these authors identified as a preservation advocate, but all played a part in 
introducing Southwestern antiquities to the Anglo-American public. I focus, there, on texts 
that introduced Mesa Verde to the rest of the country. The third chapter is an examination of 
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rhetoric produced by the earliest and best-known preservation advocates who operated on 
behalf of Southwestern antiquities. This includes several works by three social actors, two of 
whom were researchers, and one of whom was the regent of the Colorado Cliff Dwellings 
Association, a women’s advocacy group. The fourth chapter examines preservation policies 
written over a hundred years of preservation advocacy, and many of which were the result of 
lobbying on the part of archaeologists. By concluding with preservation policies and how 
they have changed over time, the dissertation begins to address how attitudes apparent within 
the federal preservation of indigenous heritage have shifted, and how some have stayed the 
same. It also moves some of the findings from earlier chapters from the particular to the 
general, and from the past to the present. 
In more detail, the second chapter of this dissertation examines the introduction of 
Mesa Verde into public discourse, as it was written about by white scientists and explorers 
during the second half of the 19th century. These include two articles submitted in the 
Bulletin of the U.S. Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories by photographer 
William H. Jackson (1875) and geologist William H. Holmes (1876), as well as Crest of the 
Continent, written by Ernest Ingersoll (1885). All three of these men traveled with a 
government funded expedition known as the Hayden Survey, and refer intertextually to one 
another’s accounts of Mesa Verde when sharing its attributes with their readership. I also 
analyze Frederick Chapin’s The Land of the Cliff Dwellers (1892). Chapin was a well-known 
mountaineer and celebrated author, and he offered a more colloquial account of his 
experience at Mesa Verde. I round out this set of texts with the published record of the first 
methodical excavation of Mesa Verde by Swedish researcher Gustaf Nordenskiöld, translated 
into English as The Cliff Dwellers of the Mesa Verde (1893). 
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I have limited the scope of the conversation in chapter two to Mesa Verde because, as 
one archaeologist wrote, "a more weird sight” than Mesa Verde’s alcove dwellings was 
“hardly to be seen in traveling over the known world."156 The way that Mesa Verde first was 
situated in Anglo-American discourse is telling of the worldviews of the authors who shared 
its story with the outside world. I call these worldviews the technological and poetic 
psychoses, drawing from the dramatistic theory of the occupational psychosis. The 
technological psychosis appealed to the myth of scientific rationality, and was the 
professional or scholarly mode of engaging with Mesa Verde. The poetic psychosis appealed 
to a more literary impulse among the authors whose works I assess in chapter two. At the 
same time that the authors portrayed Mesa Verde as a scientific specimen, they also imagined 
it as a romantic ruin, and fantasized about the lives of the people who once lived there. The 
inter-imbrication of the technological and poetic psychoses demonstrates the irrational within 
the myth of the rational, or scientific irrationality. 
The third chapter of the dissertation continues to interrogate the enchantments of 
Anglo-American engagement with Southwestern antiquities by analyzing early preservation 
advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places. The first advocate whose publications I 
study is Adolph Bandelier, who was an early alarmist concerning the state of Southwestern 
antiquities. In 1881, Bandelier published a report that catalyzed many conversations in 
Congress about preserving antiquities, though ultimately those deliberations failed to result in 
a policy enactment. Today, Bandelier is considered by a number of historians of the 
Southwest to have been something of a pioneer in terms of preservation advocacy, 
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archaeology, and ethnology, though his legacy is tarnished because of racial prejudice 
apparent in some of his theoretical claims.157 I study two of Bandelier’s reports, which merge 
advocacy, archaeology, and ethnology. Another researcher, Edgar Lee Hewett, joins 
Bandelier in my analysis. Hewett was tasked in 1904 with surveying the extent of vandalism 
at Southwestern antiquities on behalf of the United States government. As I mentioned 
already, Hewett later became part of an antiquities bill alliance. The antiquities bill alliance 
drafted the Antiquities Act of 1906, and promoted the bill until its passage. Some of Hewett’s 
very words are still part of American preservation policy, and for this reason we may 
consider him among the most influential Anglo-American preservation advocates from these 
early days of advocacy.  
 Bandelier and Hewett represent the professional ethnological or archaeological 
perspectives on preservation advocacy at the turn of the twentieth century. Operating outside 
of the sciences or politics, per se, there were a number of clubs and organizations who took 
advocacy upon themselves during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Among 
these was the Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association, with chapters across the country. This 
organization’s primary focus was to turn Mesa Verde into either a state or national park. It 
was led by a socialite from the East Coast named Virginia (Donaghé) McClurg. McClurg is a 
paradoxical figure, for she began her engagement with Mesa Verde with rhetoric similar to 
the explorers and researchers in the second chapter. She portrayed herself to be on a hero’s 
journey, questing after objects rather than knowledge—though to many of the social actors I 
study, these were equivalent. Rather than feigning objectivity, however, McClurg 
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unabashedly pursued poetic engagement with the site, and won an award for a poem she 
wrote about the Southwest. Some years after publishing journalistic coverage of her own 
exploits at Mesa Verde, McClurg founded the Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association, and 
began to write and speak about her club’s efforts as if they were a continuation of her own 
hero’s journey. McClurg ultimately failed to persuade other club members or politicians to 
tend to Mesa Verde in the manner she proposed, but she stands out as an unusual and well-
remembered preservation advocate from this period in history because of her gender, her 
rhetorical methods, and her large personality. 
 Whereas McClurg used rhetoric to advance self-serving myths, such as her own quest 
for success, Bandelier and Hewett emphasized as myths several narratives about a greater 
good, concern over clashes of culture, and the motion of progress. Differing from all of the 
other rhetors under discussion, both Bandelier and Hewett adopted a paternalistic attitude 
towards the American Indian people whom they studied, and expressed these attitudes in 
relation to their extensive archaeological and ethnological research. Bandelier and Hewett 
also advocated for the preservation of both antiquities and people, in a manner that is 
unsettling for the contemporary reader. Bandelier claimed that American Indian peoples 
needed to be urged onto the path of progress towards European-styled civilization, whereas 
Hewett felt they needed to be protected from white people, even going so far as to suggest 
“human game preserves” to cloister indigenous people from Anglo-American society.158 
While these men supposed that they worked towards the betterment of society, they proposed 
a number of policies that would have amounted to social engineering, all motivated by myths 
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that appealed to American prosperity. 
 Together, the rhetorics expressed by Bandelier, Hewett, and McClurg demonstrated a 
variety of values for Southwestern antiquities, and they expressed those values according to 
the tenets of different poetic categories, as theorized by Burke. Bandelier adopted the tragic 
frame in describing the Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants, presenting himself as an 
all-knowing narrator resigned to a sad fate for the Other. McClurg favored the epic frame, in 
which she situated herself as a hero and described other concerns as somewhat incidental. 
Hewett typically adopted the comedy when describing Chaco Canyon and contemporary 
indigenous people. Hewett’s version of comedy traveled between critique and adulation, 
however. At the same time that he derided his archaeological peers for their poor 
professional practices, Hewett fetishized American Indian people. What drew all three of 
these social actors together as preservation advocates is that they all rejected vandalism and 
government racism, as they interpreted those phenomena, and included plaints against those 
trespasses within their works. 
Bandelier and Hewett echoed the sentiment of authors in the second chapter in 
attributing great scientific value to Southwestern antiquities, as well as the living American 
Indian peoples of the American Southwest. All of the preservation advocates valued 
Southwestern antiquities as uniquely American resources, and viewed their preservation in 
line with American patriotism and advancement. Bandelier and Hewett also felt that any 
knowledge of America’s indigenous peoples, whether in the past or the present, would serve 
to ameliorate social tensions resulting from living in a settler society, though they used 
different terminology to discuss it. These early discourses of preservation advocacy 
illustrated naturalized racism prevalent at the turn of the twentieth century, such that social 
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actors who understood themselves to be concerned with indigenous rights seldom questioned 
their own right to meddle in the affairs of others. Most significantly, the advocates’ emphasis 
on data and the character of the nation entered into preservation policy at the turn of the 
twentieth century, alongside the Anglo-American privilege evident in the advocates’ 
engagement with Southwestern antiquities.   
The fourth chapter builds on the second and third chapters by examining the influence 
of scientific rationality and the ethics of preservation advocacy as both have entered into 
federal preservation policies concerning Southwestern antiquities. I begin the analysis by 
assessing the language of federal preservation policies affecting all national heritage sites, 
after which I assess a collection of site-specific national monument and national park 
designations concerning the antiquities of the American Southwest. I divide the site-specific 
park and monument designations by historical period. I analyze all of these preservation 
policies according to their uses of poetic language in the service of cultural myths, and in the 
way that preservation policy as a whole appealed to the god term, Science.  
In Chapter Four, I assess the rhetoric of preservation policies such as the Antiquities 
Act (1906), the Organic Act (1916), the Historic Sites Act (1935), the National Historic 
Preservation Act (1966), the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act (1974), the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act (1979), and the Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act (1990). For the site-specific preservation policies in the American 
Southwest, I have divided the texts into two generations: those that were passed before 
World War II, and those that came after. In the first generation of site-specific monument 
designations, I examine the proclamation of Casa Grande Ruin (1892), the Mesa Verde 
National Park bill (1906), and the national monument designations for sites like Montezuma 
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Castle National Monument in (1906), Chaco Canyon (1907), Gila Cliff Dwellings (1907), 
and Tonto National Monument (1907). The second generation of site-specific monument 
designations includes Public Law 101-313, passed during George H.W. Bush’s 
administration, concerning Petroglyph National Monument, Pecos National Historical Park, 
and Zuni-Cibola National Historical Park (1990); Bill Clinton’s proclamations of Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument (1996) and Canyons of the Ancients National 
Monument (2000); and, finally, Barack Obama’s proclamation of Bears Ears National 
Monument (2016). 
While the national preservation policies, the first generation of park and monument 
designations, and the second generation of monument designations all deferred to the god 
term Science, these three categories of preservation policy inflected the god term 
differentially. In national preservation policies, Science appeared within a context of 
nationalistic myths and a patriotic poetics. In the first generation of park and monument 
designations specific to the American Southwest, myths of primitivism and a fetishistic 
poetics about the indigenous peoples of the region transformed Science into a science of 
indigeneity. In the most recent monument designations in the American Southwest, myths 
about scientific discovery, universal humanism, and the beauty of the American landscape 
transformed Science into an overtly enchanted phenomenon, with a poetry of its own. 
The fifth and final chapter revisits the major theoretical claims of the dissertation, 
concerning the rhetorical enchantments of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf 
of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest. As contexts for rhetoric, 
archaeology, advocacy, and policy fulfilled differing generic requirements. The social actors 
who introduced Mesa Verde to the Anglo-American public enchanted their audiences with 
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the beauty and supposed mystery of the site, speaking on behalf of their own research and its 
significance more than on behalf of the preservation of the place. The advocates also used 
language to persuade their readers and auditors that Southwestern antiquities were 
remarkable, and sometimes used poetic language to portray indigenous peoples as similarly 
exotic. Though they defended both antiquities and human rights for American Indian peoples 
(as they interpreted those rights), these rhetors contributed to myths of primitivism that were 
prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Because preservation policies typically 
have been more general, they have avoided some of the troubling rhetorical tendencies 
present in the scholarly accounts of Southwestern antiquities. Some of these policies have 
become argumentative commonplaces for preservation advocates still active in the 
Southwest, today. Because of its symbolic persistence, the rhetoric of turn-of-the-twentieth 
century preservation advocacy requires study. Its legacy is addressed in the final chapter, 
through an overview of the ongoing attempts to assure the preservation of Southwestern 
antiquities. I also discuss the major challenges for preservation advocacy as people practice it 
in the twenty-first century, looking to the lessons we can learn from the origins of 
preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places as guidance—both for what is 
effective in maintaining the material integrity of ancient places, and for what not to do in 
terms of fetishizing the Other or framing human histories as science. With reference to my 
interviews with heritage practitioners, as well as recent efforts to set aside Southwestern 
antiquities as protected federal property, I identify both tendencies still at work in 
contemporary Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous 
places. 
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Summary 
Archaeologists, advocates, and policymakers at the turn of the 20th century relied on 
cultural myths to make sense of a strange-to-them phenomenon, and exhibited cultural 
prejudice and enchantment as they attempted to persuade others that Southwestern antiquities 
required ongoing (Anglo-American) care. The manner by which researchers, advocates, and 
policymakers continue to justify their worldviews, their status, and their actions through their 
public valuations of ancient indigenous places has not changed much from the earliest 
Anglo-American rhetoric about ancient indigenous places. This reality illustrates much about 
politics and patriotism in a settler society, where indigenous heritage can become a vessel 
used by the state, memory institutions, political collectives, social groups, and individuals, 
towards different ends, benefitting different parties.  
In spite of what the rhetoric of preservation advocacy demonstrates, ancient places 
can be framed in ways that challenge elitist, commercialized, Eurocentric, and supposedly 
rationalized forms of relationality. Understanding the history of Anglo-American 
preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places in the United States helps to 
outline some of the potentialities and problematics of allyship on behalf of indigenous rights 
in a settler society. Privileged social actors can gain an outsized influence in political 
environments, and can be effective in changing attitudes, comportment, and policy. What 
they do with that privilege, and its legacy, is consequential. Southwestern antiquities 
continue to act as emblems in the lasting fight for indigenous rights, as well as in efforts to 
promote environmental conservation, social responsibility, and the status of science. Many 
values are attributed to ancient indigenous places, and the myths told about them demonstrate 
their current place in society, while reflecting upon the relationships among Native nations 
and the federal government. This effort to historicize ongoing discursive relationships is an 
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attempt to show some of the work that remains to be done in decolonizing indigenous 
heritage management in the United States. 
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public consciousness. I do so by examining texts produced by a collection of self-described 
explorers and archaeologists who published broadly about their first encounters with Mesa 
Verde: William Henry Jackson, William Henry Holmes, Ernest Ingersoll, Frederick Chapin, 
and Gustaf Nordenskiöld. History does not remember any of these five white men for acting 
as preservation advocates. Yet, all of them had an outsized influence in shaping the narratives 
pertaining to Mesa Verde, an exemplary Southwestern antiquity. Moreover, all of these 
authors played a central role in establishing a particular set of attitudes toward indigenous 
places of the Southwest, as well as the practice of archaeological research. Their publications 
on the topic of Mesa Verde were widely-read and well-regarded, and cast that ancient 
indigenous heritage place as a specimen for the use of researchers, and as a vessel for modern 
enchantments. 
The argument I build in this chapter is that Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld communicated within the technological psychosis, a concept derived from 
dramatistic theory, which I will discuss shortly. Simultaneously, they adopted a poetic 
psychosis. The language of the technological psychosis emphasized the scientist as a cultural 
hero, rationalized destructive research methodologies, and translated into a clinical and 
dehumanizing comportment towards living indigenous peoples of the American Southwest. 
Altogether, the technological psychosis validated vandalism of Mesa Verde in the name of 
science, and supported racially-prejudiced theories like cultural evolution and degeneration. 
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These theories were modern myths, sustained by language that coded cultural heritage as 
science.  
The technological psychosis also served to deflect attention from a variety of more 
aesthetic enchantments that were at work in the rhetoric of Mesa Verde’s Anglo-American 
public debut. I consider these as part of the poetic psychosis. Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld all scrutinized Mesa Verde clinically, and also embellished the 
site with tantalizing legends. They turned Mesa Verde into a romantic ruin through their 
words, and they imagined at length the tragic demise of its architects. Such rich language 
advanced other myths, such as the vitalism of the place that they were busy disassembling in 
the name of science, and primitivistic notions about American Indian cultures. Mesa Verde’s 
vitality could not spare it from the actions supported by the technological psychosis, and the 
authors’ primitivistic ideas about the Mesa Verdeans ultimately served to fetishize 
indigeneity. Yet, the poetics of Mesa Verde’s Anglo-American public debut demonstrated 
that scientific rationality accommodated enchantment, even if it also denied it. These poetic 
enchantments were far from “recalcitrant fugitives from rationalization,” though they were 
indeed “understood through the categories of the mystical” and undermined by the actions of 
the adventurers and archaeologists whose rhetoric I analyze in this chapter.1 Together, the 
technological and poetic psychoses demonstrated scientific irrationality in the practices of 
the researchers who introduced Mesa Verde to the Anglo-American public. 
                                                 
1 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 57. Bennett critiques the narratives of 
disenchantment that propose that scientific rationalization succeeded in subduing 
enchantment in the modern era. 
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Whereas this dissertation addresses rhetorical enchantments throughout the American 
Southwest, I have chosen to dedicate this chapter solely to Mesa Verde’s public debut in 
Anglo-American discourse. Though many Ancestral Puebloan places were coming into 
public awareness in the middle of the nineteenth century, Mesa Verde’s unique alcove 
dwellings seemed to inspire an exaggerated mystical tone in the authors who wrote about this 
location—though this atmosphere of enchantment pervaded (and pervades) descriptions of all 
Southwestern antiquities. Mesa Verde’s later prominence in the discourse of early 
preservation advocacy also marks it for more sustained analysis, as there are parallels 
between what the adventurers and archaeologists in this chapter had to say about this site, 
and what preservation advocates in the following chapter said.  
I examine a total of five documents in this analysis of Mesa Verde’s entry into Anglo-
American public discourse. They are: 
 “Ancient Ruins in Southwestern Colorado,” in The Bulletin of the United States 
Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories (1875), written by 
photographer William H. Jackson 
 “A Notice of the Ancient Ruins of Southwestern Colorado, Examined During the 
Summer of 1875,” in The Bulletin of the United States Geological and Geographical 
Survey of the Territories (1876), written by geologist William Henry Holmes. 
 “The Antiquities of the Rio San Juan” in Crest of the Continent: A Summer’s Ramble 
in the Rocky Mountains and Beyond.  (1885), written by journalist Ernest Ingersoll 
 The Land of the Cliff Dwellers (1892), written by mountaineering personality 
Frederick Chapin 
 The Cliff Dwellers of the Mesa Verde (1891; translated into English 1893), written by 
archaeologist Gustaf Nordenskiöld  
 
As will become plain, this cohort of authors used jarring language to describe Southwestern 
antiquities and indigenous people, and many of their actions within the ancient structures at 
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Mesa Verde are frankly appalling to modern sensibilities. Yet, these men did more than 
reflect their times. They played a part in producing the norms of their time. Because they 
were among the first to publish broadly about Mesa Verde, they helped establish customs for 
the treatment of Mesa Verde and other ancient indigenous sites. By proxy, they also helped 
to reaffirm derogatory attitudes towards the American Indian peoples whom they 
encountered in the Four Corners region, as they discussed living peoples as obstacles or as 
devolved descendants of the Mesa Verdeans, or described them using unfavorable analogies. 
While readers today will never know all of the motives of the men who first wrote about 
Mesa Verde, their writings offer some answers to the questions of why they went, what they 
gained from the experience, and how they valued the sites and their architects. These texts 
helped form the attitudes to which Anglo-American preservation advocates at the turn of the 
twentieth century responded. 
Before delving into the rhetoric of Mesa Verde’s public debut, I present further detail 
about the theoretical grounding for my rhetorical analysis of Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld’s texts. I then discuss the historical moment in which these five 
authors participated. Thereafter, I undertake a rhetorical analysis of the five documents listed 
here, in order to demonstrate the technological psychosis and poetic enchantment of those 
who entered Mesa Verde at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Technological and Poetic Psychoses 
Over the course of this chapter, I argue that Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld exhibited what Kenneth Burke called the technological psychosis. In this 
section, I explain the technological psychosis in greater detail, referring to some of its 
112 
 
parallel and ancillary terms within dramatistic thought, as well as to the intellectual course 
Burke took to develop it.  
Burke arrived at the concept of the technological psychosis by way of Thorstein 
Veblen’s concept of trained incapacity, John Dewey’s concept of occupational psychosis, 
and through much of his own thinking. Thorstein Veblen coined the phrase “trained 
incapacity” to describe the ways in which habitual behaviors encouraged habitual patterns of 
thought. In Veblen’s example, he described how businesspeople conducted business with “an 
eye single to pecuniary gain,” neglecting “the industrial consequences, and their bearing on 
the community’s welfare, being matters incidental to the transaction of business.”2 Veblen 
claimed that the choice to pursue pecuniary gain at any cost to society was due either to a 
“trained incapacity . . . to appreciate the large and general requirements of the industrial 
situation,” or “to an habitual, and conventionally righteous disregard of other than pecuniary 
considerations.”3 Erin Wais considers “trained incapacity” and “righteous disregard” traits 
that “function as two sides of the same coin.”4 Whether because they were unpracticed or 
oblivious, Veblen concluded that because businesspeople had no habit of considering the 
broader ramifications of their business decisions, they failed to do so. Much the same could 
                                                 
2 Thorstein Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, and the State of Industrial Arts (New 
York: Macmillan, 1914), 351, accessed April 21, 2018, 
https://archive.org/stream/instinctworkman00veblgoog#page/n9/mode/1up, qtd. by Erin 
Wais, “Trained Incapacity: Thorstein Veblen and Kenneth Burke,” KB Journal 2, no. 1 
(2005), n. pag., accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.kbjournal.org/wais. 
3 Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, and the State of Industrial Arts, 347, qtd. by Wais, n. 
pag. 
4 Wais, n. pag. 
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be said of the authors whose works I assess in this chapter. Because they had little habit of 
considering other than scientific interests, they often failed to do so. 
Burke embraced Veblen’s concept of the trained incapacity with enthusiasm, 
appreciating it for its interpretive ambivalence. He felt it was a term that “help[ed] us to 
observe in the medium of communication simultaneously both the defects of its qualities and 
the qualities of its defects.”5 Burke observed trained incapacities at work in language use, and 
tended to enjoy their presence in some contexts, and to ridicule them in others. In Burke’s 
interpretation, a trained incapacity might be a helpful kind of ignorance or inability; it might 
also be a debilitating one, particularly with regard to societal wellbeing. Burke tended to 
romanticize the trained incapacities of so-called primitive cultures, while deriding those of 
modern science. The former critical inclination is part of what I critique in my own analysis 
of modern thinkers, whereas the latter is a helpful critical tool. 
Burke regularly paired his contemplations on the concept of the trained incapacity 
with his discussions of occupational psychosis, a phrase that he borrowed from John Dewey. 
In Burke’s interpretation of Dewey, an occupational psychosis was a type of mindset that 
accompanied one’s habitual forms of labor. Burke developed a Marxian perspective, 
claiming that communicative styles and social customs coincided with means of production, 
and could drift from one realm of practice to another. Whatever one did as labor shaped how 
one comported oneself in the world. In that way, the “‘imaginative transference of principles 
from one field to another’” characterized occupational psychosis.6 For instance, if a person 
                                                 
5 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 49.  
6 Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 133. 
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worked as a scientist and habitually scrutinized whatever came in front of him or her as a 
specimen, that person might also discuss scenery in a clinical way.7 “[P]atterns of thought” 
applicable in one arena migrated “into other channels of action or imagery.”8 When 
considered alongside trained incapacities, Burke understood occupational psychoses to 
reaffirm habitual patterns of thought while shielding others. Elsewhere in his body of works, 
Burke called this type of ideological shielding a terministic screen.9 
Terministic screens are ways of “direct[ing] our attention” towards some things and 
away from others.10 Burke emphasized the ways in which scientific discourse, in particular, 
functioned as a “reflection of reality . . .  a selection of reality; and . . . a deflection of 
reality.”11 The notion of scientific discourse acting as a terministic screen has been helpful to 
Burke’s inheritors, as well. For instance, rhetorical critic Martha Solomon used a dramatistic 
analysis to observe the ways in which scientific discourse screened scientists participating in 
the Tuskegee syphilis experiments from understanding their own actions as unethical, and 
encouraged them to interpret themselves as heroes undertaking a quest for knowledge, 
instead. All the while, they observed untreated syphilis in African American men over the 
                                                 
7 I use my own example, here, because the example from Dewey that Burke cited relied on 
quasi-ethnographic information about a supposedly primitive people: if a person hunted for 
sustenance, then marriage rites might take on the aspect of the chase, and the woman would 
be prey. Burke, Permanence and Change, 38-39. 
8 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 38-39.  
9 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 5, 28, 44-62. 
10 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 44. 
11 Ibid., 45, emphasis in original. 
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course of decades. While these men trusted their doctors to give them the proper treatment 
for their malady, they never received it.12 Given that I am also examining the screening 
functions of scientific discourse, and the portrayal of scientists as heroes, I draw inspiration 
from Solomon’s analysis.  
Whereas Solomon looked primarily to Burke’s pentad and terministic screens in order 
to guide her analysis, I look primarily to the concept of the technological psychosis, which 
blends aspects of all of the concepts discussed up to this point. Burke developed his concept 
of the technological psychosis in tandem with this thoughts on occupational psychosis. He 
read the technological psychosis as the prevailing mentality of the modern era, precipitated 
by industrialization and an epochal infatuation with science. I do not share Burke’s certainty 
about the causal factors contributing to the technological psychosis. Yet, his analysis of 
scientific discourse, its prevalence, and its traits, facilitates my interpretation of the 
archaeologists and explorers who made Mesa Verde known to the English-speaking world.   
Burke located the origin of the technological psychosis within science, which he 
defined as “the attempt to control for our purposes the forces of technology, or machinery.”13 
Burke’s emphasis on machinery is somewhat beside the point in my analysis of 
archaeological field work in the late nineteenth century. What is more salient in my analysis 
is Burke’s consideration of science as the “great rationalization” of the modern era, for he felt 
that science shaped social “valuation[s].” In elaborating upon the technological psychosis, 
Burke had this to say:  
                                                 
12 Martha Solomon, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization : An Analysis of Medical Reports of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Project,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 49, no. 4 (1985): 
233–47. 
13 Burke, Permanence and Change, 44. 
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Its genius has been called experimentation, the laboratory method, creative 
skepticism, organized doubt. It has an occupational morality all its own . . . The 
doctrine of use, as the prime mover of judgments, formally established the secular as 
the point of reference by which to consider questions of valuation. The transcendental 
accounts of moral origin . . . now gave way to the notion that considerations of 
service or interest both do shape and should shape our religious, ethical, aesthetic, and 
even cosmological judgments.14  
Many aspects of this statement warrant further discussion in describing how the concept of 
the technological psychosis informs my reading of Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld. All of these authors, whether acting as geologists, photographers, or freelance 
writers, comported themselves towards Mesa Verde with the intention of gleaning 
information from the site. They wanted to use the site to advance scientific, historical, or 
perhaps literary interests. The technological psychosis encouraged a “morality all its own,” in 
the sense that each of these authors portrayed himself as a hero on the quest for knowledge, 
while deflecting the fact that he damaged irrevocably the structures at Mesa Verde, and the 
graves of deceased Mesa Verdeans. The technological psychosis deflected the harm that 
these social actors caused at Mesa Verde, and reflected social values that emphasized use 
value, reason, and clinical analysis. Note, however, that the technological rationality that 
accompanied science at the turn of the twentieth century did not arise from a necessary 
relationship with science. Rather, it characterized the way that this historical moment 
mythologized science.  
In addition to exaggerating the utility of Mesa Verde for the advancement of science, 
the technological psychosis sometimes masked the poetics that Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld also expressed in the face of this Southwestern antiquity. The 
communicative patterns of the technological psychosis were prevalent throughout these 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 44-45. 
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authors’ texts, which emphasized the knowledge that they collected from Mesa Verde, and 
their own positions as scientific heroes. Yet, these authors also indicated through their 
language use various forms of enchantment at Mesa Verde that did not conform well to the 
technological psychosis. For all that Burke claimed there was a “modern tendency to treat 
didacticism as anthetical [sic] to poetry,”15 the adventurers and archaeologists who 
introduced the English-speaking world to Mesa Verde instructed their audiences as to Mesa 
Verde’s intellectual merits as they enchanted them with the poetics of the site. I refer to 
enchantment that the technological psychosis reflected and deflected as the poetic psychosis, 
and treat it as the foil of the scientific rationality that the authors espoused. 
The technological and poetic psychoses both pertain to the overarching theme of 
rhetorical enchantment that I develop throughout this dissertation. Rhetorical enchantment 
has to do with the myths and poetics of rhetorical acts, and the ways in which rhetors express 
their simultaneous positions as enchanted and enchanters. The adventurers and 
archaeologists in this chapter were enchanted by the technological psychosis, as well as by 
the Southwestern antiquities that they encountered. They expressed this enchantment by 
framing their experiences in cultural myths common to their era, and by communicating the 
poetics of Mesa Verde at the same time. Some of their poetics of place reinforced the 
stereotypes and prejudices that accompanied modern myths, whereas some of them indicated 
more of a fascination with the site, itself. 
The technological psychosis was an expression of the collective poem of modernity, 
that gathering of myths that demonstrated habitual patterns of thought and value common to 
social actors at the turn of the twentieth century. These myths included scientific rationality, 
                                                 
15 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 173. 
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the scientific hero, racial hierarchies, and cultural evolution. Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld expressed these myths with accompanying poetic language, 
relying on mythic representations of themselves as scientific heroes, sensational accounts of 
indigenous social actors, and the romance of ruins to emphasize their position towards 
Southwestern antiquities, and to model that comportment for their audiences. 
In the following section of this chapter, I offer more detail about the ways in which 
these authors intervened in their historical moment, and how they chose to inform the 
English-speaking public about the supposed wonders that they encountered in the American 
Southwest. I then examine their expressions of the technological psychosis at Mesa Verde, 
before describing the poetics of enchantment that the authors also communicated in their 
published works. 
The Historical Moment 
Mesa Verde’s broad public debut was the result of the Geological and Geographical 
Survey of the Territories following the American Civil War, and the national news coverage 
concerned with those events.16 The Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories 
was also known as the Hayden Survey. Ferdinand Hayden was a prominent geologist who 
launched a number of expeditions into the American West. He also organized the surveys 
that brought Mesa Verde its first national acclaim. The first two of Hayden’s surveys 
concerned the Yellowstone region, beginning in 1871. Thanks to Hayden’s interest in 
cultivating positive public opinion, he brought painter Thomas Moran and photographer 
                                                 
16 Florence L. Lister, Troweling Through Time: The First Century of Mesa Verdean 
Archaeology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 4. 
119 
 
William H. Jackson along to document the trip. Their images of Yellowstone were central to 
the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872.17 After securing Yellowstone, 
Hayden moved his attentions to Colorado, where once again, William H. Jackson helped 
show the rest of the country the wonders of the west through photography. Ernest Ingersoll 
accompanied Jackson in the Colorado survey of 1874, while working as a correspondent for 
the New York Tribune.18 
After spending some time probing the San Juan Mountains, Jackson’s party 
encountered ancient structures alongside canyon walls. There, “Jackson took the first 
[known] photograph of a Mesa Verde cliff dwelling” at a site that Jackson’s party named 
Two Story House.19 In addition to Jackson’s photographs and report on this venture, 
Ingersoll’s correspondence with the New York Tribune launched Mesa Verde and its alcove 
dwellings into public awareness. Ingersoll shared the story of a harrowing discovery with 
readers on the East Coast shortly thereafter.20 Some years later he published the full account 
of his participation in the Geological Surveys and other excursions as The Crest of the 
Continent: A Summer’s Ramble in the Rocky Mountains and Beyond.  
                                                 
17 M. Dane Picard, “Revisiting the Life and Scientific Reputation of Ferdinand Vandeever 
Hayden,” Rocky Mountain Geology 45, no. 1 (2010): 73–81; Denise D. Meringolo, Museums, 
Monuments, and National Parks: Toward a New Genealogy of Public History, Public History 
in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). 
18 Douglas Waitley, William Henry Jackson: Framing the Frontier (Missoula, Montana: 
Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1999). 
19 Lister, 6. 
20 Waitley, 153. 
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Although Jackson, Ingersoll, and other members of the Hayden expedition never 
encountered the alcove dwellings for which Mesa Verde National Park is now most famous, 
the public recounting of their time spent in Two Story house piqued national interest in the 
Southwest, and set the stage for the additional forays to the ancient sites there.21 Jackson and 
party also played an integral part in displaying photographs and findings from the 1874 
survey at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876, which brought further acclaim and 
induced even more curiosity for the ancient structures in the Southwest.22 William H. 
Jackson and William H. Holmes (another geologist and a member of the Hayden surveys) 
also worked together to produce “exact scale models of southwestern archaeological sites” 
for the Exposition, for which they won a bronze medal.23 According to a newspaper article at 
the time, “the models of these cliff houses . . . were always the center of a fascinated throng 
of the most intelligent and cultivated visitors.”24 Jackson and Holmes managed to enchant a 
public audience with their recreations of Mesa Verde. 
The alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde received significantly more attention in the years 
that followed the Hayden surveys, a condition that intensified when members of a ranching 
family called the Wetherills came upon some of the more remarkable structures at Mesa 
Verde. The Wetherill brothers and their brother-in-law, Charlie Mason, attained minor fame 
in the late 1880s when newspapers at the time covered their encounter with one of the most 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 155. 
22 Ibid., 160. 
23 Duane A. Smith, Mesa Verde National Park: Shadows of the Centuries, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 
CO: University Press of Colorado, 2002), 15. 
24 “The Cave Dwellers on the Cliffs of the Mancos Canon,” Colorado Springs Gazette, June 
23, 1877. 
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picturesque structures at Mesa Verde, which the Wetherills dubbed Cliff Palace. The 
Wetherills and Mason had been aware of the antiquities on the land neighboring their ranch 
for some time, though the story of Cliff Palace and its so-called discovery painted the 
encounter as a surprise. Mimicking other discovery legends common to the era, the story told 
of the brothers and Mason pursuing lost cattle from the ranch, only to stumble upon an 
unknown marvel. Depending on whose account one follows, the Wetherills and company 
might have expected to find structures of this sort during their foray, as they had made a 
hobby of perusing the canyons near their ranch.25 
In any event, the Wetherill family used their fame to begin a tourism business, and 
they removed many objects from the ancient structures at Mesa Verde as part of their trade. 
They turned artifact recovery into an enterprise, using their ranch in Mancos as a base for the 
business of hosting and guiding tourists to the region. In addition to collecting and 
(sometimes) documenting artifacts and other findings from their explorations of the alcove 
dwellings, the Wetherills wrote to the Smithsonian Institution to request assistance with 
collections at Mesa Verde.26 They also traveled with a display of their wares to the 1893 
World’s Columbian Exposition.27 Richard Wetherill, one of the brothers, expanded the 
family business to Chaco Canyon, where he made a homesteading claim on the land 
                                                 
25 William C. Winkler and Duane A. Smith, Travels and Travails: Tourism at Mesa Verde 
(Durango, CO: Durango Herald Small Press, 2005), 6. 
26 David Harrell, “‘We Contacted Smithsonian’: The Wetherills at Mesa Verde,” New Mexico 
Historical Review 62, no. 3 (1987): 229–48; Smith, Mesa Verde National Park, 22–42; 
Duane A. Smith, Karen A. Vendl, and Mark A. Vendl, Colorado Goes to the Fair: World’s 
Columbian Exposition, Chicago 1893 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
2011), 46–47. 
27 Smith et al., Colorado Goes to the Fair; Harrell, “‘We Contacted Smithsonian.’” 
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containing the largest and best-preserved structures there, and later earned the ire of 
preservation advocates working in the region.28 
The Wetherills’ ranch and associated excavation and tourism business failed in 1902, 
but not before the Wetherills left their mark on the land. For years, the family extracted 
materials from the ancient sites, and hosted many significant people who redefined the 
public’s relationship to Mesa Verde. Most notably, the Wetherills hosted Swedish scientist 
Gustaf Nordenskiöld, who conducted the first methodical excavation of the ancient structures 
in 1891. Indeed, Nordenskiold taught the Wetherills his excavation methods, and employed 
them in his work. The Wetherills also hosted Frederick Chapin, a writer, mountaineer, and 
self-styled adventurer. Both Nordenskiöld and Chapin published about their experiences at 
the Mancos Ranch, home of the Wetherills, and solidified both the alcove dwellings and the 
names of the Wetherills within public memory. Today, two of the mesas at Mesa Verde 
National Park are called Wetherill Mesa and Chapin Mesa, indicating the degree of influence 
these figures had over the terrain. 
For all that the Wetherills were influential at Mesa Verde, they appeared primarily in 
the accounts of others, rather than in their own words. Classism likely had something to do 
with the way of the historical record, as men of letters like Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld coupled their impressions of Mesa Verde with professional 
authority that the Wetherills lacked.  It is to these authorized accounts of Mesa Verde that I 
turn next, in the rhetorical analysis of the texts produced by photographer William H. 
                                                 
28 Don D. Fowler, A Laboratory for Anthropology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 2000), 199. Richard Wetherill’s activities in Chaco Canyon were especially offensive 
to a preservation advocate whom I will discuss in chapter three, named Edgar Lee Hewett. 
Hewett attempted to assure the passage of the Antiquities Act in part to prohibit actions like 
those undertaken by Wetherill. 
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Jackson, geologist William H. Holmes, journalist Ernest Ingersoll, mountaineer Frederick 
Chapin, and archaeologist Gustaf Nordenskiöld. I begin my analysis with the claim that all of 
these authors communicated within the technological psychosis in a manner that advanced 
them as scientific heroes, rationalized destructive field methods, and insultingly classified 
indigenous peoples of the American Southwest within the theory of cultural evolution.   
The Technological Psychosis 
Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld all presented themselves as 
researchers reporting on Mesa Verde for the rest of the curious English-speaking public, and 
recording their findings for posterity. In adopting a scientific demeanor towards Mesa Verde, 
all of these social actors communicated in a manner consistent with the technological 
psychosis. All of them presented a primarily scientific rationale for engaging with the site, 
and valued the ancient structures at Mesa Verde for their use in answering questions about 
the past, the influence of colonialism, and living indigenous cultures. Their texts illustrate 
abundant evidence that these authors exhibited the technological psychosis. They presented 
themselves as scientific heroes, conveyed confidence in research methodologies that were 
extremely damaging to the site, and attempted to measure cultural advancement according to 
racialized tenets. They also struggled to contain within the clinical parameters of the 
technological psychosis the wonder they felt when describing Mesa Verde. 
Scientific Heroism 
The authors’ emphases on their own roles as heroes of science supported their 
participation in the technological psychosis. Narratives of individualistic discovery and 
sacrifice in the name of science supported the status of science within the technological 
psychosis, and also mythologized science in poetic ways. The authors’ representations of 
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themselves as scientific heroes came through in their narrations of derring-do at the alcove 
dwellings at Mesa Verde. Though these were primarily professional accounts of research 
excursions, the authors’ heroic personae were key to each text. Clearly, generic constraints 
operated differently in the 19th century than they do today. Nevertheless, the authors seemed 
to revel in describing how difficult it was for them to arrive at the alcove dwellings and 
obtain new information in the name of scientific discovery. 
Jackson, who produced the first nationally-distributed perspective on the matter, 
described many privations during his journey to Mesa Verde. While en route, he noted 
difficult river crossings and the awkward conditions in which he operated his photography 
equipment. While attempting to ferry field equipment up into the alcoves, he recalled how a 
member of the party had to be “shoved up ahead, over the worst place, with the rope, and, 
tying it to a tree, the others easily ascended.”29 The travails continued once among the alcove 
dwellings, where Jackson recounted the “momentary peril of life” experienced by a member 
of his crew upon ascending the canyon. As the man climbed the canyon walls, “the least 
mistake would precipitate him down the whole of this dizzy height.”30   
Though Ingersoll remarked upon the relative comfort afforded by the new railroads 
that hastened his journey to Mesa Verde, he opined that “[r]oughing it” was “the marrow of 
                                                 
29 William Henry Jackson, “Ancient Ruins in Southwestern Colorado,” U.S. Geological and 
Geographical Survey of the Rocky Mountain Region Bulletin, no. 1 (1874-1875): 20. 
Nineteenth Century Collections Online. 
30 Jackson, 24. 
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this sort of recreation.”31 Indeed, Ingersoll made it seem as if the hardship of reaching Mesa 
Verde was much of the appeal of going there. In addition to discussing the aridity of the 
climate, Ingersoll depicted the “smoldering hostility of the Indians” as another obstacle to 
reaching Mesa Verde.32 Ingersoll claimed that the “privation of the undertaking” was 
worthwhile because of the promise of making new “discoveries in anthropology.”33 
Like Ingersoll, Chapin complimented the new railroad for alleviating the hardships of 
travel, noting that the Southwest once had been even more difficult to traverse, where 
“travelers were exposed to all manner of hardships, were far from a base of supplies, and 
were at times in danger from hostile Indians.”34 Chapin still managed to experience firsthand 
many similar hardships, and proceeded to describe them with zeal. For instance, he recounted 
an incident during which a bucking bronco ruined some of his own camera equipment, and 
he shared the harrowing story of surviving a rock slide, during which he “narrowly escaped a 
serious accident.”35 Chapin also continued the racialized commentary of the San Juan Basin 
established by other authors, offering stories of recalcitrant American Indian individuals 
whom he solicited for help, and “the hostility of the Utes” who had “rendered it dangerous 
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for a white man to venture down the Mancos River without military escort.”36 Overall, 
Chapin exaggerated the valor of his traveling party by setting a scene in which he and his 
companions had to confront desolation, mystery, and antagonism. Adding to the mise-en-
scène for his feats, Chapin referred to the Southwest as “a strange land, inhabited by strange 
people, and containing monuments and relics of yet stranger tribes of an unknown 
antiquity.”37 Even with all of these hardships and strangeness, Chapin dubbed the San Juan 
Basin “a most fascinating field for the explorer.”38 
Perhaps in the interest of faithfully recording his research methodology, 
Nordenskiöld, too, offered detailed examples of the difficulties he went through in his 
investigation of Mesa Verde and its alcove dwellings. Nordenskiöld, like Ingersoll and 
Chapin, expressed that “roving bands of Ute Indians rendered travelling dangerous” in the 
region for many years, until the mining industry arrived and “the Indians were forced to 
relinquish the land that had belonged to their forefathers.”39 Nordenskiöld also credited the 
railway with rendering travel easier. However, difficult horseback rides and “break-neck 
climb[s]” both featured prominently in Nordenskiöld’s account.40  
Together, these authors set a scene in which what they thought of as civilization 
arrived only slowly in the Southwest, and where the landscape imposed rugged adventures on 
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those who trespassed within it, before disclosing its mysteries for science. As these authors 
portrayed their scene, only after enduring opposition from indigenous peoples, threat of death 
from falling off the sides of the canyon, and other hardships could they contribute to 
knowledge. Jackson, Ingersoll, Chapin and Nordenskiöld seemed to offer tales from the field 
as bona fides for their right to comment on the alcove dwellings of the Southwest, and as 
evidence of their bold personalities. Not only were these descriptions sensational stories for 
their readers, but they were marks of a certain kind of frontierist credential.  
The authors’ advancement of themselves as scientific heroes was predicated on the 
dangerous and alluring scene in which they situated themselves. Though scientific heroism 
was a feature of the technological psychosis, the mystique that these authors crafted in 
describing their sacrifices in the name of discovery mythologized science. They described the 
scene in which they did their field work poetically, and in so doing, melded the technological 
psychosis’ supposed emphasis on measurement and rationality with enchantment. This was 
an enchantment with science itself, but it relied on the narrative style of an adventure. 
Whereas the scientific heroism in these authors’ works supported the technological 
psychosis by magnifying the cultural role of the scientist, the authors’ discussion of the 
research methodology in which they engaged was a truer expression of the technological 
psychosis. As Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld measured and 
catalogued the contents of Mesa Verde, they postured towards the site with clinical distance. 
Troublingly, that clinical distance validated harmful field methods and condescending 
scholarly conclusions.  
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Research Methodology 
Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld demonstrated their 
participation in the technological psychosis through their measurements and analyses of 
Mesa Verde. However, the scientific language that they used in describing Mesa Verde 
facilitated for them a clinical distancing from the site. The technological psychosis screened 
these authors from recognizing the irrevocable harm that they caused to Mesa Verde as they 
studied it, and often seemed at odds with their poetic descriptions of the site.  
Each of these authors mentioned the haste with which he made his visit to Mesa 
Verde, and his regrets about leaving mysteries unanswered upon departure. The authors also 
gave accounts of the type of activity in which they engaged when within the alcove 
dwellings, albeit for short periods of time. For instance, Jackson referred to his party’s 
engagement with one alcove dwelling as “such little scratching around as we could do” in the 
time allowed.41 Jackson bemoaned the limited time “to admit of the experiment [of 
excavation], much as we desired the information it might furnish.”42 This information, for 
Jackson, would have been comprised of “many interesting relics, and possibly some clew to 
[the] manner of life” of the original occupants of the alcove dwellings.43 For Jackson, objects 
and answers were both at the base of his efforts, arguably for the sake of new knowledge 
pertaining to ancient indigenous peoples.  
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Holmes, for his part, shared that his findings were “the result of such observations 
and measurements as could be made in a period of time entirely too short for a work of such 
importance.”44 For his part, Holmes primarily expressed interest in how the various 
collections of ancient structures could “be classified.”45 He also discussed the shape and size 
of the majority of the structures he encountered, commenting that “[m]easurements were 
taken by tape-line in all the more important structures; but in many of the ordinary ruins, 
where exact dimensions were not considered essential, the distances were estimated. It is to 
be greatly regretted that extreme haste frequently prevented close and accurate work.”46 
While commenting little on his own excavation methods in the alcove dwellings, Holmes 
demonstrated that measurement and classification were his main concerns, though he 
admitted that he executed these methods without consistent rigor. Holmes also revealed that 
Jackson and party, who had preceded him, had left “three names scratched in the soft, thick 
coat of adobe” they had seen during their own visit of a structure.47 Evidently, the little 
scratching around that Jackson could do included leaving a memento of his visit. 
Chapin divided his time in describing the methods of the Wetherills and their crew, 
and describing his own group’s efforts to explore the alcove dwellings. When Chapin 
detailed his party’s time within any of the alcove dwellings, typically he inventoried what he 
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found while there, referring to some of those procedures as excavations. In one structure, 
Chapin described his “companions . . . rummaging around the lower rooms,” while he and 
another member of his party removed a beam out of another portion of the house, and used it 
as a make-shift ladder to ascend further, effectively destroying one part of a site in order to 
pursue objects in a more difficult-to-reach portion of it.48 Chapin declared that “after our 
difficult tussle in scaling the wall, we thought we might be rewarded by finding some rare 
specimen . . . but, on the contrary, there was an air of desolation around the vacant 
quarters.”49 For Chapin, the possibility of discovering new objects validated damaging 
behavior to the site. This attitude even applied in situations where the task of investigating 
Mesa Verde could not be completed properly. As an example, in another instance, Chapin 
and crew “had not the time . . . to excavate among the rubbish, but the slightest investigation 
showed that the place was rich in relics. A little scraping away of the earth revealed human 
bones, cloths, matting, etc.”50 Chapin admitted that his rummaging and scraping were only 
perfunctory, and awaited the results of more orderly archaeological investigations with great 
anticipation.  
Chapin’s adventure occurred two years prior to Nordenskiöld’s own efforts to 
understand the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde. Nordenskiöld remarked on his methods in a 
manner not altogether different from those who came before him, though he alone styled 
himself as a professional archaeologist. Like the others, Nordenskiöld conducted his work 
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with a crew. Nordenskiöld’s work party was composed of at least two of the Wetherill 
brothers and “two Mexican laborers” who, altogether, cleared several of the rooms “of 
rubbish.”51 Nordenskiöld remarked that “a single push of the spade sent it over the precipice” 
with great ease.52 Nordenskiöld noted, however, that “[g]reat inconvenience was caused . . . 
by the fine dust, which rose in dense clouds at each blow of the spade.”53 Chapin, too, 
complained that “the alkali dust [was] choking,”54 though was less forthcoming than 
Nordenskiöld in discussing the fact that what was not of interest to the search party probably 
was hurled into the canyon by his crew, too. 
The authors I discuss here detailed the ways in which they scraped, scratched, and 
rummaged around in the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde, discarding rooms full of fill into 
the canyon and dismantling portions of the site in order to seek out objects of interest. Their 
actions were not only detrimental to future archaeologists, as NPS interpretive rangers 
typically point out during contemporary tours, but also deeply invasive, careless, and 
disrespectful. Equally disturbing is the fact that these cavalier research methods were 
undertaken in pursuit of things, to be retrieved for display, sale, souvenirs, or all three. Yet, 
all of these degrading practices were done to the site out of what appears to have been a 
genuine belief by the authors in their contributions to knowledge.  
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The belief that their wanton field methods were beneficial to science was most 
apparent in Chapin’s assessment, in which he repeatedly noted that the “antiquities” he 
observed were “well worth investigation by the archaeologist.”55 Towards the end of his 
description of his time at Mesa Verde, Chapin submitted that, if his work could “claim any 
merit, it [would] be due to the fact that the future antiquary [might] learn from the 
reproduction of . . . photographs, and their description, the condition of the Mancos ruins in 
the years 1889 and 1890.”56 Why this information would be useful, we can assume, had to do 
with a presumed contribution to new knowledge, and a safeguard against the deterioration 
that Chapin may have guessed would come to the site in intervening years.  
Despite Chapin’s belief in the utility of his photographs serving as a record of Mesa 
Verde, we know that these authors took much more than photographs when they entered the 
alcove dwellings. Like the others, Ingersoll showed great interest in the objects contained 
within the alcove dwellings. Ingersoll kept close accounts of whether or not “valuable 
implements and utensils” had been “discovered” in each structure. 57 While Ingersoll 
considered these implements and utensils among the “glorious discoveries in anthropology” 
that his party contributed to posterity,58 simply obtaining items in the first place seems to 
have been a key motivation for members of Ingersoll’s party.  For example, upon spying a 
new structure, and “fired with the hope of getting some valuable relics of household furniture 
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in such a place, one of the gentlemen volunteered to make the attempt” in achieving a 
particularly daunting ascent.59 It is likely, then, these social actors attached a monetary value 
to the objects they recovered from the alcove dwellings, in addition to an intellectual one. 
Either way, the technological psychosis dominated the discourse, as these Anglo-American 
social actors expected Mesa Verde’s contents to be useful either for learning or for personal 
gain.  
Not only were these individuals interested in objects, but they were interested in a 
particular class of object: the complete vessel. Throughout his text, it is clear that Chapin was 
interested primarily in complete vessels, presumably for purposes of collection and display. 
For example, he assessed whether or not “it would be possible partially to restore” artifacts 
such as “fragments of large bowls” he observed in his travels.60 Like Chapin, Nordenskiöld 
also displayed a fixation on “perfect vessels” for collection and display, regretting that his 
“collection contain[ed] only a few.”61 On the whole, Nordenskiöld also measured the success 
of his various excavations in terms of the quantity of objects and bodies removed from each 
site.  
In an unforgivable practice, these authors treated bodies just as they treated objects 
when they were perusing the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde. Chapin and Nordenskiöld 
were the most explicit about discussing their treatment of human remains at Mesa Verde. 
Chapin offered commentary on several burials that his group disturbed while moving about 
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the alcove dwellings, and revealed a puzzling juxtaposition between admiration and 
irreverence when discussing the deceased. For instance, after noting that an individual he 
encountered “had been buried with care,” he went on to offer many intimate details of this 
person’s interment, clinically describing the various objects buried with the individual.62 
Chapin was very interested in the human remains present at Mesa Verde but did not respect 
any right to privacy for those who had been buried there with such care. 
Nordenskiöld’s discussion of the human remains at Mesa Verde causes the 
contemporary reader even more discomfort. In one instance, Nordenskiöld and his crew 
discovered human remains that rats had damaged. Judging that the bodies “were not worth 
saving,” it seems they were discarded along with the other so-called rubbish from the site.63 
Nordenskiöld’s book presented list after list of human remains, their locations, and the 
funerary goods found with them—going quite against standards of decorum now in place 
thanks to NAGPRA. Detailed photographs accompanied these descriptions, alongside 
vigorous discussions of the cranial attributes of the original inhabitants of the alcove 
dwellings. He also expressed frustration that he had not enough evidence to “point out cranial 
affinities that might exist between the ancient inhabitants of the ruins and the people that now 
live near those deserted dwellings.”64 Nevertheless, he used ethnological data to arrive at 
some comparisons between the two. 
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Such commentary illustrates Nordenskiöld’s belief in the tenets of phrenology, that 
post-Enlightenment school of thought most popular in the mid-nineteenth century, which 
supposed that an individual’s attributes and propensities could be measured physically on his 
or her skull.65 Nordenskiöld’s attachment to phrenology as a research method was consistent 
with early archaeologists’ role in advancing the theory of cultural evolution, in general, and 
justified to Nordenskiöld the brazen desecration of many graves, for the purpose of collecting 
the crania of the people interred at Mesa Verde. It also indicates how Chapin and 
Nordenskiöld believed it no impropriety to disturb the gravesites of the Mesa Verdeans, as 
they viewed them as curious examples of a lesser form of humanity, and not as equals 
deserving of respect.  
The authors who introduced Mesa Verde to the English-speaking public 
communicated in a manner consistent with the technological psychosis. They did so by 
perpetuating the myth of the scientist as a cultural hero, and they did so by rationalizing their 
destructive actions within Mesa Verde in the name of scientific discovery. Monetary values 
and personal recognition coincided with the scholarly interests that Jackson, Holmes, 
Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld conveyed. In any case, the technological psychosis 
appears to have facilitated the alienation of the authors from their research subjects, 
justifying the desecration of graves and vandalistic research methods at Mesa Verde. The 
technological psychosis shielded these authors from acknowledging the hypocrisy of 
presenting Mesa Verde as an enchanting place as they dissected it. The authors’ scholarly 
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alienation from Mesa Verde and its architects transposed to their discussions of American 
Indian cultural traditions, as well. By measuring cultural accomplishments according to a 
cultural evolutionary telos, the authors classified all indigenous cultures as inferior to 
European cultures, and further rationalized their own interventions at Mesa Verde. 
Measuring Cultures through Cultural Evolution 
In his discussions of the occupational psychosis, Burke observed that patterns of 
thought applicable in one realm of practice often transferred into other areas of practice. Such 
was the case with these authors’ interpretations of the Mesa Verdeans. Just as they presented 
themselves as if they had clinical distance from the site that they cavalierly dismantled in the 
pursuit of knowledge, they also acted as though they had clinical distance when interpreting 
peoples of the past. Their primary instrument of measurement for cultures from the past was 
the theory of cultural evolution, which Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld 
all adopted as a way of diagnosing the habits and significance of the Mesa Verdeans. As they 
applied the theory of cultural evolution in their analyses, the technological psychosis 
translated from the realm of pick and spade to the realm of immediate social consequences.  
The theory of cultural evolution began in Europe, and used the Old World 
archaeological record to declare that movement from the Stone Age to the Industrial Age was 
the telos for all cultures. For cultural evolutionists, the more like modern European society a 
culture was, the more highly it ranked on its path towards the pinnacle of civilization. Wars 
propagated by European cultures were forgotten conveniently in these early discussions of 
the state of European advancement. However, the more or less predictable relationship 
between time depth and technological materials witnessed in the Old World did not have 
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evidentiary support in the New World, producing consternation for scholars in the nineteenth 
century who attempted to fit American Indian peoples into an ill-suited teleology.66   
In particular, scholars of the day took metalworking and script as clear markers of age 
and, hence, purported advancement in the Old World. In the absence of those phenomena in 
much of the New World’s archaeological record, the majority of white scholars could not 
imagine rich, complete lives for the ancient people who made their lives there. Authors 
submitted demeaning interpretations of the Ancestral Puebloans by studying them through 
theories like this, which passed as part of the technological psychosis (in spite of the often 
spurious evidence used to support cultural evolution). In the works of Jackson, Holmes, 
Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld, adherence to the theory of cultural evolution manifested 
in reliance on phrenology, comparisons between the Mesa Verdeans and contemporary 
American Indian peoples, and discussion of the presumed brutality of life at Mesa Verde 
during its prime. Though cultural evolution was a common mode for discussing human 
cultures at the time, it was this type of theory that supported white culture’s displacement and 
oppression of American Indian peoples and other minorities. However, the technological 
psychosis screened its rhetors from acknowledging explicitly the racial prejudice inherent in 
the theory of cultural evolution.   
Highlighting the fact that no written documents had been found that were produced 
by the Mesa Verdeans, Chapin regularly referred to the original occupants of the alcove 
dwellings as a prehistoric people, adding that by “using the term ‘prehistoric’ in these pages, 
I am not implying any great age . . . but maintain that they antedate the coming of the 
                                                 
66 Bruce G. Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 166–189. 
138 
 
Spaniards, that there are no written records in regard to them, and that traditions are very 
meagre.”67 Chapin fussed, further, that “[n]ot a scrap or piece of metal [had] been found,” 
concluding that every artifact encountered “must have been laboriously shaped by an almost 
shapeless stone axe.”68 It is unclear why he presumed the lithic tools would have been 
shapeless; however, Chapin’s editorializing illustrated his low regard for the technologies 
used by the Mesa Verdeans in their accomplishments. Like Chapin, Nordenskiöld remarked 
repeatedly on the absence of metal found within Mesa Verde’s structures. Nordenskiöld 
proclaimed that “the cliff-dwellers were entirely ignorant of the use of metal,” and that while 
they must have made everything they had using lithic technology, their “stone axes were 
probably more efficacious as weapons.”69  
As illustrated in the preceding paragraph, Chapin and Nordenskiöld were especially 
prone to outlining their cultural evolutionary interpretations of the people of Mesa Verde. In 
their discussions, both men commented at great length on the technology, arts, and presumed 
state of unrest experienced by the Mesa Verdeans. Both also made regular remarks about the 
location of the Mesa Verdeans on the trajectory towards civilization. For his interpretation of 
the archaeological record, Chapin had this to say: “As for the state of civilization of the 
ancient people, it could not have been far advanced. A community who could huddle together 
in such small, close, unventilated quarters . . . could not have reached a very high ideal of 
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refinement.”70 Throughout his volume, Chapin commented outlandishly on the cultural 
ranking of, not just indigenous peoples in the United States, but Creole, Spanish, and 
Mexican populations, as well. 
While observing that “the prehistoric inhabitants were diligent in their exercise of the 
potter’s art” and “had achieved great proficiency” in architecture,71 Nordenskiöld felt that 
relying on these accomplishments for an analysis would give a scholar “entirely erroneous 
conclusions” about the state of civilization of the Mesa Verdeans.72 Nordenskiöld considered 
that: 
 . . . the former inhabitants of the cliff-dwellings [were] . . . an agricultural people on 
the level of the Stone Age, who had attained a very high rank in the art of making and 
ornamenting pottery and in the construction of stone buildings, but who at the same 
time stood comparatively low in other respects.73 
Nordenskiöld felt that the Mesa Verdeans “ranked higher in some points of culture than the 
nomadic Indians,”74 but, “with the exception of the pottery, extremely few [objects found] 
bear witness to the advanced development of any special industry.”75 For Nordenskiöld, 
understanding this glitch in what everyone presumed to be true about cultural evolution was a 
key motivation for scholarly pursuits. As Nordenskiöld admitted, the “contrast between a 
development so high in one respect and a standpoint . . . so low in another, invests the cliff 
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people with special interest. The explanation thereof may be found in the extraordinary 
conditions under which this nation struggled for existence.”76 In the absence of a clear story 
of cultural evolution, Nordenskiöld presumed that environmental factors and a state of 
constant warfare, rather than human ingenuity, pushed the architects of the alcove dwellings 
to act as they did. Whether by cultural evolution or by environmental determinism, 
Nordenskiöld was certain that external forces determined the architects’ fate. 
Whether discussing their nineteenth-century present or the deep past, the authors 
demonstrated a fixation on supposed barbarism that clouded their ability to imagine any other 
sort of life for the Mesa Verdeans or their descendants. To them, a life that required 
defensive architecture was one that could not have been very far advanced. What is worse, 
discussions of the state of advancement of the inhabitants of the alcove dwellings often 
drifted into unfavorable comparisons between those who built the alcove dwellings and the 
indigenous peoples still present in the San Juan Basin. These comparisons always were 
prejudiced against the living peoples with whom the authors in this analysis could have 
interacted, and advanced the theory of degeneration alongside the theory of cultural 
evolution.  
Jackson, for one, felt that the “old ruined houses and towns” of the “southwestern 
corner of Colorado Territory [displayed] a civilization and intelligence far beyond that of the 
present inhabitants of this or adjacent territory.”77 Holmes concluded that the San Juan Basin 
had been occupied previously “by a race totally distinct from the nomadic savages” of his 
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day, and “in every way superior to them.”78 Ingersoll described the area as “occupied by 
ruins which show an Indian occupation previous to the present savages, and of a different 
rank if not another race.”79 Nordenskiöld posited that the Mesa Verdeans’ superior methods 
in crafting pottery had been lost over time, and were entirely “unknown” to “the few North 
American tribes that still [made] pottery” during his studies—further suggesting a 
degeneration in skills.80 Altogether, these authors viewed living American Indian people as 
inferior to those who built Mesa Verde. That the Mesa Verdeans “were the forefathers of 
certain Pueblo tribes who now occupy lands to the south” was taken as fact by Nordenskiöld, 
Ingersoll, and Chapin.81 However, recognizing the Mesa Verdeans as the ancestors of living 
peoples did nothing to raise living indigenous peoples in the esteem of these authors.  
Though casual racism was apparent throughout all of these documents, popular writer 
Chapin offered the most sensational commentary about the American Indian people whom he 
encountered in his travels, commenting with a somewhat lecherous degree of detail on the 
attractiveness of indigenous women, and referring to “raids, ravages, and massacres” as 
routine occurrences for “these children of the wilderness.”82 Chapin referred to themes of 
threat and violence, among other “troubles with the natives” with such nonchalance that they 
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seem to have been a relatively pedestrian feature of Anglo-American attitudes at the time, 
though something of a source of fascination, as well.83  
The reason all of these things are worth remarking upon is that the way these men 
discussed cultural evolution, the characteristics of the Mesa Verdeans, and the characteristics 
of contemporary indigenous peoples, were intertwined. Furthermore, they adopted stylistic 
attributes of the technological psychosis to advance self-serving hypotheses. While these 
authors did not discuss the doctrine of Manifest Destiny explicitly, they analyzed American 
Indian groups as if they were looking for proof that white Americans had a right to the 
continent. The more different in lifestyle living American Indian peoples were from the white 
settlers entering the West, the farther apart from them they were cast on an evolutionary 
spectrum. Indeed, these authors exaggerated the supposed distance between white culture and 
indigenous cultures, perhaps to amplify in their narratives their encounters with an Other and 
their alleged bravery in undertaking their research. 
Overall, the technological psychosis appeared in the works of Jackson, Holmes, 
Ingersoll, Chapin and Nordenskiöld in appeals to the mythic scientific hero, clinical 
distancing of the authors from the harmful research methods they used at Mesa Verde, and 
attempts to classify the Mesa Verdeans and other indigenous peoples as lesser “races.” The 
scientific valuations of Mesa Verde translated from one realm of practice to another. 
Ultimately, the authors’ findings at Mesa Verde helped to justify settler colonialism at the 
same time that they feigned scientific rationality. These aspects of the technological 
psychosis sometimes appeared in the context of imaginative language, and sometimes in 
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more clinical terms. In either case, the technological psychosis supported myths like cultural 
evolution, white superiority, and the rationality of science. 
In the sections that follow, I examine the openly poetic language that appeared 
alongside the technological psychosis in the works of these authors. While Jackson, Holmes, 
Ingersoll, and Chapin vacillated between the use of clinical language and the use of poetic 
language, all of their discourse supported myths of modernity. In the case of their poetic 
interludes, these authors tended to promote an infatuation with the past, the Other, and 
supposedly primitive (and sometimes idyllic) ways of life. These myths were foils to the 
scientific ones that these authors also advanced, but equally symptomatic of modernity.84  
Deflected Poetics and Cultural Evolutionary Assessments 
Even as Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld adopted clinical 
language to analyze the level of cultural development of the Mesa Verdeans, they struggled 
to maintain the technological psychosis. They were enchanted by the place, and poetic 
interludes in their texts undermined their technological psychosis at nearly every turn. One 
site where the tension between the technological psychosis and a poetic psychosis was most 
apparent was in the authors’ discussion of the masonry at Mesa Verde. While masonry was 
the sort of thing whose quality they could measure using such instruments as they had 
available, their astonishment as to its quality belied their clinical detachment. 
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In Jackson’s writings, he expressed true regard for the masonry he found there, saying 
it “was finished with exceptional care.”85 Indeed, to Jackson, “[t]he entire construction of this 
little human eyrie displayed wonderful perseverance, ingenuity, and some taste.”86 Like 
Jackson, Holmes could hardly have been more complimentary of the quality of the masonry 
he observed at Mesa Verde. Holmes also complimented the location of the architecture as 
“one of unparalleled security, both from enemies and the elements.”87 Holmes, like Jackson, 
showed some regard for the Mesa Verdeans, remarking that their structures were “built with 
much skill.”88 Considering a tower he viewed as “a defensive work” Holmes thought it 
demonstrated “not a little intelligence and forethought on the part of the builders.”89 
Altogether, Holmes proclaimed that “when one considers that [building] materials must have 
been brought from far below by means of ropes, or carried in small quantities up the 
dangerous stairway, the only wonder is that it was ever brought to its present degree of 
finish.”90 Here, Holmes offered an expression of wonder, but it was paired with incredulity at 
the task that the Ancestral Puebloans undertook in crafting Mesa Verde. While these authors 
suggested that the sturdy “eyries” at Mesa Verde may have been crudely constructed, still 
they captured the imagination. 
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Writing almost a decade later, though reflecting, perhaps, the time he spent on the 
Hayden Survey with the others, Ingersoll joined Jackson and Holmes in praising the masonry 
work in the buildings he encountered, marveling that “all this was done, so far as we can 
learn, with no other tools than those made of stone.”91 Ingersoll was thoroughly impressed, 
declaring that “so consummate was [the Mesa Verdeans’] skill in masonry that these 
abutments still stand . . . the tooth of time had found them hard gnawing.”92 Here, Ingersoll 
paired the quality of the architecture with the feat of transcending time, rendering his 
compliments more poetically than his peers. 
Chapin, too, chimed in on the building prowess of the Mesa Verdeans, particularly 
with regard to the defensive position of their structures.93 However, Chapin’s compliments 
about Mesa Verdean masonry were peppered with negative judgment. For instance, Chapin 
commented that “the marvel would be greater that a people with only stone and wooden tools 
could have accomplished such a work” if only the building materials had not been “already at 
hand, shapen by the elements.”94 At the same time, Chapin provided some editorial 
comments about what he viewed as the meagre tastes of the Mesa Verdeans. For instance, 
Chapin regarded many architectural traits as the result of “the eccentricity of the builders,” 
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further assuming that “[t]he race of Cliff-Dwellers were not liberal of space when they built 
their doors.”95 Chapin’s compliments were grudging, at best. 
Similar to Chapin’s knock about the small doors at Mesa Verde, Nordenskiöld 
remarked that “[t]he inhabitants must have had no great pretensions as regards light and 
air.”96 Nordenskiöld also furnished a backhanded compliment about the quality of the 
masonry, noting that a tower, for instance, “in its construction bears undeniable witness to 
the great skill of the builders, especially when we remember the rude implements with which 
their work was executed.”97 In discussing the manner by which the Mesa Verdeans ascended 
the canyon walls, Nordenskiöld remarked that the “perilous climbs that formed a part of their 
daily life, had inured them to difficult pathways. A few pegs in the walls . . . were certainly 
enough to satisfy their primitive wants in this respect.”98 Nordenskiöld concluded that 
because these people were supposedly primitive, they were more tolerant of unpleasant 
architectural features than he was. Even with all of his complaints about the masonry at Mesa 
Verde, Nordenskiöld confided to his his readers: “I cannot refrain from once more laying 
stress on the skill to which the walls of the Cliff Palace in general bear witness, and the 
stability and strength with which has been supplied to them by the careful dressing of the 
blocks and the chinking of the interstices with small chips of stone.”99 Nordenskiöld’s 
rhetoric demonstrated a dialectic of contempt and attraction, indicating the fascination that 
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crept out from beneath the terministic screen of the technological psychosis. The 
technological psychosis urged these authors to interpret the masonry in cultural-evolutionary 
terms, but their own astonishment as to the workmanship undermined their disdain for the 
builders of Mesa Verde. 
The tension between the technological psychosis and the poetic psychosis also 
showed itself in expressions of consternation that the authors declared, when attempting to 
come to terms with what they experienced at Mesa Verde. For instance, Holmes proclaimed, 
“What could have induced people to build and dwell in such a locality it is useless to 
surmise,” though of course, he did make several guesses as to the motives of the Mesa 
Verdeans.100 Chapin couched his own questions in terms of racial descriptors and mystery, 
wondering “How long since human foot had trod those sandstone floors? Surely not since the 
forgotten prehistoric race had deserted the caves. Certainly no white man had ever entered 
these walls before.”101 Nordenskiöld shared in the bewilderment his peers felt, asking “What 
can have induced a people to have recourse to dwelling-places so incommodious?”102 He 
asked further, “What can have induced an agricultural people to prefer desolate cañons and 
dry sandy plains to fertile mountain slopes . . . Another of the many riddles which confront 
the student of the prehistoric inhabitants of these tracts!”103 Mesa Verde filled these authors 
with questions, and withheld the answers. 
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Though the authors bemoaned the inscrutability of Mesa Verde when discussing their 
interpretations, their use of poetic language in describing the site suggests that they enjoyed 
their time there, and found pleasure in Mesa Verde’s mystique, as they saw it. They added to 
the narrative of wonder by talking about riddles, abandonment, and mystery, sensationalizing 
their accounts. Through their use of language, they demonstrated to their readers the 
fascination they felt for the ancient site. They may have intended to enchant their readers, as 
well, at least by convincing them that Mesa Verde was a wondrous place. 
The example of the authors’ commentary on the masonry at Mesa Verde 
demonstrated the tension between the technological psychosis and poetic enchantment that 
Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin and Nordenskiöld conveyed in the presence of this 
Southwestern antiquity. In the following discussion, I describe unabashed expressions of 
poetry at Mesa Verde, which the technological psychosis deflected and reflected by turns.  
The Poetic Psychosis 
I identify as evidence of the poetic psychosis any profession to wonder, awe, or 
mystery in these authors’ texts. In this discussion of the poetic psychosis, it is key to note the 
authors’ technological psychosis shaped the way they expressed wonder in the face of 
Southwestern antiquities. The myths to which they ascribed also inflected their poetic 
expressions of wonder at Mesa Verde. For whatever astonishment or awe these authors 
claimed to feel while walking in Mesa Verde, they also felt entitled to do as they wished with 
the walls, objects, and buried individuals that they encountered there. They also used the sites 
in order to advance a number of deleterious claims about America’s indigenous peoples.  
Thus far, I have described the ways in which the technological psychosis shaped the 
communication of the adventurers and archaeologists who made Mesa Verde known to the 
149 
 
Anglo-American public. However, it is key to note that all of the men whose works I discuss 
described a combination of professional and more enigmatic reasons for entering the alcove 
dwellings. References to mystery and wonder are signs of the poetic psychosis that 
accompanied the technological one. Holmes remarked that he had been “assigned the very 
agreeable task of making examinations of . . . ancient remains” while he satisfied his “duties” 
as a government geologist.104 Jackson, the photographer, said that he was on a “quest for the 
picturesque,” a fitting mission for a person tasked with capturing the beauty of the west in 
order to promote the Hayden survey.105 As Ingersoll, the journalist, told his story some years 
later, his party had been drawn to the region after having “vaguely heard of marvelous relics 
of a bygone civilization unequaled by anything short of the splendid ruins of Central America 
and the land of the Incas.”106 For Ingersoll, finding the truth in a rumor and witnessing the 
marvelous seemed to be major motivations. Chapin, the mountaineer, admitted that the “[t]he 
spires of the San Juan ranges had exercised a powerful fascination upon [him],” which only 
intensified once he encountered the ancient structures therein.107 For the scholar, 
Nordenskiöld, simply learning about the alcove dwellings from Richard Wetherill was 
enough to inspire curiosity, and later, excavations. Nordenskiöld claimed that his “first ride 
along Mancos Canyon” with Wetherill “inspired [him] with a strong desire to examine [the 
ancient structures] more closely.”108 
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For these authors, the combination of mystery, beauty, and the promise of new 
discovery “inspired” their subsequent actions within the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde. 
They expressed their enchantment with Mesa Verde primarily through their poetic renderings 
of it as a romantic ruin, and through their fanciful interpretations of American Indian culture, 
which fetishized indigenous heritage at the same time that it rendered it poetically. While the 
poetic psychosis accompanied the technological psychosis, typically it supported cultural 
myths that fit poorly within that more rationalistic discourse. The poetic psychosis appealed 
primarily to myths of romantic ruins and primitivism, expressed through the assumption of 
tragedy for the Other. 
Romantic Ruins 
The alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde, and other aged structures throughout the 
American Southwest, never were called “ruins” until non-American Indian travelers 
encountered them and wrote about them. Yet, the authors in this chapter discussed 
Southwestern antiquities as ruins all the time, and routinely used language to frame them as 
such. For these learned men of European descent, we may assume a certain influence from 
Romanticism, the 18th and 19th century literary trend that emphasized transcendence, tragedy, 
and—yes, ruins. Whereas Wordsworth, Shelley, and Coleridge dwelled poetically on abbeys, 
Pompeii, and the like,109 the authors under discussion here surveyed different terrain. Yet, 
through the communication style of the poetic psychosis, Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld turned Mesa Verde into a  place with the aspect of a literary 
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“ruin.” Their frequent reference to the structures in Mesa Verde as ruins certainly 
emphasized this effect.  
All of the authors discussed in this chapter diminished the wonder of Mesa Verde 
through their actions and their professional interpretations, even as they crafted its wonder 
rhetorically for their readership. None of these authors escaped Mesa Verde’s appeal, 
however. In this way, they turned Mesa Verde from a specimen for the technological 
psychosis into a literary ruin, described through the poetic psychosis. For instance, though 
typically a fairly dry writer, geologist Holmes offered a poetic interlude in his report on Mesa 
Verde. Talking about the experiences of a person encountering Mesa Verde for the first time, 
Holmes wrote:  
In one place in particular, a picturesque outstanding promontory has been full of 
dwellings, literally honeycombed by this earth-burrowing race, and as one from 
below views the ragged, window-pierced crags, he is unconsciously led to wonder if 
they are not the ruins of some ancient castle, behind whose moldering walls are 
hidden the dread secrets of a long-forgotten people.110  
In this narrative, Holmes assumed the subject position of a discoverer, and invited his readers 
to do the same. He added mystique to his narrative by rendering the Mesa Verdeans as 
dramatically Other, describing them as a long-forgotten, earth-burrowing race in possession 
of dread secrets. While this was an exotic rendering, with problematic representational 
features, it was a short-lived fancy for Holmes. No sooner did he paint this picture than he 
belittled the sense of wonder he had just cultivated, defining the architecture as a simple 
stronghold, and filled with only modest goods. Even so, the poetic register appeared in 
Holmes’ wandering description of the picturesque at Mesa Verde. 
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In contrast to Holmes’ aesthetic, the journalist Ingersoll favored analogies between 
the Mesa Verdeans and their contemporaneous Old World counterparts. Towards the end of 
the account of his time at Mesa Verde, Ingersoll implored future travelers to the region never 
to “forget how populous was this dry and garish valley during those bygone days, when the 
Crusaders were waking up in Europe, and all that was known of America was that the 
Basque fishermen went to the fog-banks of an icy western coast to catch codfish.”111 By 
emphasizing all that was unknown about Mesa Verde until the Hayden survey, Ingersoll 
made it sound like part of a New World, indeed. Ingersoll, further, was the only one of these 
authors to include actual poetry in his discussion of Mesa Verde. Ingersoll concluded his 
chapter on the ancient architecture of the San Juan Basin by quoting a poem written by an 
acquaintance, “in Swinburnian measure.”112  
The poem Ingersoll included in his account, written by Stanley Wood, described a 
collection of ancient structures in a nearby region, overlooking a river named Hovenweep. 
Wood described the antiquities’ setting as a desolate land “Beloved of the sun, and bereft of 
the rain” in which the “wild winds” blew “o’er the plains of the dead.” As in Holmes’ 
interlude, Wood portrayed the ancient structures as castles, “like the nest of a swallow” 
where no one dared to go. The poet wrote of shrines and altars, and silence interrupted only 
by cries of birds. In the final stanza of the poem, Wood personified the remaining structures 
at Hovenweep, and described them as sentries:  
Dismantled towers, and turrets broken, 
Like grim and war-worn braves who keep 
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A silent guard, with grief unspoken,  
Watch o’er the graves by the Hoven-weep. 
The nameless graves of a race forgotten; 
Whose deeds, whose words, whose fate are one 
With the mist, long ages past begotten, 
Of the Sun.113  
Though offered in more florid language than the authors’ prose, Wood’s poem contained 
many of the same cultural biases of the scientists, journalist, and adventurer whose texts I 
assess here. For instance, describing the towers “[l]ike grim and war-worn braves” certainly 
evoked the trope of the noble savage. Meanwhile, as Wood pondered upon the romances of 
the “maidens loved, and lovers daunted,” a dreamy tone also emerged as a fashion of the 
epoch. Finally, Wood’s emphasis on the mystique of the ancient structures of the Southwest 
emphasized the aesthetic of fascination that the other authors put forth as well.114   
Chapin was a man of words more than a man of science, much like Ingersoll and his 
poet friend, Wood. Accordingly, Chapin presented many poetic descriptions of Mesa Verde. 
Given Chapin’s fame as a mountaineer, his conviction that the setting of Mesa Verde added 
to the allure of his time there is fitting:  
Perhaps these same ruins, if placed on a plain or in a quiet valley, would not appeal so 
strongly to our sense of the marvelous; here, in a remote cañon, far from the river, far 
from water of any kind, with high frowning walls upon three sides, and an untracked 
ravine below it, one wonders why the lost tribes should have selected such a place for 
their home.115  
Chapin explicitly referred to the “sense of the marvelous” that drew him to Mesa Verde, and 
referenced wonder, as well. Though a problematic figure in many regards, Chapin was very 
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open to the quality of fascination that operated in the discourse of Mesa Verde, and even 
accentuated it in his own writings. He remarked on the “beauty and magnitude” of Cliff 
Palace and other locales in great detail, though favored the contrast between the beauty of the 
mountains and the alcove dwellings and what he perceived as the desolate surroundings for 
both.116  
Nordenskiöld also used poetic language to describe the alcove dwellings at Mesa 
Verde. He found them to possess “an aspect at once singular and imposing . . . perched like 
an eagle’s eyrie half-way up the most inaccessible precipices.”117 He referred to the path 
towards the mesa as “a perfect labyrinth to the uninitiated.”118 When discussing his findings, 
Nordenskiöld admitted that the “still scanty information of the cliff-dwellers [could not] lift 
the veil of obscurity” covering the site.119 Imposing eyries, labyrinths requiring initiation in 
order to pass, and veils of obscurity–these read like the stuff of magic. Nordenskiöld joined 
the other authors in writing about Mesa Verde as if it were otherworldly.  
The preceding poetic descriptions of Mesa Verde portrayed the place as strange and 
enchanting. Each of the authors communicated picturesque and dramatic elements of the 
alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde, often relying on stereotypes about American Indian people 
in order to portray the mystique of the site. Such stereotypes were evidence of the myths of 
primitivism and white superiority that were prevalent in the nineteenth century. Though 
much of the authors’ poetic writing about the Mesa Verdeans and their descendants 
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emphasized their alterity, there were occasional gestures to assume the perspective of the 
alcove dwellings’ architects. These humanizing commentaries typically adopted poetic 
language, as well.  
More than the other authors, Chapin attempted to imagine himself in the subject 
position of the Mesa Verdeans. For example, he described viewing the same panoramas that 
the Mesa Verdeans had seen. He found “hewn steps on the face of the cliff, and descending 
by them, as members of the tribe must have done, --as perhaps their ferocious adversaries 
may have done also,” he reached his destination in a contemplative mood.120 It is intriguing 
that Chapin identified both with the Mesa Verdeans and with their “ferocious adversaries” 
when taking the steps into the gorge; however, his reflection on the bodily position of the 
Mesa Verdeans suggests a willingness to sympathize with those people. Yet, Chapin’s 
perceived connection with the Mesa Verdeans did not translate into more compassionate 
regard for their descendants, nor for any other minority group. Chapin held his racial biases 
and his fellow-feeling towards the Mesa Verdeans at the same time.  He comingled the 
technological and poetic psychoses, but always adhered to modern myths that disparaged 
non-white social actors. 
The recognition of humanity in the Mesa Verdeans showed in one other marked way 
in these writings, in a fascinating parallel across most of these authors’ works. Jackson, 
Holmes, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld all commented on the fact that the fingermarks of the 
Mesa Verdean masons still could be seen in the mortar of their buildings. Holmes noted that 
“impressions of the minute markings of the cuticle of the fingers” were evident in the 
                                                 
120 Chapin, Loc. 1482.  
156 
 
mortar.121 Nordenskiöld, though disagreeing with Jackson’s technical assessment of the 
masonry work, remarked that “the finger marks of the masons still [could] be traced in the 
mortar.”122 In tours today, NPS interpretive rangers still draw visitor attention to the enduring 
fingerprints of the Mesa Verdeans. This, like other attributes of the site, attracts 
contemporary visitors as much as it once charmed the nineteenth century authors who 
interacted with Mesa Verde. Such humanizing depictions evinced the poetic psychosis, rather 
than the technological one. 
From this discussion of these authors’ expressions of wonder at Mesa Verde, we may 
conclude that Mesa Verde “exercised a powerful fascination” on Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, 
Chapin, and Nordenskiöld.123 Yet, it is difficult to attribute a positive ethic to the quality of 
fascination that appeared so prominently in these authors’ texts. While admiration was one 
component of what these authors expressed, it was coupled with fetishism and the regular 
assertion of the authors’ own cultural superiority. The sensational way in which these authors 
engaged with Mesa Verde served to distance them from the Mesa Verdeans. Given the 
authors’ references to cultural evolution, and hence, a belief in their own racial superiority, 
any effort to Other the Mesa Verdeans connected ideologically to the tenets of cultural 
evolution and other prevalent cultural myths of their time. In such a configuration, if the 
Mesa Verdeans were interesting or peculiar, it was due, in part, to their lesser ranking on an 
evolutionary scale. Through the poetic language these authors used, their impressions of the 
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Mesa Verdeans as curiosities overshadowed their occasional attempts to regard the Mesa 
Verdeans as complete, complex people.  
Tragic Fates 
As the preceding discussion illustrated, Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld demonstrated a poetic psychosis when they described Mesa Verde to their 
readers. Imaginative depictions of Mesa Verde as a literary ruin illustrated the poetic 
psychosis, and that psychosis also appeared in the authors’ occasional attempts to humanize 
the Mesa Verdeans. They exhibited wonder in the presence of Mesa Verde, and they 
exhibited it through the use of poetic language. These authors also adopted charged language 
to describe the Mesa Verdeans, themselves, as well as the American Indian people whom 
they encountered over the course of their field work. Whereas their infatuation with place 
demonstrated a form of esteem, their poetic psychosis towards the Mesa Verdeans and their 
descendants tended to fetishize those people, typically by framing them as tragic figures out 
of legend. 
All of the authors hazarded a few guesses about what life must have been like for the 
Mesa Verdeans. All of the authors, further, assumed that life was nasty, brutish, and short, at 
least insofar as violence was a foregone conclusion for Mesa Verdeans, in the minds of these 
nineteenth-century authors. Typically, though, Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld depicted the supposedly violent lives of the Mesa Verdeans with relish, and 
painted a tragic tale about those people in great detail. The poetic psychosis informed their 
interpretations of the Mesa Verdeans at least as much as the technological psychosis did. 
Holmes was the most succinct of these authors, in his interpretations of the alcove 
dwellings and their architects. He imagined “that no ordinary circumstances could have 
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driven a people” to build within the alcoves, but rather, the threat of war must have done it.124 
Jackson, for his part, was also modest in his interpretive claims about the Mesa Verdeans, 
saying it did “not seem worth while . . . to advance any theories” about them.125 He did, 
however, quote at length from a New York Tribune article published earlier in the year by 
Ingersoll, recounting a story about Mesa Verde told to them by their local guide. In this story, 
“troublesome neighbors—ancestors of the present Utes—began to forage upon [the Mesa 
Verdeans], and, at last, to massacre them and devastate their farms; so, to save their lives at 
least, they built houses high upon the cliffs.”126 After the “long fight,” the story held that 
those who survived moved to Arizona and became the “Moquis . . . preserving more 
carefully and purely the history and veneration of their forefathers than their skill or 
wisdom.”127 In Jackson’s telling, the move into the alcoves was an act of desperation, 
because a nomadic group was thought to have preyed on an agricultural group. When settlers 
and their government witnessed the descendants of the surviving agricultural people, they 
considered them a lesser version of the Mesa Verdeans.  
In his full text, Ingersoll added to his earlier newspaper coverage, portraying the 
Mesa Verdeans as “gentle shepherds and husbandmen (but no less brave warriors).”128 He 
used the architecture he observed to develop an argument about how “sharp and incessant 
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was the lookout [the alcove communities] kept against well-mounted and savage nomadic 
tribes, the prehistoric Utes and Apaches and Navajos, who were to them as the Scythians and 
the Vandals and Goths to the weakened empire of effeminate Rome.”129 Though Ingersoll 
meant to do the Mesa Verdeans a credit, one supposes, in comparing them to an effeminate 
Rome, nevertheless he cast aspersions upon the nomadic groups of the Southwest. Ingersoll 
romanticized the duress of war more than Jackson and Holmes before him, but arrived at 
many of the same conclusions about the lifestyle and motivations of the Mesa Verdeans. 
Chapin imagined conflict with still more vigor than Ingersoll displayed, telling his 
readers that throughout Mesa Verde there was “evidence” that “savage warriors once 
struggled and battled for the possession of the land.”130 Like the others, Chapin concluded 
that “the inhabitants lived in fear of attack from outside enemies.”131 Chapin agreed with 
Holmes’ assessment that the alcove dwellings were undesirable places in which to live, 
commenting upon “[w]hat a dark and gloomy place did these mysterious people select for 
their home, their fortress, whichever name we may give to it! A stronghold surely it was . . . 
and the vertical cliffs could not be scaled when rocks were being hurled from battlement and 
tower above.”132 It is Chapin’s evocation of rock-flinging, in particular, that indicates the 
more imaginative narrative he presented of the Mesa Verdeans, compared to his peers. In 
general, though, his conclusions were consistent with those of the other authors. 
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Like the rest, Nordenskiöld assumed that life for the Mesa Verdeans centered on 
defense, considering it “and fortification of the dwelling [to be] uppermost in the mind of its 
builders.”133 Nordenskiöld concurred with the other authors in presuming “that the 
immigrants, constantly menaced by their enemies, first took refuge in caves and recesses 
fortified by the hand of nature and offering a safe retreat.”134 Nordenskiöld commented on 
the defensive position of several of the dwellings with which he interacted, and whether or 
not the inhabitants of particular dwellings “succumbed to their enemies.”135  
Current archaeologists concur with some of what these nineteenth-century authors 
concluded, agreeing that the architecture at Mesa Verde indicates that defense was one of the 
factors that the architects of the alcove dwellings considered when they chose to build their 
homes in canyon walls. Current archaeologists do suggest that a combination of activities 
resulted in the early demise of some of the people who once lived at Mesa Verde.136 
However, much of what distinguishes the current era of anthropological writing from the 
nineteenth-century interpretations is the effort to regard the actions of those in the past within 
a framework of cultural relativism, and with the assumption of agency on the part of the 
social actors who participated in various practices. Further, in light of the influence of post-
modernism, anthropological writing today typically resists the assumption that anything 
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people do is inherent to their nature, culture, or upbringing.137 By contrast, Jackson, Holmes, 
Ingersoll, Chapin and Nordenskiöld treated violence as an intrinsic part of life for all 
indigenous peoples of the Americas, and as evidence of some evolutionary shortcoming, as 
well. Even so, they enjoyed describing that violence, and it provoked some of their most 
poetic language. It was no iteration of the technological psychosis to dwell on the tragic fates 
of the Mesa Verdeans, but an allusion to other cultural myths prevalent at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Namely, these authors appealed to myths of primitivism and the noble 
savage, alongside racial stereotypes that presumed indigenous people were doomed to lives 
of violence. 
In summary, the authors who introduced Mesa Verde to the Anglo-American public 
communicated both the poetic psychosis and the technological psychosis. They 
communicated the influence of the poetic psychosis through their transmogrification of 
ancient structures into literary ruins, and in their fetishizing rhetoric about the Mesa Verdeans 
and their supposedly tragic fate. Both the technological psychosis and the poetic psychosis 
informed the authors’ discussions of the state of preservation at Mesa Verde, though both 
forms of communicative engagement with Mesa Verde screened the damage that the authors 
caused to that ancient place. 
Preservation Advocacy 
As Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld discussed their time in 
Mesa Verde, the technological and poetic psychoses overlapped. The authors emphasized the 
romance and mystique of Mesa Verde at the same time that they classified and scrutinized 
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the site through their research methods. They admired the works of the Mesa Verdeans at the 
same time that they worked to establish Mesa Verdean inferiority. They imagined themselves 
looking at the same vistas the Mesa Verdeans saw, at the same time that they looked down on 
contemporary indigenous peoples. Based on their texts, it seems that these authors found 
nothing incongruous about their joint fascination and scholarly detachment, with its 
accompanying belittlement. Similarly, they did not describe it as dissonant that they damaged 
Mesa Verde while examining it, nor that they made declarations about archaeological 
preservation and allied social issues while exacerbating the need for both. 
History does not remember any of these authors as preservation advocates; they were 
not. However, some of the authors discussed here did offer opinions about the state of 
preservation at Mesa Verde, and about related issues. Though most were impressed by the 
endurance of the site, Jackson, for one, bemoaned the fact that a collection of rooms he and 
his party located “had all been despoiled” prior to their arrival.138 Given that Jackson’s group 
had entered the room with the intention of despoiling it themselves, this could hardly be 
called preservation advocacy. Nordenskiöld, for his part, also commented on the state of 
preservation of various parts of the site that he had occasion to excavate. On the whole, 
Nordenskiöld felt that he “should have preferred to investigate places that had not been 
touched before.”139 Like Jackson, Nordenskiöld wished that others had not taken objects out 
of Mesa Verde before him. Both authors mostly expressed their disgruntlement as the result 
of having been denied a more pristine hunting ground for themselves. In this, Jackson and 
Nordenskiöld exhibited the technological psychosis. 
                                                 
138 Jackson, 19. 
139 Nordenskiöld, 22. 
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In terms of archaeological ethics, surprisingly, it was the mountaineer and outspoken 
cultural evolutionist Frederick Chapin who spoke with the most prescience about the future 
of Mesa Verde. Though he saw “no reason why, if unmolested, the walls [at Mesa Verde] 
should not stand a thousand years as we now see them,” Chapin expressed his ardent wish 
that only people with the correct qualifications conduct work on the site.140 Chapin hoped: 
. . . that any work which may be done here in the future will be carried on under 
competent supervision, and that the walls will not be damaged in any way. Collectors, 
so far, have been very thoughtful. With a suitable appropriation, this structure could 
be so arranged that it could be converted into a museum, and be filled with relics of 
the lost people, and become one of the attractions of southern Colorado.141  
I hesitate to call this an example of preservation advocacy for three reasons. First, Chapin 
eagerly wished for archaeological work to continue at Mesa Verde, and archaeological work 
was and is inherently destructive. Second, Chapin wanted Mesa Verde to become an 
“attraction,” which is another purpose for the site that is inherently destructive. Finally, 
Chapin viewed the damages to the site prior to his visit as the results of time or of 
inconsiderate collectors, and not of individuals we would now consider as pot-hunters or 
overly aggressive archaeologists. Even taking Chapin’s cultural context into account, the fact 
remains that the people who had preceded him had altered the site dramatically and 
irrevocably. In expressing his hopes for preservation, however, Chapin illustrated dimensions 
of the poetic psychosis. 
In terms of allied social issues, Chapin, though laudatory about the ease with which 
one could take the train into the Southwest, mourned the presence of industry in the mountain 
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141 Ibid., Loc. 1664. 
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ranges, indicating that mineral extraction disrupted his enjoyment of the outdoors. While 
traveling in the proximity of a mine, for example, Chapin said he felt he was “not in a very 
wild country, [having been] preceded by many.”142 Chapin regretted the deforestation of the 
mountain ranges as well, saying that in a town close to Mesa Verde “the axe [was] already at 
work, and the town-folk [needed to] look out for the future, before it [was] too late to 
preserve the forests.”143 Chapin’s conservationist remarks were situated within a 
conversation about adventure and the picturesque. It was apparently for these reasons, rather 
than environmental responsibility, that Chapin opined about the negative effects of industry 
and deforestation. Notably, the technological psychosis was not a factor in Chapin’s 
conservationist attitude. Indeed, he opposed the overuse of the forests. 
Nordenskiöld alone commented on the quality of life of the American Indian peoples 
near Mesa Verde. Nordenskiöld fell short of advocating for indigenous rights, as such, but 
recorded frank remarks about life for the Ute Indians, noting that they, like most other 
American Indian peoples, were “rapidly dying out, and form[ed] but the last remnant of a 
once great and powerful nation.”144 While this comment seemed to be tinged with some 
regret, and appeared to recognize indigenous sovereignty, referring to the extinction of a 
group of people dehumanized the people in question. In a similar line of thought, 
Nordenskiöld brought up a proposal that would have offered “the surviving Ute Indians . . . 
another territory in some part of Utah where the hunting [was] said to be more productive, 
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and the pasturage better, and where, above all, no white neighbours as yet dispute[d] the 
possession of the soil.”145 Nordenskiöld seemed to critique the fact that the proposal had been 
“mooted,” though critiqued its rejection obliquely, at best.146 Nordenskiöld also seemed to 
recognize the white settlers’ threat to the American Indian people in the Southwest, tacitly 
acknowledging that American Indian people were likely to suffer losses in land disputes with 
white settlers. On the whole, though, Nordenskiöld’s commentary on the well-being of the 
Ute he encountered served as context for his study, rather than a key focus for it. The 
distance with which he referred to tense intercultural relationships in the American 
Southwest was most consistent with the technological psychosis. 
The opinions that Chapin and Nordenskiöld gave on matters related to preservation 
advocacy demonstrate that, even in the nineteenth century, observers connected the well-
being of Mesa Verde with environmental preservation, the presence or absence of industry, 
archaeological practice, tourism, and the federal government’s treatment of contemporary 
American Indian peoples. Yet, the authors discussed here entered the ancient structures with 
motivated self-interest, building their reputations through tales of grandeur, and defending 
the ideologically-destructive tenets of cultural evolution through biased interpretations of the 
Mesa Verdeans. While they may have expressed fascination with what they observed at Mesa 
Verde, their remarks of respect for Mesa Verdeans were sparse and often grudging. Their 
wishes for the ongoing treatment of Mesa Verde reflected their valuation of the site as a 
domain for archaeologists and a resource for personal enjoyment.    
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Conclusion 
Over the course of this chapter, I have claimed that the authors who introduced Mesa 
Verde to the English-speaking public demonstrated aspects of both the technological 
psychosis and the poetic psychosis. Drawing from dramatism, I have defined the 
communication pattern of the technological psychosis as one typical of researchers and 
modernity, which advances the myth of the scientific hero, the rationality of science, and 
various modes of classification, while emphasizing the use value of various resources above 
other considerations. When Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin and Nordenskiöld applied the 
technological psychosis towards their interpretations of indigenous peoples, they classified 
American Indian cultures according to the condescending theory of cultural evolution. The 
purported objectivity of the technological psychosis obfuscated the racial prejudice that these 
authors advanced in the name of science, and deflected attention from the destructiveness of 
their field methods. 
I have developed the poetic psychosis as the foil and companion to the technological 
psychosis. As I understand it, the poetic psychosis is evident in a communicative style that 
embraces wonder, awe, and enchantment. The authors whose texts I study in this chapter 
demonstrated the poetic psychosis in their astonishment at the feats of the Mesa Verdeans, 
their poetic transformation of an ancient place into a literary ruin, and their obsession with 
the tragic fate of the Mesa Verdeans. Whereas narratives in the technological psychosis 
emphasized myths about reason and racial superiority, language reflecting the poetic 
psychosis romanticized the Other, advancing myths like primitivism and the noble savage, 
instead. Both of these psychoses screened rhetorically the physical and social damage that 
these authors encouraged through their interpretations of Mesa Verde. 
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Whereas Burke enjoyed Veblen’s concept of the trained incapacity because of its 
ambivalence for critical analysis, I intend for the term “psychosis” to be understood 
ambivalently, as well. I do not intend for the term to imply that these authors displayed 
mental illness, nor do I necessarily intend for the term to intimate that the authors used 
language pathologically. Rather, they used language to shape facts in a manner that reflected 
reality selectively. The technological and poetic psychoses were mindsets, certainly, in the 
manner by which Dewey and Burke described them. They also encouraged selective 
renderings of the phenomena that the explorers and archaeologists in this chapter 
encountered, and perpetuated cultural myths that reaffirmed the professions and social 
positions of those who exhibited those psychoses. All rhetoric is but a partial representation; 
these were especially focused partialities. 
My joint analysis of the technological and poetic psychoses that shaped Mesa Verde’s 
Anglo-American public debut calls to mind other scholarship pertaining to the era in which 
Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld practiced their trades, and the eras 
preceding it. For instance, Jason Josephson-Storm has identified bimodal thinking in the 
works of noteworthy Enlightenment thinkers, where magical thinking and scientific 
rationality coexisted with, co-constituted, and challenged one another.147 Josephson-Storm 
claims that such an entanglement between enchantment and myths of disenchantment formed 
a major component of the discourses of modernity. Jane Bennett, like Josephson-Storm, has 
proposed that expressions of rationality during the modern era never diminished 
enchantment, though narratives such as those stemming from the technological psychosis 
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proposed that disenchantment was a fait accompli. Bennett, too, has observed that narratives 
of both rationality and enchantment often coincide.  
Within the context of settler colonialism, the bimodal thinking that the technological 
and poetic psychoses indicate often assumes a prejudicial form. Saurabh Dube has noted 
competing myths of modernity, particularly in contexts of settler colonialism, where 
subaltern peoples historically have received mystical descriptions in contrast to the 
supposedly rationalistic and advanced categorizations for colonial powers and their 
institutions. Colonial agencies described subaltern peoples as referents of a pre-modern or 
pre-industrial time, enchanting and inferior by turns, and radically different from dominant 
social formations. The difference itself was enchanting, and so was the myth of that 
difference. In the United States, specifically, Philip Deloria has studied the ways in which 
racism and primitivism were the two primary interpretive modes that white social actors used 
to understand the American Indian people about whom they communicated during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By my own understanding, the technological 
psychosis encouraged scientifically-supported racism through cultural evolutionary thinking, 
whereas the poetic psychosis encouraged the fetishization and romanticism that accompanied 
the myth of primitivism. 
This chapter enters into these conversations by reinforcing such researchers’ 
premises. It supports the claim that disenchantment is an enchantment, albeit a mythic one 
rather than a poetic one, and expressed primarily through the myth of scientific rationality. It 
finds that the rhetoric of reason and the rhetoric of enchantment often appear in tandem, 
coupled together in expressions of scientific irrationality. It concludes that scientific racism 
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and fetishization of the Other are two complementary expressions of racial prejudice. This 
chapter also makes its own interventions. 
To begin with, this analysis indicates that scientism and romanticism both were 
present in discourse about Southwestern antiquities from their entry into Anglo-American 
public consciousness. The thrills of intellectual discovery and phenomenal encounter both 
featured early on as values for Southwestern antiquities. Whereas social actors like those 
whom I studied in this chapter often found Southwestern antiquities (and sometimes their 
architects) to be praiseworthy, researchers shaped their findings about these sites to fit 
mainstream attitudes. Both the technological and poetic psychoses valued the materiality of 
Mesa Verde, whether for research or romanticism. Both also appropriated the site for Anglo-
American uses, while amplifying the alterity of American Indian peoples through scientific 
distance or fetishistic narratives. 
As a basis for preservation advocacy, Mesa Verde’s introduction to the English-
speaking public may have encouraged technological and poetic curiosities, and care for the 
site of Mesa Verde on those grounds. The preservation advocates whose works I analyze in 
the next chapter certainly demonstrated both. They also introduced the well-being of their 
American Indian contemporaries as a pressing social issue that accompanied their advocacy 
on behalf of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest. Both the technological 
and poetic psychoses continued to inform Anglo-American comportment towards indigenous 
heritage, while the advocates diverged in their poetic forms during their attempts to safeguard 
ancient places—and indigenous people. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESERVATION ADVOCACY AT 
THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The previous chapter detailed the ways in which self-described adventurers and 
archaeologists introduced Mesa Verde to the Anglo-American public at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In this chapter, I examine the rhetoric of three representative preservation 
advocates who both combatted and reaffirmed many of the rhetorical tendencies of 
individuals like Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld. Those adventurers 
and archaeologists, alongside newspapers, early tourists, other researchers, and the ranching 
family of Wetherills, brought increased attention to Mesa Verde and other ancient structures 
in the American Southwest. Events such as the 1876 Centennial Exposition and the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 solidified the antiquities of the Southwest as 
wonders of the American West. At those events, fabulous images, scale-models, and displays 
of artifacts made Mesa Verde accessible to the American public as never before. With 
increasing renown came increasing damage to the structures at Mesa Verde, and growing 
public sentiment that something had to be done to safeguard alcove dwellings and other 
antiquities before they were destroyed. 
The preservation advocates whose works I explore in this chapter are Adolph 
Bandelier (1840-1914), Virginia (Donaghé) McClurg (1857-1931), and Edgar Lee Hewett 
(1865-1946). All three of these historical figures participated in excavations in the American 
Southwest, and also worked to preserve Southwestern antiquities. Bandelier was an 
ethnologist and sometime- archaeologist. He is noteworthy as the first scholar to raise alarm 
over vandalism to an indigenous heritage place in the American Southwest. McClurg was a 
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socialite who visited Mesa Verde as a freelance journalist as a young woman, and later 
founded the Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association in order to set aside Mesa Verde as a 
protected park. Hewett was an archaeologist with political connections in Washington, DC. 
Hewett spent most of his career studying Chaco Canyon, and he helped draft the Antiquities 
Act of 1906. These three advocates are representative of the early days of preservation 
advocacy in the United States. All three were elite, well-traveled, and white. All valued what 
they could learn from ancient indigenous places.  They all coupled their advocacy on behalf 
of ancient indigenous places with commentary on the United States government’s failings 
towards contemporary indigenous people, and blended the poetics of place with a poetics of 
people, often fetishizing both in their narrative framings. These advocates advanced myths 
like primitivism, cultural evolution, and paternal benevolence, while they added to the luster 
of places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon through their enchanted rhetorics of place.  
For all of their similarities, these three advocates expressed their values and concerns 
in somewhat divergent ways. They described their historical situation differently, and the 
roles they adopted with reference to it. In order to assess the divergent frames of preservation 
advocacy at the turn of the twentieth century, I refer to dramatism, its frames of rejection and 
acceptance, and the three poetic categories that constituted the primary frames of acceptance: 
the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy. With the aid of those theoretical insights, I examine 
three approaches to advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous heritage and living American 
Indian peoples practiced near the turn of the twentieth century. I conclude that the way these 
advocates framed their political engagement supported prevalent features of the mythology 
or collective poem of their time, in spite of differences in framing. 
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In this chapter, I expand upon my interpretation of Burke’s frames and poetic 
categories, and their relation to rhetorical enchantments. I describe the historical moment in 
which Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett intervened, before discussing the role of rhetorical 
rejection in these three authors’ works with reference to their advocacy on behalf of ancient 
indigenous places and the rights of American Indian contemporaries. Then I undertake a 
sustained analysis of each author’s preferred frame of acceptance, claiming that Bandelier 
favored tragedy, McClurg favored the epic, and Hewett favored comedy. I conclude the 
chapter with a brief comparison of the authors’ rhetorical strategies. The discussion of this 
chapter’s theoretical orientation is next. 
Frames, Poetic Categories, and Rhetorical Enchantments 
I draw from dramatism in my analysis of the rhetoric of three representative 
preservation advocates from the turn of the twentieth century. Specifically, I refer to Kenneth 
Burke’s frames and attitudes in my analysis. I adopt these concepts with reference to the 
theme of rhetorical enchantment that runs across all of the chapters of this dissertation. 
Through their inclusion of myths and poetics, Burke’s narrative frames offer another 
perspective on the workings of rhetorical enchantment. Specifically, the narrative frames that 
I identify within the works of these preservation advocates were poetic engagements with 
myths. Given that each of the advocates whom I discuss described their historical 
circumstances by way of conspicuous literary styles, Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett all 
worked to mythologize their efforts in archaeology, ethnology, and preservation advocacy. 
These rhetors used language to enhance the grandeur of their actions, demonstrating their 
own enchantment with what they did, and their intent to enchant their audiences. 
176 
 
Burke approached the concept of the frame from multiple directions. For one thing, 
Burke claimed that historical eras each had their own frames, and that such epochal framing 
would always eventually fail, only to be replaced by another frame that better fit the 
historical moment. In broad strokes, the modern framing that I have outlined in the previous 
chapter applies in my analysis of the preservation advocates in this chapter.1 The modern 
frame accepted hierarchies in race, class, sex, and gender, privileged reason and scientific 
inquiry, and naturalized empire and colonialism. As I have claimed previously, this type of 
framing was a collection of myths. While the myths of the modern frame may not have 
represented the world as it was, they served to set agendas, define circumstances, and 
normalize many social actions.  
Dramatism implies that narrative frames are rhetorical, and can encourage attitudes in 
their audiences. 2 Burke defined an attitude as an “incipient program of action,”3 which 
narrative frames helped to define. Framing was also a way of defining a rhetor’s role within a 
historical moment, and indicating his or her proposed course of action and the myths that 
accompanied that action. When the authors discussed in the previous chapter framed 
themselves as heroes on an epic journey of discovery, they normalized their destructive 
behavior within the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde. Their self-representation—their framing 
of themselves—indicated they had few qualms about pursuing new knowledge at any cost. 
Simultaneously, they mythologized the pursuit of knowledge. In this chapter, Bandelier’s 
framing of Puebloans within the narrative of a tragedy, for instance, indicated his basis for 
                                                 
1 By “modern framing” I refer to a framing of modernity. 
2 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1961), 40. 
3 Ibid., 20. 
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interfering paternalistically in their affairs. The myths he appealed to, and the literary style of 
his rhetoric, demonstrated his inclinations towards a program of action.   
In addition to referring to frames as features of historical epochs, or carriers of 
attitudes, Burke also examined frames as poetic categories. This, alongside their pertinence 
to cultural myths, is their closest connection to the dissertation’s overarching theme of 
rhetorical enchantment and its emphasis on poetics. Burke referred to poetic categories such 
as the epic, the tragedy, and the comedy as framing devices “whereby the mind equip[ped] 
itself to name and confront its situation.”4 Frames could become “‘collective poems,’ the 
total frames of thought and action”5 that defined an era, or they might operate on a more 
granular level. In any event, “the individual’s frame [was] built of materials from the 
collective frame.”6 Frames were a narrativization of a moment, crafted by individuals and 
appealing to collective attitudes, which enabled social actors to make sense of their own 
place in history while encouraging the norms of their epoch. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I consider a frame a kind of literary device that 
social actors might apply in defining their real situation, or a type of storytelling that might 
be endemic to a particular historical situation. Since frames may assume the form of a 
“collective poem,” they can contain the kind of mythology that I attend to in my discussions 
of the myths of modernity. Frames might also appear in less generalized iterations, related as 
parts to a whole. The preservation advocates whose rhetoric I assess in this chapter wrote in 
reference to the collective poems of their day, and also used individualized literary framing 
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of their own moment in order to intervene in history. All of them, even as they accepted 
many prevailing norms within the collective poem of modernity, attempted to change norms 
through rejections of vandalism at Southwestern antiquities, and by rejecting the 
government’s comportment towards indigeneity 
Indeed, Burke theorized narrative frames in terms of whether they accepted or 
rejected the conditions of a historical moment. Burke claimed, by “‘frames of acceptance’ we 
mean the more or less organized system of meaning by which a thinking man gauges the 
historical situation and adopts a role with relation to it.”7 Burke claimed that the poetic 
categories of the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy accepted circumstances, whether through 
resignation to failure, identification with a hero, or through levity and critique in the face of 
tragedy. Burke considered frames of rejection more narrowly, and listed poetic categories 
such as “the plaint or elegy, satire, burlesque and the grotesque” as frames of rejection.8 
These were frames of rejection in the sense that they rejected particular historical 
circumstances, often through accusation, lament, mockery, or caricature. Rejection and 
acceptance were two parts of a whole, however, and any frame that rejected one condition 
likely accepted another—and vice versa. Because of the complementarity of acceptance and 
rejection within dramatistic theory, I address both in the forthcoming discussion.  
Rhetorical critics who engage with dramatism today have observed inconsistencies in 
Burke’s assignations of poetic categories, their specific functions, and whether or not they 
encourage or inhibit political action. For instance, they have observed ambiguities in the 
ways that Burke, himself, defined the various poetic frames. In my own engagement with 
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frames of acceptance and rejection and their accompanying poetic categories, I have adapted 
dramatism to accommodate the kinds of discourse forwarded by Bandelier, McClurg, and 
Hewett. For my purposes, frames of rejection are poetic styles that resist circumstances 
(through condemnation or mockery), and frames of acceptance are poetic styles that condone 
or at least forebear circumstances (through resignation, praise, or measured critique). The 
binary of rejection/acceptance is of less interest to me than the ways in which preservation 
advocates at the turn of the twentieth century turned to diverse poetic framing techniques in 
order to advance a variety of myths and social causes, and the ways in which they situated 
themselves within the task of preservation advocacy.  
Burke’s thoughts on the topic of poetic categories as rhetorical framing devices are 
helpful in my ongoing investigation of rhetorical enchantments because of their relation to 
myth and poetics. Collective poems are mythologies; frames relate to myths, in that they 
offer a narrative style that naturalizes a set of attitudes contained within a frame. Usually the 
attitudes that frames naturalize are myths or have mythic components. In the preservation 
advocates’ rhetoric, Bandelier’s framing of himself as a narrator to another culture’s tragic 
demise naturalized Bandelier’s belief in the superiority of white culture. McClurg’s framing 
of herself as a trailblazing hero in an epic about adventure and advocacy naturalized her 
belief in her right to intervene in indigenous heritage management, and also normalized white 
pioneer culture and myths of the Western frontier at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Hewett’s adoption of the comic frame to critique his archaeologist peers and to elevate the 
Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants promoted myths about universal humanism—and 
also continued to naturalize belief in the theory of cultural evolution as well as the myth of 
antimodern primitivism. All of these authors adopted divergent poetic categories in order to 
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make sense of their own situation, and yet all of them at one point or another appealed to the 
collective poems—the modern mythology—of their era. 
Burke’s frames of acceptance and rejection relate to the poetic aspect of rhetorical 
enchantment by virtue of their status as poetic categories. Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett 
all indicated their infatuation with their sites of research, work, and advocacy through their 
uses of language. The fact that their rhetoric conspicuously took on narrative styles such as 
the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy indicates how deeply entranced they were with their 
topics of engagement. Their narrative styles emphasized the enchantment they felt in the 
presence of antiquities as well as, at times, in the presence of indigenous people. The poetics 
of preservation advocacy, meanwhile, encouraged acceptance of a variety of cultural 
myths—some novel to these preservation advocates, and some reiterative of the 
archaeologists and adventurers from the previous chapter. Whereas the authors often 
expressed their enchantment with indigenous heritage through densely-connotative and 
fantastical language, the majority of this chapter focuses on the ways in which their rhetoric 
aligned with particular poetic categories, rather than on the poeticism of their language, itself. 
This is a departure from the previous chapter, in which I attempted to establish the scientific 
irrationality of those who introduced Mesa Verde to the Anglo-American public. The same 
emphasis on the poetics of place that the authors in chapter two demonstrated endured, and 
even increased, in the works of the preservation advocates. 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett all chose to express themselves poetically when they 
advocated on behalf of Southwestern antiquities—and on behalf of indigenous peoples. Their 
choices in narrative style amplified the romance of the historical moment, and their roles 
within it. The stories that Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett told when defending indigenous 
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heritage illustrated their own enchantment with antiquities and indigeneity, and worked to 
enchant audiences by way of attractive stories couched in familiar cultural myths—and in 
familiar literary forms.  
Before discussing how Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett poetically oriented 
themselves towards their historical situation, I describe their historical context and advocacy 
interventions in more detail. What is most striking about these preservation advocates, and 
sets them apart from their contemporaries and forebears, is their articulation of advocacy on 
behalf of antiquities with advocacy on behalf of living indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, 
their advocacy on behalf of American Indian people often assumed the myths of cultural 
evolution and paternal benevolence, and it was tainted by racial prejudice. I will return to 
these claims later in the chapter. Additionally, I will expand upon Burke’s theorization of the 
poetic categories of the tragedy, the epic, and comedy as I discuss Bandelier, McClurg, and 
Hewett, respectively. 
The Historical Moment 
In outlining their historical moment, I offer additional justification for selecting 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett as representative preservation advocates from the turn of the 
twentieth century. While they shared similarities in terms of their social positions, each also 
played a unique and memorable role in initiating preservation advocacy on behalf of 
Southwestern antiquities. Their actions in history inform my interpretation of their frames of 
acceptance and rejection within that context.  
Adolph Bandelier was a Swiss-American scholar who received his education in 
Europe. Bandelier trained as a geologist prior to turning his attentions to archaeology and 
ethnology. He received much of his archaeological and ethnological experience while 
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traveling in Mesoamerica alongside Lewis Henry Morgan. Morgan was a noteworthy 
Darwinian, and applied the theory of evolution to human cultures. Morgan was one of the 
first and most enthusiastic supporters of the theory of cultural evolution.9 Bandelier remained 
dedicated to his mentor and the theory of cultural evolution when he moved his career to the 
American Southwest. 
Bandelier performed field work in the Southwest from 1880-1885, working in 
affiliation with the Peabody Museum at Harvard and at the behest of the Archaeological 
Institute of America (AIA).10 I consider three of Bandelier’s publications in order to 
understand his position as a preservation advocate on behalf of indigenous heritage in the 
Southwest. I examine Bandelier’s initial contribution to the AIA’s American Series, which 
contained both a “Report on the Ruins of the Pueblo of Pecos” and a “Historical Introduction 
to Studies among the Sedentary Indians of New Mexico.” I refer to this text as the Bandelier 
Report, in common with histories that treat the subject of preservation of American 
antiquities.11 I also analyze another publication in the American Series entitled “Final Report 
of Investigations among the Indians of the Southwestern United States, Carried on Mainly in 
the Years from 1880 to 1885,” published in 1890. The “Final Report” was more of an 
ethnological text, describing contemporary Puebloan cultures, rather than archaeological 
                                                 
9 Gordon R. Willey and Jeremy A. Sabloff, A History of American Archaeology, 3rd ed. 
(New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1993), 73–74. 
10 Denise D. Meringolo, Museums, Monuments, and National Parks: Toward a New 
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data. In it, Bandelier expressed concern about the government’s treatment of living 
indigenous people, but focused little on antiquities. Finally, I discuss a novel written by 
Bandelier called The Delight Makers. The Delight Makers combined Bandelier’s 
ethnographic, geological, and archaeological investigations of the Southwest into a 
pedagogical narrative, written in the style of a romance. The Delight Makers was published 
in 1890 and shared close rhetorical similarities to the “Final Report,” though the texts 
represented different genres. 
Historians of the American Southwest credit the Bandelier Report of 1881 with 
initiating broader interest in the preservation of Southwestern antiquities.12 The Bandelier 
Report led to a petition in Congress to preserve the antiquities of the Southwest. Senator 
George F. Hoar of Massachusetts raised this petition in 1882; it failed, as did several 
subsequent efforts to protect the archaeological resources of the Southwest and the United 
States at large. Even so, by 1886, word was spreading. At least one journalist that year had 
called for the preservation of the “Mancos Ruins,” urging for Congressional action providing 
for the preservation of ancient structures and the establishment of an infrastructure for 
tourists. This opinion piece was published in the Denver Tribune-Republican a full two years 
before the Wetherill family advertised their so-called discovery of Mesa Verde’s most 
famous structure, which they named Cliff Palace.13 
By the 1900s, the public viewed the Wetherills with increasing suspicion. A 
newspaper article in 1901 blamed “a family of ranchmen living in the vicinity” for using 
                                                 
12 e.g., Lee, “The Origins of the Antiquities Act;” Meringolo, Museums, Monuments, and 
National Parks. 
13 "The Mancos Ruins," Tribune-Republican (Denver, CO), Dec. 12 1886, 12. 
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Mesa Verde “as a source of revenue from tourists and as a mine for archaeological 
collections,” and raised concern over the fact that “[m]any of the ruins ha[d] been completely 
gutted in the search for specimens.”14 The same article praised the efforts of a Colorado Cliff 
Ruins Association for liaising with the local Ute people in order to secure a treaty to preserve 
and protect Mesa Verde. Though the article referred to the Colorado Cliff Ruins Association, 
it is likely that the author referred, in fact, to the Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association, 
founded by Virginia (Donaghé) McClurg. 
McClurg has been referred to as a “one-woman crusade” working on behalf of the 
alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde.15 McClurg interacted with Mesa Verde starting in the early 
1880s, and presented herself as an expert on the alcove dwellings for the rest of her life. 
Before her marriage to Gilbert McClurg, Virginia (then) Donaghé had earned a reputation for 
herself as a poet and a newspaper correspondent. Her newspaper work included reporting on 
journeys to the alcove dwellings, in a period of her life that I term her exploration years. 
During her exploration years, McClurg wrote about Mesa Verde in much the same manner as 
the explorers and scientists described in the previous chapter. To understand the rhetoric she 
used at that time, I examine a serial narrative called “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” that 
McClurg published in 1889 in a magazine entitled The Great Divide.  
In “Cliff Climbing in Colorado,” McClurg offered a semi-autobiographical sketch of 
an 1886 excursion to the Mancos Valley. The cast of characters about whom McClurg wrote 
included a guide and his wife, whom she referred to as Rip and “Mrs.” Van Winkle. The Van 
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Winkles were joined by a man with a greatly-admired mustache, whom McClurg referred to 
only as “My lord.” Finally, McClurg referred to her own proxy as “the Enthusiast.” McClurg 
wrote “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” in a humorous style, poking fun at the Van Winkles as 
slow-witted and coarse, at “My lord” for his pompousness, and at herself for her prissiness. 
Certainly, “Cliff Climbing” relied on the stereotypes of mainstream culture for its humor. 
Yet, McClurg’s accounts of wayward ponies and luncheons on precipices still seem funny 
today. For as much amusement as we might take from McClurg’s zippy writing, her 
anecdotes sometimes demonstrated an irreverence towards the alcove dwellings. She shared 
this disregard with Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld.  
Roughly ten years after she published her “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” narrative, 
McClurg took it upon herself to begin a preservation advocacy campaign on behalf of the 
alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde. In 1899, McClurg attempted to negotiate a lease with the 
Ute community most affected by the increasing number of tourists, on whose reservation part 
of Mesa Verde resided. In 1900, McClurg and her associate Lucy Peabody established the 
Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association (CCDA), positioning themselves as Regent and First 
Vice-Regent, respectively.16 To attend to McClurg’s rhetoric as an advocate, I take up “Two 
Annual Addresses” that McClurg delivered to the CCDA in 1903 and 1904. These addresses 
were circulated as a booklet, presumably to the members of the CCDA who were unable to 
attend the annual meetings. In considering McClurg’s advocacy years, I examine, also, an 
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award-winning poem that McClurg publicized nationally, and to which she referred at length 
in her 1904 address: the “Ode to Irrigation.”17  
McClurg and associates spent a considerable amount of time writing letters and 
raising funds to set aside Mesa Verde as a park, and requesting politicians to champion the 
cause on their behalf. In this, they joined the ranks of many other women’s organizations that 
were operating at the time. The primary objectives of the CCDA were to turn the region of 
the alcove dwellings into a protected park area, to develop a tourism infrastructure within the 
region of the alcove dwellings, to create treaties with the Ute leaders in possession of the 
alcove dwelling territory, and to educate the public about the antiquities of the Mancos 
Valley through tours of Mesa Verde and off-site speaking events.18 
The CCDA played a major role in bringing forward Mesa Verde’s preservation as a 
political issue. However, the CCDA struggled to gain recognition in Washington, DC. The 
Secretary of the Interior declined to recognize the treaties that the CCDA negotiated with the 
Ute people, asserting that the CCDA had no authority to make such treaties.19 To compound 
the CCDA’s problems, in time, the two women heading it disagreed about the best kind of 
organization for the proposed Mesa Verde Park. While McClurg hoped that the alcove 
                                                 
17 McClurg also distributed the “Ode to Irrigation” within the pamphlet containing her “Two 
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dwellings would become a state park over which she could maintain considerable influence, 
Peabody advocated for the dwellings to become a national park. Newspapers at the time 
reviewed negatively the standpoints of both women and the perceived pettiness of their 
disagreement. Eventually, Peabody’s desire to see the alcove dwellings become a national 
park became the reality. Meanwhile McClurg retreated to Colorado Springs and built a 
reproduction of Mesa Verde’s most renowned sites out of pieces of a lesser-known antiquity 
in the Southwest. She called the reproduction the Manitou Cliff Dwellings.20 Under 
Peabody’s direction, the reorganized advocacy campaign continued to strive for the creation 
of a national park at Mesa Verde. In June 1906, the Mesa Verde National Park bill passed.21  
At the same time that the CCDA worked to have Mesa Verde set aside, other political 
actors were trying to address the broader issue of archaeological, historical, and scientific 
preservation in the United States. The American West was central to conversations in 
Congress and elsewhere that eventually led to the passage of the Antiquities Act in 1906—
twenty one days before the Mesa Verde Park Bill was passed. Edgar Lee Hewett was 
extremely influential in gaining the passage of the Antiquities Act in 1906. Early in his 
career, the Secretary of the Interior sent Hewett to investigate Mesa Verde and other 
Southwestern antiquities, to comment on their historic value “in view of the preservation and 
protection of the ruins.”22 Starting in 1904, Hewett published extensively about the 
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Archéologiques Sur La Distribution et L’organisation Sociale Des Anciennes Populations Au 
188 
 
government’s existing protocols towards the preservation of Southwestern antiquities, and 
what he viewed as the need for more formal measures in this regard. He distributed his 
appeals about preservation through the General Land Office and through professional 
organizations, reaching an audience of politicians, archaeologists and ethnologists. 
Hewett eventually took part in an “antiquities bill alliance,” which coordinated the 
archaeological community with the Department of the Interior and the Smithsonian 
Institution.23 Hewett worked with friend and colleague John F. Lacey to pull together a draft 
bill that would please all parties involved. The Antiquities Act of 1906 was the successful 
outcome of the antiquities bill alliance, and a subject for the next chapter. After the 
Antiquities Act and Mesa Verde Park Bill were passed, Hewett continued his career in 
archaeology, focusing later publications on Chaco Canyon, where he did the bulk of his 
academic work. For my analysis of Hewett’s overall rhetorical profile, I examine nine of his 
publications, ranging from 1904-1943, on topics such as “The Government Supervision of 
Historic and Prehistoric Ruins,” “Ethnic Factors in Education,” and “The Southwest: 
Yesterday and Tomorrow.” 
While Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett were not alone in their decisions to advocate 
on behalf of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest, they were among the 
most noteworthy preservation advocates at the turn of the twentieth century. Together, their 
attitudes toward advocacy capture many of the epistemic ebbs and flows of their era, and 
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demonstrate parallels between the practice of destroying Southwestern antiquities in the 
pursuit of knowledge and the desire to safeguard them—often for the same reason. Of further 
interest is the manner in which all three of these advocates rejected both vandalism and what 
they viewed as the mistreatment of indigenous peoples by the United States federal 
government. The ways in which Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett articulated advocacy for 
place and past to advocacy on behalf of living people was their greatest innovation. It is also 
an area of concern for contemporary advocates looking back on the past, since the ways in 
which these three representative advocates framed their historical situation remained 
deleterious to the sovereignty of American Indian people and their place in United States 
society.  
In the following section, I examine in detail the rhetorical rejections of vandalism and 
the mistreatment of American Indian people that Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett expressed 
in their published works. I adopt Burke’s theory of the frame of rejection to examine how 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett attempted to intervene in their collective poem, and to reject 
myths common to their era. I also examine how their rejections implied acceptance of other 
cultural attitudes of their day, speaking in a poetic register of preservation advocacy. While 
these three advocates used rhetorical enchantments of myth and poetry to influence their 
audiences, they demonstrated their own states of enchantment as well. 
Plaints against Vandalism and Government Relations with American Indian Peoples 
I begin my discussion of the representative advocates’ attitudes by analyzing their 
rejections of vandalism and the federal government’s harmful relations with indigenous 
contemporaries. The ways in which Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett framed these 
phenomena within their works is the reason that they were advocates at all. Their discussions 
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of vandalism and indigenous rights (or welfare) were rejections of aspects of the collective 
poem of modernity, and among their clearest attempts to intervene in their historical 
situation.   
I refer to the following excerpts from these three advocates’ works as plaints against 
vandalism and the government, in conversation with Burke’s discussion of poetic categories 
as rhetorical framing devices, but also extending dramatism’s conceptualization of the plaint. 
In Attitudes Toward History, Burke defined plaints as frames of rejection. Like other frames, 
plaints had the potential to act as “equipment” in negotiating an individual’s position to a 
historical circumstance that the individual opposed. While Burke supposed that plaints did 
“not properly gauge the situation,” still they could be a refined means of making sense of the 
world.24 Plaints protected their rhetors from elements in their situation by allowing them to 
attack symbolically that which caused discomfort. As Burke theorized the category of the 
plaint, it was a way of being “content with pessimism.”25 Rather than offering solutions to 
problems posed by the historical moment, plaints elevated the art of condemning the 
situation. 
Apart from these insights, dramatism provides relatively little guidance for defining 
the poetic category of the plaint. Moreover, my observations somewhat contradict the 
parameters of the plaint outlined by Burke, and cohere more closely to a general definition of 
a plaint: “a complaint or lamentation,” or “a statement in writing of grounds of complaint 
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made to a court of law and asking for redress of the grievance.”26 The preservation advocates 
identified problems, assigned blame, and occasionally described the forms of redress that 
would ameliorate the problem they identified. Their plaints were forms of rejection in the 
sense that they condemned vandals and the government for their poor behavior, and 
problematized their historical situation. These plaints also acted as frames of rejection 
because, in their advocacy work, Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett relished their pessimism. 
Though these authors sometimes offered solutions to the problems that they identified, they 
lingered much more enthusiastically on the topic of how others were failing. They asked for 
redress of numerous grievances, which they described with zeal. 
In the next section, I describe the accusations that all three advocates brought against 
vandals in the American Southwest, before describing the ways in which they translated their 
concern for place into a concern for indigenous people. All of these rejections also accepted 
myths prevalent in their day, such as the inevitability of cultural conflicts and the dominance 
of white culture. They also advanced new myths that relied on the poetics of place in the 
American Southwest.  
Note that the plaints that these authors presented were secondary to the frames of 
acceptance that each advocate cultivated independently. While the advocates shared elements 
of a political agenda, they did so by accepting several divergent cultural myths, as expressed 
by way of distinctive poetic categories. I shall discuss how the advocates differed poetically 
and mythically after my analysis of the advocates’ shared plaints.  
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Plaints against Vandalism 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett all described acts of vandalism at Southwestern 
heritage places within frames of rejection. Bandelier and McClurg rejected graffiti at 
Puebloan and Ancestral Puebloan places, and both critiqued those who would pursue 
“immortality” by carving their names into aged structures.27 Bandelier and Hewett framed 
amateur collecting as insults to scientific inquiry. Hewett rejected careless scientists, as well, 
framing them alongside amateur pot-hunters. All of the frames of rejection utilized by these 
rhetors accepted the beauty of Southwestern heritage places and the structures’ right to 
endure unmolested (by amateurs). For Bandelier and Hewett, the rejection of amateur 
engagement with antiquities also implied acceptance of scientific ideals and an elitist 
approach to research. All of these advocates accepted Southwestern antiquities as treasures, 
even when they rejected the treasure-hunting committed by others. In doing so, they all 
tacitly accepted that commercial valuations of antiquities existed, as well. 
Bandelier offered the first published diatribe against the careless treatment of 
indigenous heritage places in the American Southwest. Bandelier exhibited a passionate 
response to the destruction that he witnessed on his first survey of that territory. In describing 
a structure at the Pecos Pueblo, he declared: 
In general, the vandalism committed in this venerable relic of antiquity defies all 
description. It is only equaled by the foolishness of such as, having no other means to 
secure immortality, have cut out the ornaments from the sculptured beams in order to 
obtain a surface suitable to carve their euphonious names. All the beams of the old 
structure are quaintly, but still not tastelessly, carved . . . Most of [the scroll-work 
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ornamentation on the beams] was taken away, chipped into uncouth boxes, and sold, 
to be scattered everywhere. Not content with this, treasure-hunters, inconsiderate 
amateurs, have recklessly and ruthlessly disturbed the abodes of the dead. . . . These 
dead have been scattered over the surface, to become the prey of relic-hunters.28 
Bandelier adopted a harsh tone to describe what he observed at the Pecos Pueblo. What 
historians of preservation advocacy in the Southwest fail to emphasize is the fact that the 
“relic of antiquity” about which Bandelier professed deep concern was a Catholic church, 
and the work of Spanish missionaries who had converted members of the Pecos Pueblo to 
Christianity. The disturbed graves that Bandelier mourned were presumably those of 
Christians, and Bandelier’s indignation at the disrespectful treatment of those deceased 
individuals had something to do with their creed. As I will discuss later in the chapter, 
Bandelier admired the Spanish colonization of the Southwest, and this influenced his 
advocacy activities.  
McClurg shared Bandelier’s disdain for graffiti at Southwestern heritage places, but 
she lacked some of Bandelier’s ire on the topic. Primarily, McClurg derided individuals 
whom she thought of as reckless or uneducated, who sought “undeserved immortality” by 
marking their names on historic or ancient structures.29 McClurg expressed her consternation 
at the presence of “no less than half a dozen names . . . cut in the living rock” of the back 
wall of an alcove dwelling at Mesa Verde. She felt that “John Smith, Tom Jones and that ilk” 
were “[s]criblers and scrawlers” who had trespassed on that place.30 She wished to turn Mesa 
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Verde into a state park so as to protect it from “the ravages of the ignorant treasure-seekers 
and iconoclastic relic-hunters.”31 McClurg asserted that in order to “punish depredators, to 
preserve the ruins, control must be assumed.” 32 At the same time that McClurg rejected 
graffiti and pot-hunting, she accepted that places like Mesa Verde needed to be managed and 
controlled. She presented herself and her advocacy organization as the best possible stewards 
of Mesa Verde. 
Hewett shared McClurg’s conviction that Southwestern antiquities needed care, 
though he differed from McClurg in that he supported the federal oversight of ancient 
indigenous places, rather than state or local care. Hewett presented himself as “a citizen of 
New Mexico who . . . watched with deep concern the loss of many of the incomparable 
treasures of the southwest.”33 Hewett defined commerce as the primary threat to the enduring 
safety of Southwestern antiquities. In a 1904 circular distributed by the Department of the 
Interior, Hewett said: 
It is well known that during recent years an extensive traffic has arisen in relics from 
[Southwestern] ruins. In securing these, buildings, mounds, etc., have been destroyed. 
These relics are priceless when secured by proper scientific methods and of 
comparatively little value when scattered about either in museums or private 
collections without accompanying records. No scientific man is true to the highest 
ideals of science who does not protest against this destructive work, and it will be a 
lasting reproach upon our Government if it does not use its power to restrain it.34 
                                                 
31 McClurg, “Two Annual Addresses.” 
32 Ibid. 
33 Edgar Lee Hewett, Government Supervision of Historic and Prehistoric Ruins (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1904), 1. 
34 Edgar Lee Hewett, Circular Relating to Historic and Prehistoric Ruins of the Southwest 
and Their Preservation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 4, emphasis 
added.  
195 
 
Hewett emphasized the exceptional status of science when he paired federal preservation 
initiatives with its highest ideals. Later in his career, however, Hewett observed that 
archaeology was the cause of a “new problem in conservation” for Southwestern 
antiquities.35 He expressed dismay that so many ancient structures had been “wrecked in the 
path of progress—even in the name of science,” blaming the “pot-hunter, both scientific and 
commercial” for irreversible damages.36 In this way, Hewett pointed out deficiencies in the 
“ideal of science,” which he both promoted and critiqued.37  
These plaints against vandalism at Southwestern heritage places rejected ignorance, 
greed, and carelessness. Bandelier decried the damage to the Pecos Church, mourned the 
disturbance to the Pecos graves, and spurned others’ motives as they pertained to money, 
comfort, and legacy. McClurg had a narrower frame of rejection than Bandelier 
demonstrated, and opposed careless vandalism in pursuit of unearned immortality. McClurg 
also rejected ignorance in her discussions of vandalism at Southwestern antiquities, 
indicating her elitist attitude towards engaging with those sites. Hewett framed carelessness 
and commerce negatively, but accused fellow scientists of the recklessness that he viewed in 
amateur collectors, as well. These frames of rejection indicated acceptance of the authors’ 
motives, even as they disparaged so-called vandals. Bandelier accepted a scientific 
engagement with heritage sites. McClurg accepted deserved pursuits of immortality, such as 
writing, research, and advocacy—activities in which she engaged. Hewett accepted careful 
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scientific engagement. All of these advocates accepted an inherent value to Southwestern 
antiquities. Additionally, all of these preservation advocates viewed the preservation of 
Southwestern antiquities within the context of their contemporary political environment, 
particularly in terms of the federal government’s comportment towards American Indian 
people. 
Plaints against the Government 
Bandelier spent the majority of his career performing ethnological, rather than 
archaeological, work. He specialized in studying the Puebloan peoples of the American 
Southwest, and he felt that the United States government failed in its duties to those 
collectives. Unfortunately, Bandelier rejected the United States’ harsh treatment of 
indigenous populations because he viewed them as childlike wards. He rejected violent 
policies and accepted the infantilization of American Indian peoples alongside modern myths 
like cultural evolution, paternal benevolence, primitivism, and scientific rationality. 
Bandelier viewed teleological cultural change as inevitable, but expressed concern 
over the path that cultural evolution would take in indigenous populations. In Bandelier’s 
view, there was a “wide gap between Indian culture and European civilization” that “could 
not be filled; the aborigines had to be led across it gradually” rather than “at once.”38 He 
looked to Spanish colonialism for guidance in how to prompt the cultural evolution of 
American Indian people without causing them undue harm—though he alleged that force was 
sometimes necessary, as parents might need to use the “corrective rod” on wayward 
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children.39 Bandelier joined other authors of his era in repeatedly referring to American 
Indian people as if they were children.40 To him, indigenous cultures were stuck in the 
infancy of cultural evolution. He felt it was up to the supposedly more mature European 
cultures to bring American Indian people forward without trauma.  
Bandelier was firm in his belief that that “the Indian, as Indian, must disappear” in the 
wake of inevitable cultural-evolutionary progress. However, he felt that any attempt at 
“violent extirpation” of social organization or creed would be harmful to “the purely human 
part” of indigenous culture.41 He argued that the purely human part of American Indian 
people was: 
. . . entitled, and above all from our national standpoint, by the formal declaration 
‘that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ To 
enable the Indian to enjoy these rights with a view to his progressive culture, patience 
on the part of those who have this progress in trust is above all required. We must 
have patience with him and his ways.42  
While Bandelier preached patience, his thoughts on how “to reconcile the advancement of 
the Indian with his preservation” were tempered by “the discouraging theorem, if it takes 
twenty-one years in the eyes of the law to make a man out of a child, how much time will it 
take for thousands of men, born and bred in organized childhood for unknown centuries, to 
develop into independent manhood?”43 While Bandelier used a patriotic argument to defend 
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the rights of American Indian people, he simultaneously infantilized them. He expressed a 
paternalistic view towards American Indian people, and he urged the government to view 
these people as childlike wards, rather than as peers with a full range of rights. While 
Bandelier may have said that he respected the humanity in American Indian people, he did 
not believe they were capable of taking care of themselves. His plaint against the government 
included praise for racially-biased myths. 
In addition to Bandelier’s meddlesome recommendations for encouraging the 
supposed cultural evolution of American Indian people, Bandelier always retained a 
scientific rationale for the forms of cultural conservation that he proposed. Because Bandelier 
viewed indigenous cultures as the closest living link to pre-Columbian history, he felt that 
their study was vital for understanding cultural development and the consequences of 
European colonialism. Though Bandelier seems to have favored the cultural changes wrought 
by European cultures, he felt that working with the descendants of the Ancestral Puebloans 
was the primary “task of the practical ethnologist” in the region, so as to fill in gaps in 
knowledge of the deep past. Colonialism and its legacy threatened that knowledge. 
Bandelier’s scientific interests contributed to his choice to critique the United States 
government’s treatment of American Indian people, as he felt that “researches” into the 
course of human cultural evolution would be “richly rewarded,” but could not succeed if the 
government imposed too many changes on indigenous people too quickly.44 Bandelier’s 
rejection of the violent or harsh treatment of American Indian people accepted the supposed 
inferiority of those people. It also accepted the necessity of ethnological research and 
paternal benevolence.  
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McClurg shared Bandelier’s conviction in the theory of cultural evolution, and it 
influenced her comportment towards American Indian people, as well. Whereas Bandelier 
offered subtle recommendations for the government’s relationships with American Indian 
people, McClurg’s commentary took the dramatistic form of a plaint more singularly. She 
condemned the government’s ineptitude without offering much in the way of a corrective. 
Even so, both Bandelier and McClurg seemed content in their pessimism, and condemned 
others for their infringement on the values that each advocate held.  
During McClurg’s advocacy years, she demonstrated concern about relations between 
the Anglo-American government and the American Indian peoples of the Southwest. 
McClurg linked her organization’s failed efforts to preserve Mesa Verde with the unresolved 
“government policy of the Indian question!” More specifically, McClurg complained of the 
joint ownership of Mesa Verde by the government and the Weeminuche Utes, remarking 
upon it as a nearly insurmountable problem. McClurg felt that the government misunderstood 
how to liaise with Weeminuche Ute leaders and that it worked slowly and bureaucratically. 
Meanwhile, McClurg griped that the Weeminuche Ute leaders and other American Indian 
stakeholders were difficult business partners. Without much in the way of preamble, 
McClurg interjected in one of her addresses to the CCDA that “[a]n Indian is an anomalous 
landlord. He comes up bright and smiling with every new moon, to suggest an entire change 
in demands and mutual relations.” She carried on, describing other frustrations or anomalies 
she observed when attempting to secure land from the Weeminuche Ute representatives, but 
always described recalcitrant Ute leaders with more sympathy than she described the 
government. 
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Although McClurg expressed that their way of doing business was annoying, she 
presented herself as superior to government officials who, she said, imagined that the 
Weeminuche Ute leaders sat “at ease in their agency, pens and blotting paper at hand, ready 
to sign leases.” Without an overhaul in its conduct towards the Weeminuche Ute people, as 
well as a major legislative change, McClurg thought it was unlikely that the government 
could “make Mesa Verde a National Park, because it [did] not belong to the government; nor 
could it be bought.” 45 McClurg recognized that it belonged, instead, to the Weeminuche Ute 
people on whose land it resided. Not only did McClurg doubt that the government could 
obtain control of Mesa Verde, but she expressed mistrust of the government regarding its 
conduct towards American Indian people. She blamed the government for the difficulty with 
which she, herself, liaised with the Weeminuche Ute leaders, claiming that they were rarely 
available because they spent “most of the time out foraging for the scanty subsistence denied 
them by the government.” She remarked upon the inadequate “work of Cabinets and 
Presidents and all the Departments of the Interior, and the United States army, which has 
guarded or fought the red man by turns.” With all of those forces combined, McClurg 
concluded that the “Indian [was] not set right yet.”46  
It is unclear to what extent McClurg self-identified as an advocate on behalf of 
indigenous rights in conjunction with her work at Mesa Verde. For instance, she seemed to 
regard a national organization called “Friends of the Indian” as ineffectual, for she felt that 
they “wept and prayed and debated over the righting of Indian wrongs” but accomplished 
little. Yet, she maintained that whether Mesa Verde passed to “national or state control, its 
                                                 
45 McClurg, “Two Annual Addresses.” 
46 Ibid. 
201 
 
value and status [needed to] be accurately defined by its Indian owners.” She recognized 
Weeminuche Ute sovereignty over their reservation land and over the meaning of Mesa 
Verde, at the same time that she hoped to convince them to cede “certain rights in Mesa 
Verde” to the CCDA. Certainly, McClurg’s investment in improving relations with the 
Weeminuche Utes coincided with her desire to assume authority over Mesa Verde. It was 
primarily Mesa Verde’s location that made it “a part of this tremendous, pressing perplexity 
of our national common weal” (government relations with American Indian collectives), 
rather than its cultural importance to many American Indian peoples. In the end, McClurg 
simply admitted that the “Indian” problem was a “hard nut to crack—even for a Denver 
Club-woman.”47  
In McClurg’s rejection of the government’s policies towards American Indian 
constituencies, she accepted that the Weeminuche Ute people had a different way of life than 
the people who governed them, and she accepted that they had rights to the land and to the 
interpretation of their own heritage. At the same time, McClurg described the indigenous 
persons with whom she liaised as peculiar, and promoted her own right to possess their land. 
McClurg recognized indigenous individuals as social actors with rights, and she avoided 
prescriptive recommendations about how the government should address the rights and 
wellbeing of American Indian political collectives. 
Hewett showed no such compunction against offering recommendations to the 
government in its treatment of American Indian people. Hewett paired his advocacy on 
behalf of antiquities explicitly with his advocacy on behalf of indigenous people, sometimes 
in disturbing ways. Throughout his body of works, Hewett condemned the European 
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colonization of the New World, bemoaned the march of industry, and romanticized 
indigenous peoples and their heritage in the extreme. Like Bandelier, Hewett’s rejection of 
the government’s treatment of American Indian people accepted paternal benevolence as a 
preferred policy, and accepted that there were significant biological differences between 
indigenous people and their European counterparts. Hewett lauded indigeneity in a fetishistic 
way, and critiqued whiteness for its infringements on a romanticized Other. 
Hewett was outspoken in his admiration of indigenous culture throughout his 
professional career. The topics of his admiration ranged from the ingenuity of the Ancestral 
Puebloans to the resilience of their descendants. What he rejected was anything that white 
settlers or the United States government did to damage indigenous people and their heritage. 
For instance, Hewett lamented that few representatives of the “Indian race” remained to 
“maintain its sacred fires,” and blamed “alien conquerors” for the “disposition . . .  to put 
[American Indian people] out rather than to preserve them.”48 The notion of preserving a 
people for the alleged betterment of society was a major theme in Hewett’s later works. All 
the while, Hewett rejected the ills of colonialism and accepted the purported mystique of 
indigenous cultures.  
At times, Hewett’s complimentary demeanor towards indigenous people had a 
distinctly eugenic bent to it. For example, Hewett defined American Indian people as a “race 
of splendid works and noble characteristics . . . who, in spite of the appalling adversities of 
the last four centuries, may by blending with its conquerors and at the same time preserving 
its own arts look forward to a future on the high plane of its ancient traditions.”49 Not just for 
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the sake of the conservation of indigenous culture, but also for the benefit of white culture, 
Hewett expressed his hope that “somewhere the blood, language, and cultural potentialities 
of these remarkable people [the Ancestral Puebloans] surviv[ed] to become available in the 
evolution of the American race, for it was a virile stock.” Though Hewett urged that 
American Indian people should not be forced to join European American culture, 
nevertheless he hoped that over time the two would blend together, and compensate for one 
another’s supposed shortcomings. Hewett rejected conquest but accepted a framework in 
which the peoples who had endured conquest contributed to a new “American race.” 50 
Hewett’s demeanor towards indigenous culture took an especially appalling turn 
when, in 1943, he argued that American society needed “specialists in human conservation” 
to help address the “Pueblo problems” of the era. Comparing Puebloans to “disappearing 
buffalo,” he proposed that the creation of “human game preserves” would allow those people 
to live their lives unmolested by the federal government. Like the buffalo, they would 
flourish again, and become available for the kind of eugenic program that Hewett tacitly 
proposed.51 In this way, Hewett went beyond “playing Indian”52 and wrote with optimism 
about a biologically-constituted unity with American Indian culture.  
Hewett’s comparison between Puebloan people and the buffalo strikes the 
contemporary reader as ghastly. It is evidence, however, of Hewett’s deeply-held conviction 
that white culture was detrimental to American Indian cultures, and that American Indian 
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people needed to be protected from white culture. While he marveled at the many resources 
that white culture had taken from indigenous cultures, he said that the “gifts of the white 
man” were suspect: “firearms, fire-water and other agencies that kill, such as tuberculosis, 
syphilis, and numerous other scourges; a new style of costume which has proved to be less 
sanitary . . . a religion which seems rather barren . . . and a system of education that seems 
devoid of . . . essentials.”53 Hewett’s belief that American Indian people had been subjected 
to “too much white man’s medicine” supported his “plan . . . to leave [the American Indian 
individual] alone in most of his personal affairs, merely giving him the opportunity to select 
and adapt what we [white people] have to offer under the guidance of his own judgment.”54  
Overall, Hewett advocated for a laissez-faire approach to assimilation so as to avoid 
unnecessary discomfort for members of a “race . . . in its childhood,” as he believed 
American Indian people were.55 This attitude appeared in his chilling proposal about human 
game preserves, and it appeared in his discussion of the Indian Schools of the early twentieth 
century, as well. On the whole, Hewett expressed paranoia about the deleterious effects of 
American imperialism on its various subjects, viewing whiteness as a contamination of the 
Other. In the same rhetorical move, however, he defined the Other in a state of primitive 
idealism, and therefore fetishized people dissimilar from himself. He accepted radical 
difference among ethnicities as a fact, and his advocacy was predicated on that belief.  
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Alone among the preservation advocates discussed in this chapter, Hewett was 
outspoken about what he viewed as the shortcomings of white culture, particularly with 
regard to colonialism and the Indian Schools imposed on American Indian people. He 
resented efforts to force white culture on American Indian people, but his resentment was 
based in mythic notions about biological difference, and a pronounced fetishization of 
American Indian culture, some features of which he hoped to preserve. Indeed, at the same 
time that Hewett emphasized perceived racial differences, he intimated that he wished to 
merge with indigenous people. This was fetishism at an extreme. 
The advocates’ condemnations of vandalism and the government were attempts to 
expose the flaws of prevalent cultural myths. Bandelier and McClurg attempted to counteract 
the supposed glory of carving names onto the walls of ancient structures, and attempted to 
sap such harmful acts of their mythic quality by accusing vandals of pursuing immortality 
without earning it. Bandelier and Hewett attempted to counteract the myths of profit at 
Southwestern antiquities, by using densely-connotative language to reinforce the profligacy 
of selling science. All three of these advocates attempted to expose the ill-informed racism 
and bigotry against American Indian peoples as harmful cultural myths, as well. Though they 
advanced attitudes that privileged scientific racism and paternalism towards a childlike 
Other, they were united in their opposition to violent disrespect of their American Indian 
contemporaries, and of indigenous heritage places.  
In their plaints against vandalism and the mistreatment of American Indian peoples, 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett demonstrated the cultural myths that motivated their 
advocacy, and they indicated aspects of their frames of acceptance for the historical moment 
in which they participated. All three of these advocates believed in the value of Southwestern 
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antiquities, and perpetuated myths of majesty and primitivism when discussing indigenous 
pasts. All three of them accepted ethnic and racial differences as a key problematic of 
modernity, and endorsed the myth of cultural evolution when considering that problem. 
These advocates paired their concern for ancient indigenous heritage places with a concern 
for American Indian peoples, but they referred to those collectives in a condescending way. 
Even in the frames of acceptance of the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy, elements of these 
advocates’ condescension infringed on their tone, claims, and recommendations. I shall 
discuss each advocate’s unique poetic style next. 
Tragedy, Epic, and Comedy in Preservation Advocacy at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century 
For the remainder of this chapter, I outline the ways in which Bandelier, McClurg, 
and Hewett favored the poetic categories of the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy, 
respectively. I have assigned each of them their narrative framing device based on the 
manner in which each most regularly situated himself or herself in relation to the historical 
situation. All of the authors exhibited pronounced poetic engagement with Southwestern 
antiquities, and with the descendants of those who built them. What varied was the literary 
style each preferred when defining those phenomena, and the cultural myths that they 
appealed to through their divergent poetic categories.  
Bandelier favored the tragedy. McClurg favored the epic. Hewett favored the 
comedy. According to dramatism, all of these were frames of acceptance. Furthermore, when 
Burke defined these three poetic categories as frames of acceptance, he described a number 
of overlapping characteristics across these frames, such as magnification, exaggeration, and 
whether or not they were well-rounded (none of these terms were well-defined). The origin 
of these poetic categories in dramatism helps to account for a significant degree of ambiguity 
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and overlap across the three frames of acceptance that I discuss. For instance, Bandelier and 
McClurg both referred to the Ancestral Puebloans in language that emphasized what those 
authors found peculiar or exotic about them, though I interpret Bandelier in the tragic frame 
and McClurg in the epic. Both McClurg and Hewett offered intensely admiring commentary 
about the Ancestral Puebloans, as well, and again, I consider McClurg’s texts as examples of 
the epic frame, while I find that Hewett operated within the comic frame. My rationale for 
assigning the frames as I did is this: I chose each advocate’s dominant frame according to the 
primary way in which the author positioned himself or herself vis-à-vis the historical 
situation.  
Focusing on the way the rhetors cast themselves within poetic narratives helped to 
illustrate the types and intensities of enchantment that each experienced or promoted in the 
context of Southwestern antiquities. For instance, Bandelier positioned himself as an all-
knowing narrator in the Other’s tragedy. In so doing, he attempted to distance himself from 
the enchantments of his context, yet demonstrated conviction in the myth of scientific 
rationality. By asserting that he had a clinical perspective, he illustrated that he was 
susceptible to the myth of disenchantment. By contrast, McClurg admitted to her own 
enchantment in the American Southwest when she portrayed herself as a heroine undergoing 
a variety of crucibles, and coming through them transformed. When McClurg appealed to 
colorful imagery, she enriched the scene in which she undertook her adventures, and added 
lyricism to the narrative of her heroism. Her own position, as the center of a sensational 
story, solidified my choice to define her primary frame as the epic. Meanwhile, her 
magnification of her actions and the scene in which she undertook them advanced myths 
about the inevitability of white cultural success on the Western frontier. Hewett also admitted 
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to his own enchantment. As he spoke of himself, his field of research, and the government, he 
adopted the critical or iconoclastic component of the comic frame, as defined by 
dramatism.56 Yet, Hewett also proselytized as to the merits of the Ancestral Puebloans, the 
Puebloans, and the antiquities of the American Southwest. It seems as if his ability to critique 
archaeology was predicated on his reverent attitude towards indigeneity. His self-positioning 
as a comedic-critic stemmed from his overwhelming enchantment by the peoples and places 
of the Southwest, which he expressed regularly by way of hagiography that bordered on the 
fetishistic. The uneven relationship between critique and reverence in Hewett’s texts 
challenges the viability of the comic frame as a tool for social change, insofar as dramatism 
theorized it. While Burke never would have suggested that the comic frame was unbiased, he 
understood it as a frame that acknowledged its own biases and promoted humanism. Hewett 
certainly acknowledged his reverence, and so perhaps performed a comic frame in as near a 
form as could be expected reasonably. The frames varied in terms of the comportment 
towards indigeneity that each supported, and the comic frame, though imperfect, offered the 
greatest challenge to prejudicial attitudes that were prevalent during the historical moment in 
which these advocates operated. I begin my discussion of each author’s poetic framing with 
commentary on Bandelier’s use of the tragedy. 
Bandelier: Tragedy and the All-Knowing Narrator 
Bandelier adopted the tragic frame throughout his writings in order to describe the 
indigenous people of the American Southwest, their heritage, their relationship to the 
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environment, and their relationship with white culture. Within the tragic frame, Bandelier 
presented himself as the all-knowing narrator, aware of dramatic ironies and causal factors, 
but regarding the subjects of his narrative at a distance. In Burke’s description of tragedy as a 
poetic category, he acknowledged that the tone of resignation was its most pervasive feature. 
Burke also identified “magical patterns of fatality, magnification, and humility” within the 
tragic frame.57 Bandelier exhibited all of these rhetorical tendencies as he painted a picture of 
the denizens of the Southwest and the forces that affected them. Bandelier’s enchantment 
with the places and peoples of the Southwest augmented his tragic framing of the subjects of 
his writings.  
Bandelier tended to suppress his sense of wonder and poetry in his scholarly works, 
operating under the guise of scientific rationality. He was more open with the captivating 
qualities of Southwestern antiquities in his novel, The Delight Makers. Bandelier set his story 
in the canyon of the Rito de los Frijoles in New Mexico. He described the setting as “a 
beautiful spot, lovely in its solitude, picturesque and grand. About its ruins there hovers a 
charm which binds man to the place where untold centuries ago man lived, loved, suffered, 
and died as present generations live, suffer, and die in the course of human history.”58 The 
charm of the Rito de los Frijoles contributed to Bandelier’s choice to set his romantic story 
there, while his emphasis on suffering cued his attraction to the tragic frame.  
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Meanwhile, Bandelier demonstrated a fixation on Native peoples. Whereas 
Bandelier’s admiration for the ancient structures of the Southwest was profound, his 
commentary about Native peoples tended towards the prurient. The Delight Makers was a 
rather sudsy melodrama, tantamount to an Ancestral Puebloan Romeo and Juliet story. 
Bandelier described the characters with great (and sometimes lecherous) detail, and also 
emphasized the stereotype of the noble savage while building the tragic style of the tale. For 
instance, in Bandelier’s first description of the Romeo figure, named Okoya, he described the 
“youth” as “a statue of light-coloured bronze decked with scanty drapery, and adorned with 
crude trinkets, holding a bow . . . outlined against the shrubbery, immovable above the 
running brook.”59 When Bandelier introduced his facsimile for Juliet, named Mitsha, she 
entered the scene as part of a group of “buxom lasses, rather short, thick-waisted, full-
chested, with flat faces, prominent cheek-bones, and bright eyes.”60 In his scholarly works, 
he quoted another researcher’s observations about the bust size of Puebloan women in one of 
his ethnographic reports, and did not stoop to comment personally.61  
Bandelier wrote The Delight Makers in an attempt to make Puebloan culture known 
to the Anglo-American public, presumably for the purpose of instilling interest and goodwill 
in Bandelier’s readers, as well as educating his readers about his scholarly conclusions. As 
Bandelier wrote, he: 
. . . was prompted to perform the work by a conviction that however scientific works 
may tell the truth about the Indian, they exercise always a limited influence upon the 
general public . . . By clothing sober facts in the garb of romance I have hoped to 
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make the ‘Truth about the Pueblo Indians’ more accessible and perhaps more 
acceptable to the public in general.62  
Bandelier viewed it as his mission to share everything he knew of Puebloan culture with his 
peers. Unfortunately, what Bandelier thought of as the “Truth” was denigrating. Moreover, 
his position that he knew and could share the “Truth” emphasized his position as an 
omniscient narrator, describing the tragic fate of the Other. 
Throughout The Delight Makers, Bandelier portrayed the Ancestral Puebloan 
characters as if they were driven by nature and by their cosmology to engage in actions that 
had disastrous outcomes. While none of the characters behaved irrationally according to the 
system of beliefs Bandelier described, Bandelier’s authorial voice made clear his opinion that 
his characters were prisoners of their belief system. The story encouraged acceptance of 
Bandelier’s fatalistic interpretation of the past, and of a similar interpretation of the 
contemporary Puebloan people whom Bandelier studied. The enchantments that Bandelier 
advanced towards people in his ethnographic texts also objectified them, and also distanced 
them from Bandelier as he continued to assume the voice of an all-knowing narrator. The 
presence of rhetorical enchantments throughout Bandelier’s works amplified his use of the 
poetic frame of the tragedy, and also supported his position as a distant, though not 
disinterested, spectator. 
Bandelier’s relation to the tragic frame as an all-knowing narrator appeared in his 
scholarly works, as well. For instance, Bandelier was convinced that the Southwestern 
environment had left an indelible mark on the Puebloan people. He referred to the desert 
setting in vivid language, magnifying its influence over the trajectories of the people who 
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lived in it. Bandelier observed in the Southwest “a stillness prevailing which produce[d] a 
feeling of quiet and solemnity,” and which acted as a defining force in the cultural 
development of the people who lived there for centuries.63 The wide expanses, impressive 
natural phenomena, and overall atmosphere led Bandelier to conclude that there was “a 
certain harmony between all the kingdoms of Nature in the Southwest. They compose[d] 
everywhere a picture, not lovely, but very striking; attractive through . . . originality rather 
than through beauty.”64 Bandelier seldom admitted to being struck by the beauty of the 
Southwest, even though he considered the Southwestern landscape “so striking that over 
primitive man it . . . wielded power in every sense.”65 When talking about himself, Bandelier 
described more moderate “pleasure and quiet enjoyment” gleaned from the environment.66 
The combination of sensational descriptions of Puebloans in thrall to nature, and his own 
removed enjoyment, further demonstrated Bandelier’s relation as distant narrator to a tragic 
frame.  
Bandelier’s assumptions about the forces that influenced Puebloan culture 
demonstrated a tragic framing of those people, and exposed Bandelier’s commitments to 
cultural evolution and scientific rationality. His stance as an omniscient narrator often 
emphasized his expertise, and he grounded his conclusions about the fates of the Puebloans 
in his authority as a researcher. Nowhere was this more evident than in Bandelier’s 
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overarching statements about “the Indian.” Though Bandelier recommended caution when 
attempting to make claims “concerning the Indian’s arts, habits, and creed,” he made many 
assertions of his own regarding what “the Indian” believed, did, or needed.67 Bandelier 
concluded that “the Indian” was reticent, superstitious, and lazy. Because of the prominent 
role of religion in the cultural practices that Bandelier witnessed, he concluded that “the 
Indian” was “the merest, most abject slave” to cultural institutions and religious belief, and a 
sufferer of “an inflexible despotism of thought” that allegedly accompanied those beliefs.68 
Religious organization among the Puebloan peoples, thought Bandelier, “more than anything 
else contributed to retard the advance of the Indian on the path of progress,” and furthermore, 
“caused a constant clash with the European element.”69 This was another tragedy that 
Bandelier depicted in his narratives: the inevitability of conflict with a supposedly more-
advanced culture. He was so resigned to this tragic frame that he dedicated much of his 
career to advocacy that would adapt to it, rather than advocacy that might reject it.  
On the whole, Bandelier’s tragic frame included resignation to ethnic difference, 
cross-cultural conflict, and cultural evolution. Bandelier’s own role within that frame, as the 
narrator who kept his characters at a distance, reinforced myths of scientific rationality and 
primitivism. The sometimes mysterious language that Bandelier used typically served to 
make the scene of his narrative seem exotic, alongside the cosmology and customs of the 
people whom he studied. By casting Puebloans as a doomed people with self-damaging 
tendencies, he presented them in caricature. This magnification of personality traits, physical 
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appearance, and so on, helped to increase the grandeur of the narratives that Bandelier 
shared, making their tragic outcomes all the more poignant.  
Virginia McClurg shared some of Bandelier’s framing devices, in that she, too, 
tended towards caricature in her descriptions of Ancestral Puebloan peoples. She often turned 
that caricature towards narratives in which she starred, as well. Whereas Bandelier offered 
himself a position as narrator of a tragedy, McClurg cast herself as the hero of several epics 
in the American Southwest. In both cases, literary magnifications served to enhance the 
poeticism of the stories that these preservation advocates told. Whether sharing tragedies or 
epics, these preservation advocates enchanted their publics with scope of their tales.  
McClurg: Epic and the Trailblazer 
Virginia McClurg shared certain cultural assumptions with Bandelier. Like Bandelier, 
McClurg took the theory of cultural evolution as a fact. For instance, McClurg attempted to 
classify the level of artistic development of the Mesa Verdeans according to sequential 
“steps,” which she understood as “representative, symbolic, and phonetic” forms of “picture 
writing.” She believed that the Mesa Verdeans were “verging on the second” step in what she 
viewed as a teleological progression in writing habits.70 Like Bandelier, McClurg 
acknowledged the power and strangeness of the American Southwest, commenting, for 
instance, on the “far and desolate cliffs” in which the Mesa Verdeans made their homes.71 
Like Bandelier, McClurg often interpreted the Ancestral Puebloan people with a certain 
degree of distance, as if she were an all-knowing narrator in someone else’s tragedy. As an 
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example, McClurg once described the Mesa Verdeans as a “feeble folk . . . perched in eagle-
like eyries.”72 Indeed, McClurg’s interpretation of the Ancestral Puebloans was often tragic. 
She assumed that the people who built Mesa Verde were a “gentle, industrious race” who 
were “harassed and exterminated by a nomadic and cruel people—the red men.”73 For all of 
her similarities with Bandelier, however, McClurg most often adopted the poetic category of 
the epic when she narrated her own actions in the American Southwest, and her engagement 
with preservation advocacy. She related to her historical situation by narrating herself as a 
heroine in a frontier epic. Her attitude in this regard is best captured by the motto that she 
chose for the Colorado Cliff Dwellings Association: “Dux Femina Facti.” 74 A woman led the 
exploit.  
When Kenneth Burke theorized the poetic category of the epic, he supposed that it 
was a literary style most appropriate for accepting purportedly primitive conditions, in a long 
ago time during which collectives were pitted against one another in a constant struggle for 
survival. While I find this essentializing aspect of his theory unhelpful, Burke identified a 
number of rhetorical traits within the epic poetic category that support my analysis of 
McClurg’s works. Burke concluded that the epic category was designed for conflict, and 
“accept[ed]” such conflict and “the rigors of war . . . by magnifying the role of the warlike 
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hero.” He claimed that the rhetorical magnification of the hero’s feats lent “dignity to the 
necessities of existence, ‘advertising’ courage and individual for group advantage.”75 Epic 
tales normalized conflict and emphasized the ethos of the hero, all the while offering the hero 
to the epic’s audience as a person with whom the audience should identify. Burke argued that 
the epic poetic category and its accompanying heroic frame encouraged acceptance by 
“making the hero’s character as great as the situation he confront[ed].” However, he noted 
that the heroic frame did not provide a particularly “well-rounded . . . frame of acceptance” 
because it tended “to gauge the situation falsely.”76 Burke seemed to hold this opinion of 
most frames, aside from the comedy. In any case, dramatism claimed that epics glorified both 
the conditions they described and the hero who intervened in those conditions. As rhetoric, 
epics encouraged their audiences to accept undesirable cultural conditions and to identify 
with their heroes. They also encouraged audiences to accept the cultural myths that they 
advanced, through stylized grandeur. Both the hero and the situation became magnificent 
through the telling of the epic. 
McClurg’s adoption of the epic frame was apparent in her “Cliff Climbing in 
Colorado” narrative, as well as in the two annual addresses that she delivered to the CCDA. 
In the former narrative, she presented herself as a plucky young woman, or “the Enthusiast,” 
undertaking an adventure in a dangerous and alluring scene. This story echoed the discovery 
tales that individuals like Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld advanced. 
Like those men had done, McClurg advanced her professional reputation through tales of 
derring-do. Her tendency to emphasize her own perseverance continued in her advocacy 
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years, during which she presented herself as an enterprising leader, battling the odds to save 
Mesa Verde. In both cases, McClurg was the center of her own stories. McClurg framed 
herself as an epic hero in a frontier saga in a variety of ways. First, she described the 
spectacular scene in which she undertook her work as an adventurer and advocate, often 
describing the Ancestral Puebloan people and other Native peoples as remarkable features of 
that scene. Second, she detailed a variety of hardships that she endured as both an adventurer 
and advocate. Finally, she detailed the forms of glory that she achieved through her exploits. 
I describe McClurg’s epic framing of both her adventures and her advocacy next. 
McClurg appealed to rhetorical enchantment regularly when she described the 
magnificent (or, per dramatism, magnified) scene in which she undertook her heroic 
activities. She portrayed the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde vividly, and both aggrandized 
and fetishized the Ancestral Puebloans as she wove them into a narrative with epic 
proportions. She used densely-connotative language and a number of ready cultural 
commonplaces in order to relay her story in mythic form. In so doing, she also mythologized 
herself. The legendary way in which she framed her experiences also promoted a number of 
myths, having to do with cultural conflict on the frontier, a woman’s place in society, and the 
mystique of the Other. 
When McClurg described the poetics of place at Mesa Verde, her linguistic choices 
echoed some of the stylistic tendencies of the authors in the previous chapter. Like them, 
McClurg advanced a romance of ruins, speaking in terms of both beauty and the exotic in 
order to enrich her epic narrative. In terms of the beauty of Mesa Verde, and its splendor, 
McClurg described the structures there as “palatial stone pueblos.”77 Like the authors of the 
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previous chapter, McClurg marveled that “here and there and everywhere [were] the marks 
of the busy fingers which had laid [the plaster] on and which have been dust for so many 
centuries.”78 Like Chapin, McClurg pondered upon “the cloud-swept sky, below; the 
precipice and the tree-tops,” and admired how “the ancient cliff builders must often have 
viewed the same prospect.”79 Though McClurg had a number of outlandish things to say 
about Mesa Verde, she posited that its “simple reality” was “wonder enough” to inspire any 
visitor.80  
McClurg illustrated the charm of Mesa Verde through allusions to Old World heritage 
places, as well as through speculation over whether or not Mesa Verde was haunted. In one 
instance, McClurg compared the alcove dwellings to Egyptian temples and Shakespeare’s 
birthplace, lamenting that both places had fallen victim to vandalism, and fearing that “haunt 
of the cliff dwellers” could not “escape” that fate.81 Elsewhere, she described alcove 
dwellings at Mesa Verde as “haunted . . . “war-worn and alone.”82 The specter of the 
“ghostly cliff dwellers” was “uncanny” to McClurg, and also a sensational attribute of her 
storytelling.83 Such descriptions of Mesa Verde added to the glamor of McClurg’s epic 
narrative, by enriching the scene of her story with familiar cultural figures and tropes—in 
this case, ghostly American Indian people dwelling within haunted ruins.  
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There were a number of peculiar theories that McClurg advanced about Mesa Verde, 
which also served to magnify the scene in which she made her supposed discoveries. 
McClurg offered a summary of the existing “theories of race origin and development on the 
American continent,” refusing to disregard any of the following as geneses for the Mesa 
Verdeans: the “Autochthonic theory, or that of separate creation or evolution of man on the 
American continent;” “The Ten Lost Tribes of Israel;” “The survivors of the lost continent, 
Atlantis;” “The Phoenicians;” “The Carthaginians or other Mediterranean border nations;” 
“The Greeks;” “The Chinese, in 458 A.D.;” and “The Mongols under a son of Kubla Khan in 
the thirteenth century.”84 As this example indicates, much of how McClurg magnified the 
scene of her epic narrative had to do with the other characters who appeared there, and their 
own theatrical appeal for the purpose of her story. 
Indeed, the Ancestral Puebloans themselves often featured as dramatic components in 
the scene of McClurg’s epic tale. Given that the Ancestral Puebloans were always absent 
from the scene about which McClurg wrote, they became background features in her story of 
discovery. Her descriptions of the Ancestral Puebloans swung from complimentary and 
aggrandizing to demeaning and fetishistic. At both extremes, McClurg’s descriptions of the 
Other served to enhance the impressiveness of the epic’s scene, and the size of the heroine’s 
feats therein. They also advanced myths of primitivism, supposed savagery, and fetishistic 
engagement with the Other, demonstrating a form of enchantment predicated on the 
presumed exoticism of the Other.85 
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McClurg aggrandized the Ancestral Puebloans and their works, according to metrics 
that had value in her contemporary moment. As I mentioned previously, McClurg 
emphasized the grandeur of Mesa Verde by bringing it into an analogous relationship with 
Old World legends and timelines. Egypt, with its pyramids, was a consistent touchstone for 
comparison throughout her narrative, but she referenced other ancient cultures with 
regularity. For example, at the beginning of her “Cliff Climbing” narrative, McClurg 
introduced her readers to Mesa Verde by noting that “centuries ere the Genoese sailed forth 
on the ‘Sea of Darkness,’ to a world explorers erroneously supposed to be new—there was 
civilization in Colorado.”86 The juxtaposition of cultural assumptions with McClurg’s 
findings about Mesa Verde also served to expand the scope of McClurg’s heroic narrative. 
McClurg also compared the Mesa Verdeans to contemporary Americans, and 
imagined them to be part of a primordial American identity. In reflecting upon the Mesa 
Verdeans’ relationship to other ancient indigenous peoples of the Americas, McClurg 
wondered whether or not the “Mound Builders, Colhuans, Toltecs, Aztecs, Pueblos or Cliff 
Dwellers . . . [formed] one primeval American brotherhood.”87 When artwork that McClurg 
and her party found in the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde vaguely resembled the American 
flag, McClurg joked that “My lord” was “anxious to patent this discovery and dispose of it to 
the Fourth of July orators.”88 Though McClurg jested about “My lord’s” patriotism, still she 
entertained the idea that there was continuity in American identity from the time of the Mesa 
Verdeans to the present. This commentary elevated Mesa Verdeans at the same time that it 
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advanced nationalistic valuations for indigenous heritage places—another myth in this 
context.  
In addition to casting the Mesa Verdeans as “primeval” Americans, McClurg and 
company sometimes portrayed the Mesa Verdeans humanistically. Such commentary 
appeared extensively in a conversation “The Enthusiast,” “My lord” and the Van Winkles 
had at their campfire in McClurg’s “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” narrative. As the four 
characters reflected on the sum of their knowledge of the Mesa Verdeans, they attempted to 
imagine what life would have been like for a typical Mesa Verdean, from cradle to grave. 
The quartet turned their conjectures to the typical manner of dress, occupation, and food 
culture for a Mesa Verdean. The conversation included ponderings on the arts and leisure 
activities of the Mesa Verdeans, with Rip Van Winkle declaring that “the cliff dweller had 
work and play . . . or he would have been a dull boy.” 89 In another excerpt of “Cliff 
Climbing in Colorado,” the character of “My lord” found a flute and thereafter insisted that 
an “enamoured, cliff-dwelling troubadour had strolled beneath [a] scarped precipice, and 
serenaded his Dulcinea on the heights.”90 These somewhat whimsical interludes humanized 
the Mesa Verdeans through a holistic consideration of their quotidian lives. Yet, inevitably, 
McClurg returned to peculiar aspects of the Mesa Verdeans when she described them, and 
never could resist romance or humor, either. All of these descriptors created interest and 
ambience for the story of McClurg’s transformation in the crucible of “Cliff Climbing.” 
Even when McClurg attempted to understand the lifeways of the Mesa Verdeans, she 
spoke about them in ways that amplified the scene of her own saga. For instance, McClurg 
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remarked that she had “hobnobbed with [the Mesa Verdeans,] so to speak; . . . visited their 
houses, fingered their china, employed their tools, profaned their temples, and probably 
inhaled their very dust!”91 Although McClurg humanized the Mesa Verdeans by talking of 
their pottery, pastimes, and religious ways, she spoke of them in such a way as to make them 
somewhat preposterous. While this interlude served to create poetic interest in the scene of 
McClurg’s activities, it also emphasized McClurg’s actions and the peril that she undertook 
when completing her adventures. The Mesa Verdeans were a topic of conversation, but only 
McClurg was an agent in this scene. 
While McClurg had complimentary things to say of the Ancestral Puebloans, she also 
described them in ways that would make them seem exotic, strange, or even somewhat 
frightening. Whatever compliments she proffered were tempered by her biased 
interpretations of the Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants. Through the rhetorical 
enchantments of exoticizing descriptions, McClurg advanced myths about white superiority. 
For example, McClurg drew on some of the same tropes as the authors from the previous 
chapter in order to enhance a strange aesthetic for the Mesa Verdeans, considering them a 
“mysteriously harassed” people.92 McClurg detailed what she thought was grotesque about 
the Mesa Verdeans by commenting at length upon the practice of skull-flattening, defining it 
as “something abnormal and horrible.”93 Though she suspected that the Mesa Verdeans had a 
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robust spiritual life, she considered indigenous religious beliefs, from past or present, 
fascinating “superstition[s].”94  
McClurg also employed exoticizing descriptions of American Indian people from her 
own moment in history to add texture to her tale. Throughout her “Cliff Climbing in 
Colorado” narrative, she indicated her belief in the theory of degeneration: a loss of cultural 
advancement and integrity between past and present indigenous peoples. She considered the 
Mesa Verdeans to be members of “a race unique in its development, a nation which, as such, 
has quite passed away and is known to us, if at all, but a diminished and degenerate 
remnant.”95 While McClurg declared that the Puebloans were certain descendants of the 
Mesa Verdeans, she claimed that:  
It should not detract from the romantic interest of the lost life of the cliffs, even if we 
may still see, in [Puebloans’] squalid homes, the most diminished, degenerate and far-
off descendants of the builders who reared palaces and scaled precipices. Romulus 
and Remus . . .  have lost none of their traditional charm, because the Italian organ-
grinder may be droning at our gates.96  
Although the above quotation illustrates that McClurg’s use of ethnic slurs was not limited to 
indigenous peoples, it certainly shows McClurg’s racial bias against American Indian people, 
which was present throughout her works. Her insulting descriptions of indigeneity supported 
a heroic narrative about white settler colonialism, rather than humanizing non-white social 
actors with whom she interacted. I will expand on this topic, next. 
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Several excerpts from “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” framed tense relationships with 
American Indian groups as dangerous hardships to be overcome by the epic’s heroine. She 
appealed to a myth of enduring and inevitable cultural conflict in order to enchant her 
audience with her own bravery. For instance, McClurg noted that during her first visit to 
Mesa Verde the San Juan Basin was practically impossible to visit. Such it was that 
“government expeditions alone [had] been enabled to conduct systematic explorations . . . to 
find means to surmount the drawbacks of pathless wastes, insufficient pasturage, water and 
food, and the dangers from predatory or hostile Indians.”97 Indeed, McClurg only gained 
access to Mesa Verde at that time thanks to a military escort. In reference to her later visit to 
Mesa Verde, detailed in “Cliff Climbing in Colorado,” McClurg advised that in “Indian 
country one must either have a party large enough to defy savage annoyances or sufficiently 
small to elude observation.”98 By portraying “hostile Indians” as a feature of the scene of her 
exploits, McClurg supported myths of racial prejudice. 
McClurg’s “Cliff Climbing” story also normalized strained intercultural relationships 
in the American Southwest. For instance, while McClurg and company were en route to 
Mesa Verde, they trespassed onto the Weeminuche Ute reservation. She expressed concern 
that they might encounter danger while camped on the edge of the reservation for an evening, 
and admitted that she and her companions “had no right to be [there, and] the red man was 
‘dans ses droits’ to remove them.”99 She expressed dismay on another occasion, when she 
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encountered a couple of gruff cowboys who informed McClurg and company that they were 
on their way “to reclaim some horses ‘stolen’ by the Utes.”100 McClurg was frightened when 
the men “proposed to ‘ventilate the blamed redskins’ and toyed suggestively with their 
pistols” before riding away.101 The dangers posed by encountering members of the local 
Native nation, or by being on the wrong side of the white Westerners, became sensational 
features of McClurg’s epic saga. Yet, she also accepted them as unavoidable features of her 
crucible.102 While McClurg aggrandized herself for enduring the dangers of trespassing on 
Ute territory and encountering armed cowboys, she encouraged her readers to accept the 
myth that conflict would be inevitable. 
Other hardships joined intercultural conflict as epic ordeals for McClurg, the heroine, 
to overcome. McClurg emphasized the physical discomforts of camping in the open air, 
climbing up into the alcoves, and breathing in the dust of the ancients as she and her 
companions rummaged about in the alcove dwellings. McClurg wrote that her “first night 
spent out of doors [was] an epoch,” though would have been much improved had she only 
thought to bring a hammock instead of a bedroll.103 She mocked herself for being so spoiled 
by modern mattresses and other “superfluities,”104 but described the unpleasantness of camp 
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life routinely, complaining of the foul-tasting water she and her party drank and the 
monotonous and dwindling culinary fare. When she went on her field excursions to Mesa 
Verde, she described “slipping, stumbling, crouching, crawling” to uncover the secrets of that 
place.105 While authors from the previous chapter discussed the choking dust in the alcove 
dwellings, McClurg went further. She remarked that it was “dry work rambling in the dust of 
ages. Every object . . . was covered with fine, gray dust, ankle deep . . . We breathed it and 
were covered with it. It had a charnel-house flavor, as if it had been disintegrated from 
generations of cliff-dwellers.”106 Thankfully for McClurg’s party, they had brought claret 
punch with them on their expedition, and to their “dust-dried throats it was nectar.”107 
McClurg often added humor to the descriptions of her ordeals, and so strove to present 
herself as a character with whom her readers might identify easily, though laughing as they 
did.  
Even McClurg’s victories in excavating came with their own hardships to overcome. 
On one occasion, McClurg remarked at length on how she endured a badly-stubbed toe when 
a stone vandalized with the name “Paddy Boyle” fell upon her foot.108 She overcame this 
hardship and continued in her pursuit of objects at Mesa Verde, and in this way illustrated a 
strength of character to her readers. McClurg’s “Enthusiast” character “forgot her ailing, 
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aching body, like a sick soldier in a moment of action. She [rose, reeled, staggered] over to 
Mrs. Van’s corner, and throwing herself down by the rubbish pile essay[ed] to dig.”109 
Indeed, McClurg’s supposed strength of character received a reward when McClurg found a 
perfect vessel, and a number of other objects. By the end of their journey, McClurg and 
company had found so many artifacts that the party’s pack animals could not carry 
everything that they excavated back to town. This became an ordeal in McClurg’s epic tale, 
as well. McClurg remarked that suddenly, she and her companions “began faintly to 
approximate the emotions of those who fling away gold and silver in the hour of a 
shipwreck.”110 McClurg had found her Scylla and Charybdis. In the face of an almost 
impossible decision (apparently), she salvaged her perfect vessel and bade farewell to the 
remaining objects.  
On the whole, McClurg’s emphasis on her “Herculean” effort to ascend into the 
alcove dwellings advanced the glory of her undertaking, building up her reputation in a 
manner similar to the other cadre of explorers already discussed.111 She portrayed herself as a 
bold woman daring to venture where no one else had dared to go before, always against 
insurmountable odds, and always in the middle of conflict—and peril. McClurg embraced the 
preposterous in the telling of her epic saga, but conveyed her pride in being able to endure 
circumstances that she described as arduous.  
McClurg’s pride in her accomplishments supported the narrative’s epic form, as she 
wrote of her various victories as glories or rewards. The rewards that McClurg listed for the 
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heroine of “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” included those excavations in which she found 
souvenirs. The epic heroine’s rewards also included more cerebral benefits, as well as 
prestige. As other visitors to Mesa Verde had done, McClurg described the hardship of 
arriving at the alcove dwellings as commensurate with the reward of seeing them. For 
instance, after completing a “hazardous climb over loosened rocks and slippery ledges, eager 
expectation smothering all thought of danger, . . . ‘The Enthusiast’ [was] first to stand face to 
face with the finest cliff dwelling we saw during our hasty trip.”112 A moral of McClurg’s 
story was that one who dared won. 
McClurg’s hyperbolic account of the struggle of excavation, and the prestige that 
came as a reward, continued in her account of the slab carved “Paddy Boyle” falling on her 
foot. When McClurg triumphed and found a perfect jar in spite of her pain and hardship, she 
declared that she and Mrs. Van, “a couple of neophytes” had done better in a day than two 
men more accustomed to digging at Mesa Verde would have done in a fortnight.113 Indeed, to 
McClurg, it was as if “lightning [had struck] twice in the same place” when both she and her 
companion left the alcove dwelling with excellent specimens of pottery, and this situation 
was all the more remarkable because two untrained women had bested professional men.114 
McClurg considered the indented jar that she found, following her foot injury, to be the 
“pride and glory” of the expedition.115 
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 “The Enthusiast” and her companions had entered the alcove dwellings at Mesa 
Verde in pursuit of “novelty or glory,” and they found both.116 A final reward that McClurg 
and her companions received had to do with a kind of spiritual transformation that each 
experienced at the end of their joint quest. Towards the end of the “Cliff Climbing in 
Colorado” narrative, McClurg recounted the mood that swept over the “Enthusiast” and her 
party as they prepared to leave Mesa Verde at the end of their trip. McClurg wrote that she 
“saw deepening in ‘My lord’s’ world-weary eyes a wide, far-reaching gaze; a restful 
perception of the without and beyond. With Rip and Mrs. Van it was a placid, almost bovine 
content.”117 Going further, McClurg wrote that “[t]he charm of the sylvan life, so ineffably 
peaceful, so shadowlessly sunny, gained on us. We craved its indefinite continuance; the 
thought of the workaday world jarred. It was a true place of transfiguration, but needed not 
that human hands should rear its tabernacles.”118 The glory that McClurg and company 
experienced was their reward for enduring the hardships of excavating. Such an emphasis on 
rewards and adversity contributed to the epic dimensions of McClurg’s tale. 
Most of McClurg’s “Cliff Climbing in Colorado” narrative helped to illustrate the 
transfiguring qualities of the scene in which she, the heroine, accomplished great things. Her 
use of rhetorical enchantment added alluring detail to the places and people whom she 
described, sometimes in flattering ways, and sometimes in demeaning ones. Either way, 
through her epic framing of adventuring through Mesa Verde, McClurg rendered her scene 
poetically. All of this, however, supported cultural myths about cultural difference, white 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 15. 
117 Ibid., 28-29.  
118 Ibid., 29.  
230 
 
superiority, cultural evolution, and the rights of researchers and tourists to impede on 
Southwestern antiquities, sometimes even for profit. While McClurg’s narrative of conflict in 
the American Southwest framed her situation so that her audience might accept conflict as 
inevitable, it also accepted that white social actors like McClurg were the future of the 
American Southwest. In her “Cliff Climbing” narrative, she concluded that the “yielding” of 
the nomadic peoples to what she termed “the dominant white race” was inevitable.119 Not 
only did McClurg imagine that white settlers would come to possess the West, but that the 
desert itself would “rejoice and blossom as the rose” when that happened.120 In this way, 
McClurg presented herself as an epic hero of the dominant white race. Her own success in 
the West was indicative of white success in the West. She framed herself as a hero of the 
white people. 
Far into her years as an advocate, McClurg maintained the belief that white people 
would take possession of the land, as if it were necessary and right for them to do so. The 
“Ode to Irrigation” that she shared in her 1904 address to the Colorado Cliff Dwellings 
Association (CCDA) exemplified this aspect of McClurg’s rhetoric. The “Ode to Irrigation” 
primarily detailed the “March of Races” across the Southwestern desert. The ode’s “March of 
Races” began with the “peaceful” Ancestral Puebloans cultivating the land, moving on to 
violent “red men” on an “ensanguined war-path,” and concluding with Mormon pioneers, 
divinely favored in their effort to turn the desert into a land of “green fields, honey bees, and 
gold sun!” 121 While McClurg did not contribute new data to the theory of cultural evolution, 
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she naturalized it in her rhetoric. This attitude may have supported McClurg’s own feelings 
of entitlement in terms of attempting to gain ownership over Mesa Verde. Certainly, she 
articulated her personal success to the success of white settlers in the Southwest. In that way, 
she presented herself as a hero of white settlers, and her narrative served to normalize the 
conflicts caused by appropriating land belonging to indigenous peoples. Even her ode 
became epic, for it aggrandized the perceived heroism of white pioneers in the West. 
While McClurg’s rhetorical style was engaging during her time as a freelance 
journalist, it took on more overt political force when she started the CCDA. McClurg’s epic 
framing remained during her advocacy years, in spite of the decreased risk of falling from the 
side of a ravine. One example of the incongruous juxtaposition between a task and its degree 
of difficulty came in McClurg’s description of a rummage sale the CCDA held in Pueblo in 
1902, which she described in her 1903 presidential address to the organization. McClurg 
called the rummage sale the “magnum opus” of the CCDA’s efforts that year, and “an 
undertaking which demand[ed] more heroism than a Boston tea party, and more endurance 
than an anthracite coal strike.”122 In the same address, she assured her audience that the 
CCDA was “not discouraged by . . . troublous things,” though they had become “daily meat 
and drink.” Here, McClurg presented herself once again as the bold leader of a group that 
faced difficult challenges—daily! 
McClurg described the organization’s struggles as a way of galvanizing her audience, 
and orienting them towards their shared goal. She rallied her audience with the declaration 
that “Difficulties do not daunt us and we propose to fight it out on this line—or any other 
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vexatious line that may arise.”123 Again, McClurg paired challenges with their rewards, 
claiming that “[i]t were easy for us to write and read papers; to get up debates and concerts, 
but our work demands sterner stuff, and I never doubt—not for a moment—that our reward 
will be correspondingly great.”124 McClurg was explicit in setting goals for the CCDA, and 
in defining the rewards of her organization’s endeavors. She told her listeners that they 
would “live to see Mesa Verde Park the cynosure of the nation: unique, unrivalled,” and that 
they would “hear those who scoffed admit that not in her mines, scenery, agriculture, or 
health values, lie Colorado’s greatest interest and wealth—but in her Cliff Dwelling Park.” 
McClurg urged her audience that they must believe in that, and work to that end. She used 
poetic language to stress how difficult the task of preserving Mesa Verde was, and used the 
scale of the feat to present herself (and the CCDA) as dauntless heroes.   
In her advocacy work, McClurg often expressed her conviction that difficulty and 
glory were intertwined, continuing her epic framing of her activities in the American 
Southwest. Just as she did in her 1903 address, in her 1904 address she once again claimed 
that the CCDA faced dramatic challenges, and that the organization would succeed with 
McClurg at the helm. She told the audience of her 1904 presidential address to “[b]e of good 
courage” in spite of the difficulties that they faced. She declared that the CCDA had “a future 
whose power for wisdom and good [was] as yet unreckoned—and therefore its difficulties . . 
. proportionately greater.” She ended this line of reasoning with the remark that “Great is the 
glory, for the strife is hard!”125 After assuring her listeners that the CCDA would not “be 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 1904 address. 
233 
 
found lacking” in the face of its many challenges, she recounted a story that she had heard 
from a fellow member of the Daughters of the American Revolution. The story followed two 
frogs “swept up by accident into a churn” of milk. “One frog was drowned; the other was 
perched triumphantly on a cake of butter, which his struggling legs had churned for his safety 
and his triumph.” McClurg proclaimed that if “members of the [CCDA were] batrachians, 
they would surely belong to the class of butter-making frogs.” Once again, McClurg situated 
herself in the midst of a conflict, and asked her audience to accept to struggle alongside her 
on her exploits.126  
Although McClurg was oriented towards the success of her organization when she 
was the president of the CCDA, she often made comments that reinforced her unique 
position as its leader. For instance, during her 1904 address, McClurg reported on the great 
success of her “Ode to Irrigation.” McClurg shared with her audience that she won “a prize 
of $50 offered by the National Irrigation Congress for an Irrigation Ode.” She also shared 
that her ode appeared in several newspapers and journals, and had a distribution of eleven 
thousand copies. McClurg noted that she had collected “copies of it from more than 100 
newspapers. So here our Cliff Dweller obtained a wide recognition.”127 Of course, so had 
McClurg. In this way and others, she solidified her position as leader of the exploit. 
During her advocacy years, McClurg emphasized her position as a “Denver club-
woman,”128 caught between ignorant Westerners and apathetic politicians, and struggling to 
secure the alcove dwellings at Mesa Verde with the help of her companions in the CCDA. 
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She never explained why she was invested in securing the alcove dwellings, but accepted that 
it was her quest to do so. The epic framing that she used in her advocacy years was consistent 
with the rhetorical choices she made during her adventurous youth, as well. McClurg 
presented herself as the epic hero in most of the narratives that she told. She magnified a 
number of her own characteristics as she detailed her exploits in the Southwestern United 
States, and she situated herself as a trailblazer on the frontier. The way that McClurg 
expressed her enchantment with the antiquities of the Southwest supported her idealistic 
portrayal of the scene in which she practiced her heroism, and served to magnify her situation 
in the manner that dramatism suggests is consistent with the poetic category of the epic. Her 
epic rendering of both excavations and advocacy helped to naturalize myths about white 
settler culture in the Southwest. Whereas McClurg sought to aggrandize the role of the white 
woman on the Western frontier, Hewett hoped to diminish the ill effects of settler 
colonialism—through the comic frame. 
Hewett: Comedy and the Reverent Critic 
While McClurg was a freelance journalist, a socialite, and a clubwoman, Hewett was 
a scholar for most of his life. Hewett differed significantly from the other scholars and 
enthusiasts whom I have discussed in this dissertation, for he was the most outspoken 
advocate on behalf of Southwestern antiquities and indigenous rights, and because he 
embedded many of his attitudes in federal law.  
To be sure, Hewett advocated for the status of science, as well as for appalling modes 
of government intervention in the lives of American Indian peoples and other minorities, 
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through his proposed “human game preserves”129 and his thoughts on “race pedagogy.”130 
Yet, he also helped to secure government intervention in preserving indigenous heritage 
places, and often he advocated for the human dignity of indigenous people and their cultures. 
Hewett shared with Bandelier a belief in paternal benevolence, and this myth oriented almost 
all that Hewett did. Whereas Bandelier framed the myth of paternal benevolence as a 
necessary intervention because of what he viewed as the inevitable tragic fate of American 
Indian peoples, Hewett primarily defended paternal benevolence on the grounds that 
indigenous culture was spectacular, and merited protection. Hewett’s overly worshipful 
language when he spoke of American Indian peoples, however, indicated the zealousness 
with which he hoped to “care” for indigenous people and their heritage, and also indicated 
the key problematic within his rhetoric: the tension between care and control.  
Hewett was also distinctive from other preservation advocates because typically he 
adopted the comic frame when he discussed his profession. Note, while Hewett oriented 
himself towards his historical situation as though it was comedy, his frequent and extreme 
praise for indigenous heritage sometimes made his frame less “well-rounded” than 
dramatism’s ideal of the comic frame, which would have “involve[d] constant 
discrimination” on every topic. Because of Hewett’s constant discrimination of his own 
actions, those of his archaeologist peers, and those of his government, however, clearly he 
considered himself and Anglo-American culture within the comic frame.  
Dramatism defines the comic frame as the most humanistic frame of acceptance, in 
which symbol-users pair praise and criticism dialectically in order to arrive at a measured 
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view of their circumstances. Burke further noted that the comic frame was a critical 
demeanor, and one in which the critic himself or herself would express a realistic 
understanding of his or her own relationship to the frame. In offering the definition of the 
comic frame that is most useful for my analysis, Burke called the comic frame one in which a 
symbol-user swung between “‘iconoclasm’” and “‘hagiography.’” 131 Burke further described 
the comic frame as “charitable, but at the same time . . . not gullible,”132 later referring to it as 
“sour grapes plus.”133 It was a somewhat skeptical way of describing circumstances, but 
skepticism with hope. For Burke, the comic frame emphasized “humanism” without 
aggrandizing it or critiquing it unfairly; the former (avoiding aggrandizement) was an aspect 
of the comic frame that Hewett sometimes failed to exemplify in his rhetoric.134  
As I interpret dramatism, the comic frame attended to foibles and victories in human 
action, and above all else, offered measured judgment of those actions. Hewett humanized 
the characters in his situation through two different rhetorical methods: diminishing the status 
of scientists and Anglo-American cultural values, and enhancing the status of Ancestral 
Puebloans and indigenous expertise. He reserved his iconoclasm for social actors like 
himself, and his hagiography for the Other. In both instances, he compensated for 
mainstream attitudes by offering contrary ones. In this, Hewett performed the role of the 
comic frame’s gadfly-critic perfectly. His rhetorical enchantment, however, appeared 
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primarily in his hagiographic descriptions of the Other, and indicated a clear bias in his 
attempts to mythologize peoples like the Puebloans and places like Chaco Canyon. 
Iconoclasm is half of the dialectical pairing that dramatism defines as indicative of 
the comic frame. For the purpose of this analysis, I consider iconoclasm as “[t]he action of 
attacking or assertively rejecting cherished beliefs and institutions or established values and 
practices.”135 Hewett regularly assumed the role of an iconoclast in that he regularly critiqued 
his field of research, the status of science, and the government’s interventions in the lives of 
American Indian people, discussed already. In so doing, Hewett attempted to disenchant his 
audience of myths having to do with the status of science and the righteousness of 
government action, while using poetics in order to support myths of universal humanism and 
antimodern primitivism, instead. 
In his most explicit displays of iconoclasm against the institution of the academy, 
Hewett was often skeptical of the good intentions of his archaeological peers. For Hewett, 
best practice in archaeology included careful excavation, consistent preservation, and 
restrained scholarly conclusions; Hewett was critical that his peers failed to perform these 
actions in the manner he envisioned. Hewett told his readers that the “archaeologist, like 
other historians, best serve[d] his science by recovering, describing, and preserving unaltered 
the evidences of human activity, calling attention to possible interpretations of the evidence, 
and allowing it to teach what it will.”136 He informed his readers that American archaeology 
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had participated in “much tall guessing,” requiring “much discreet hedging” after the fact.137 
He was concerned about archaeology’s tendencies towards “conjecture and unwarranted 
conclusions,” and he felt that the matter of interpretation never could be final.138 Hewett 
regularly situated himself within the professional community of archaeologists while noting 
its “foibles,” and in that way demonstrated aspects of a comic frame of interpretation.139 
Hewett wrote as an iconoclast when he addressed the theory of cultural evolution, as 
well. Like the other authors of his era, Hewett accepted the popular premise that Europeans 
were “a stronger people” than the American Indian people whom they were displacing, and 
more technologically-advanced.140 While Hewett took it as a foregone conclusion that white 
culture had the most advanced technology on the planet, he felt that white culture was 
deficient in aesthetic and spiritual matters, and thus he expressed cutting criticism of dearly-
held cultural beliefs and institutions. Hewett also bemoaned technological changes that he 
witnessed, arguing that humanity “would probably be content without rapid movement, 
instantaneous communication, the measurement of time into fractions of seconds, the 
incessant shock of machinery, political campaigns, class hatreds, industrial revolutions, and 
world wars.”141 Hewett seems to have resented the fact that “the evolution of modern 
society” had alienated American Indian people, for he felt that their “ages of experience” had 
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prepared them for a different—more peaceful—form of life.142 While Hewett used the comic 
frame to critique the myth of cultural evolution as a social good, he simultaneously advanced 
the myth of antimodern primitivism.  
Hewett also criticized the academy for succumbing to the enchantments of “pick and 
spade.” As he said, the “pick and spade of the archaeologist coupled with the imagination of 
the artist have recreated a history of an almost perfect adaptation to environment, a story as 
fascinating, as glamorous as that of any race on earth [that of the Ancestral Puebloans at 
Chaco Canyon].”143 He appreciated the findings of diligent archaeologists, but felt that “the 
study of the surviving peoples [had] fallen behind” the work of pick and spade (referring to 
ethnography).144 He critiqued scientists for failing to speak with “the living informant,” such 
as Puebloan people, who could give more certainty to topics otherwise subject to mere 
conjecture by archaeologists.145 Yet, Hewett admitted that “the specimens of human 
handiwork that [had] lain buried for ages [had] a charm for both scientist and layman that 
[could] not be found in the note-books of the ethnologist.”146 While Hewett wanted 
archaeologists and ethnologists to admit to the allure that biased their research, he never 
denied that it existed, nor that he, himself, was enchanted by it.  
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Hewett recognized that many of his attitudes were in tension with one another, and 
performed the reflexivity that Burke defined as a component of the comic frame. Hewett also 
appealed to as many perspectives as he could when he advocated on behalf of Southwestern 
antiquities. When Hewett described his goals, he offered both practical reasons for setting 
aside antiquities, as well as humanistic and aesthetic reasons for doing so. He vacillated 
between the supposedly rational and what Burke called “the irrational and the non-rational” 
purposes for undertaking his work, presenting all as a cohesive “rationale,”147 To be sure, 
Hewett was adamant about the value of “scientific research.”148 Yet, he also acknowledged 
an “educational value” 149 and even an “economic”150 benefit for keeping Southwestern 
antiquities intact. Finally, Hewett marveled at the “esthetic and spiritual values” of the 
Ancestral Puebloan culture.151 Hewett thought Southwestern antiquities were nearly 
universally valuable; they had something to offer everyone, and this justified their 
preservation, as well as the government’s intervention in assuring that. 
Hewett never shied away from discussing the aesthetic allure that he felt in the 
presence of Southwestern antiquities, rhetorically acknowledging the enchantment that he 
felt in places like Chaco Canyon. While this frequently pushed his frame towards veneration, 
at other times he tempered his enthusiasm for antiquities with mild cynicism or critique. For 
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instance, when discussing Southwestern antiquities, Hewett commented on the strange and 
beautiful atmosphere in which they sat, and concluded that their “unusual situations” made 
them susceptible to “countless stories and theories, romantic and absurd.”152 While this 
passage indicated a tongue-in-cheek comportment towards the popular narratives of the 
Southwest, Hewett often related to the landscape lyrically, himself. Hewett imagined the 
“majesty of silence and space” at Chaco Canyon as suggestive of “the vastness in which the 
Eternal Mind organize[d] the energies of the universe,”153 and he urged that this unique 
atmosphere be preserved alongside the antiquities themselves. His mild cynicism arose again, 
however, when Hewett explained that he had “no objection to tourists” coming to learn at 
Chaco Canyon. He merely asked that “some elements of modern civilization,” such as roads 
and hotels, “be left outside these sacred precincts,” for “Chaco Canyon, with its mysteries, 
[was] nowhere else on earth.”154  
Hewett’s hagiographic demeanor towards antiquities and indigenous peoples 
sometimes overshadowed the roles of iconoclasm and reflexivity within his works. For the 
purpose of this analysis, I define hagiography by its common usage, as “a description of 
someone that represents the person as perfect or much better than they really are, or the 
activity of writing about someone in this way.”155 Whereas hagiography has the more 
specialized meaning of being a biography of a saint or holy person, by any definition, it is a 
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form of writing about people that praises them as transcendental, somehow. Hewett reserved 
his hagiography for occasions when he wrote the stories of ancient or contemporary 
indigenous people, and he used his veneration of the Other to advance the myth of universal 
humanism. These gestures supported Hewett’s participation in the comic frame insofar as 
that frame also emphasized humanism.  
Hewett’s works contained many examples of hagiographic humanism. As one such 
example, he defined preservation as an effort to maintain “the fruits of the human spirit as 
they came from the hands and minds of the men and women who made and cherished 
them.”156 He abhorred vandals because they “put out the torch that ha[d] been kept burning 
by human devotion for a thousand years.”157 The mistreatment of ancient places damaged the 
humanity within them, and Hewett portrayed this as unethical in the extreme. In perhaps his 
most explicit indication of the humanistic reason for preserving Southwestern antiquities, and 
his laudatory comportment towards the same, Hewett stated in 1936: 
Ruins are important because they were the abodes of human beings, because they tell 
of the lives of people, who, like us, found themselves living in a world of nature 
which they strove to understand, found themselves possessed of aspirations which 
they tried to realize, who, therefore, wrought ceaselessly with hands and minds during 
their stay on earth; perhaps not knowing why, but faithfully performing the function 
of human life—to create, to actualize existence, to do what no other creature can do, 
consciously hold the achievements of each generation and add thereto the fruits of 
new endeavors. Ruins likewise remind us that human society struggles, achieves, 
rises, declines, perhaps recovers, but ultimately passes into oblivion.158 
Hewett recognized himself and his contemporaries in the human pursuits of the Ancestral 
Puebloans, and accordingly felt that their craftsmanship deserved to be maintained in the 
                                                 
156 Hewett, The Chaco Canyon and Its Monuments, 51. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 134. 
243 
 
state in which it was found. Hewett combined mythic humanism with his desire for new 
knowledge, in referring to antiquities as if they were nearly sacred. To Hewett, “[a] great ruin 
[was] an object of veneration and . . . a never-ending source of knowledge.” It contained “the 
spirit of its builders, to which is due whatever greatness it ever had.”159 While this set of 
passages appealed to the myth of universal humanism, it surely did so through hagiography. 
Hewett’s sirenic descriptions of humanity translated, at times, to his descriptions of 
his field of research. While he often critiqued archaeology—and archaeologists—he also 
claimed that archaeology had a “high purpose,” which was to “inspire . . . striving, to guide 
human aspiration to new inquiry, to new achievement, to harmony with the way of nature, to 
the freedom of mind that is the measure of manhood.”160 Alongside the other “business of the 
archaeologist” that Hewett described at length, he also found that the archaeologist’s “richest 
finds [were] those that were created [by past people] for the pure pleasure of it” on the 
grounds that “[e]veryone of every race is able to find [beauty] wherever he goes, for he 
carries it in his own soul.”161 The aesthetic of archaeology, and particularly the panhuman 
quest for beauty, was part and parcel of Hewett’s conceptualization of his work. While 
Hewett may have pursued objects, it was the humanism and beauty that they evoked that he 
found most valuable. Yet, while Hewett did attempt to portray the Ancestral Puebloans as 
complete, complex people, he also adopted fetishizing rhetoric when he discussed the 
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Ancestral Puebloans. In this way, Hewett succumbed to the stylistic tendencies of 
hagiographic writing, for he described his subjects as though they were nearly divine.  
Like McClurg, Hewett’s aggrandizement of the Ancestral Puebloans appeared in 
comparisons with famous Old World cultures, descriptions of an ancient American 
patriotism, and in other capacities. The two authors differed, however, in the sense that 
McClurg’s aggrandizement of the Ancestral Puebloans served to make her story more 
thrilling, whereas Hewett’s emphasis on the grandeur of the Ancestral Puebloans served as an 
attempt to convince his audience that these humans deserved praise. As did McClurg, Hewett 
wrote that the Ancestral Puebloans had rivaled “Egypt and Mesopotamia and Asia Minor and 
Middle America” in their architecture; given the epoch in which he operated, this Old World 
comparison was intended to impress.162 It was a further aggrandizement for Hewett to 
Americanize the Ancestral Puebloans. He emphasized them as “a free people of the first, the 
only real American race.”163 He admired “their genius for successful republican government; 
their love of beauty, their mastery of construction and design; their physical superiority; their 
dominating love of the home and the beautiful imagery of their folk-lore and their ceremonial 
religion.”164 He called the Puebloan culture a “noble heritage” that had come down “from the 
long past of America.” Moreover, he concluded that studying the descendants of the 
Ancestral Puebloans through ethnological work was “the finest aspect of the conservation 
movement—an attempt to rescue and preserve the life-history of a great division of the 
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human species.”165 Hewett was thoroughly impressed by these ancient people, and wrote in 
such a way as to convince his readers to be impressed, too.  
For all that Hewett’s hagiographic descriptions of the Ancestral Puebloans and their 
descendants elevated those social actors rhetorically, Hewett’s narrative framing had political 
dimensions. Hewett expressed a belief that so-called traditional cultures complemented the 
progress-oriented European cultures of the world, and had “qualities . . . priceless to human 
society.” He believed in his work as an ethnologist and archaeologist because he thought that 
white culture could find its “soundest insurance against spiritual decline and extinction by 
way of our own violence” through “the discovery, recognition and cultivation of the special 
abilities in the less powerful races.” Hewett thought that the Puebloans and “long-lived races 
of the East” had managed to withstand the tests of time, whereas “European nations . . . 
enjoyed rapid material development and suffered early disintegration.”166 Though Hewett 
concluded that indigenous culture was biologically-fixed, and radically-different from white 
culture, he looked to living Puebloans as part of the solution for resolving white culture’s 
problems.  
Hewett’s stated desire to assist in the perpetuation of indigenous culture was not 
entirely altruistic, for he believed that there were both social and scholarly benefits in 
attempting so-called cultural conservation. Troublingly, while Hewett depicted American 
Indian people as humans with agency and rich cultural traditions, even lauding them 
hagiographically, he also regarded them as specimens for inquiry. Hewett viewed American 
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Indian people as “an invaluable aid in American archaeological research” because their 
“minds [ran] in the same racial channels” as their forebears.167 Hewett expressed optimism 
that truths about the deep past would come to light “through modern psychoanalytical 
methods, from the crannies of the living Indian brain, where ancestral memories sleep.”168 
These demeaning attitudes, alongside Hewett’s comparisons of Puebloan people with 
buffaloes and his oblique eugenics program, cast a pall on Hewett’s ethos as an advocate for 
indigenous rights. They also demonstrate that the blending of iconoclasm and hagiography in 
Hewett’s comic frame failed to result in comprehensive reflexivity, nor in comprehensive 
humanism. The comic frame was not a path to ethical comportment, though the dialectic that 
it demonstrated showed a number of the stakes of preservation advocacy at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. It also showcased a number of competing myths and narratives that 
pertained to this discursive context. 
Conclusion 
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett were united as preservation advocates because of 
what they all stood against. Framing their condemnations of the status quo as plaints, all 
three of these social actors opposed the vandalism of Southwestern antiquities, and all three 
of them opposed the United States government’s comportment towards American Indian 
people in their historical moment. Yet, what each of these advocates stood for differed, and 
their values emerged through each advocate’s preferred frame of acceptance, and the myths 
they each expressed poetically. Bandelier’s rejection of vandalism at the Pecos Pueblo 
                                                 
167 Hewett, The Chaco Canyon and Its Monuments, 56. 
168 Hewett, Ancient Life in the American Southwest, Preface. 
247 
 
stemmed from his esteem for the myth of scientific rationality, and even from a certain 
degree of esteem for Spanish colonialism and the Christianity that it brought. After all, the 
Pecos Pueblo was a relic of that moment in history. While McClurg rejected unearned 
attempts to gain immortality by marking walls, she supported her own trailblazing pursuit of 
novelty and glory. She also offered her own stories of adventure in the American West as 
synecdoche for white settlers on the frontier, with herself positioned as a hero. Hewett 
rejected vandalism and carelessness at Southwestern antiquities because he revered both 
proper science and humanity. He expressed repeatedly his conviction that humanity had 
noble traits, that those traits were preserved in antiquities and in living cultures, and that both 
required dignity and scrutiny. His idealism pushed him towards appalling extremes when he 
applied it towards proposed government intervention in the lives of the Puebloans with 
whom he worked. Yet, his rejection of vandalism stemmed from his veneration of the human. 
All of these preservation advocates accepted that Southwestern antiquities were 
valuable, and all of them even framed them as treasures like those in Old World legends. 
Whereas Bandelier and Hewett understood that value partially within the realm of research, 
each of these advocates urged their audiences to accept the inherent and humanistic value of 
Southwestern antiquities, as well. Bandelier offered the most incomplete effort to humanize 
the Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants, because he presented himself as the all-
knowing narrator in the tragedy of the Other. Whereas he endeavored to make Puebloan 
culture more comprehensible to his audience, simultaneously he advanced myths of scientific 
rationality, cultural evolution, and primitivism. His poetic engagement with Southwestern 
antiquities and with the people who built them resulted in a demeaning and fetishistic 
representation of both, while keeping him at a scholarly remove from the narrative he told. 
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McClurg’s adoption of the epic frame situated her, as a character, in the middle of the 
enchantments that she wove. Ultimately, Southwestern antiquities became part of a scene for 
her narrative of white conquest over the Southwestern frontier. In spite of this, she offered 
herself as a sympathetic figure because she acknowledged tensions of settler colonialism 
even as she promoted herself as the best possible steward of indigenous heritage sites. 
McClurg’s emphasis on her own heroism eclipsed other elements of her scene, and cast the 
Ancestral Puebloans and the Weeminuche Ute people as background characters in her story. 
Her descriptions of both tended towards aggrandizement or exoticizing descriptors, and in 
both cases these poetic distortions served to emphasize the extent of her own heroism. 
Hewett’s poetic demeanor towards Southwestern antiquities and indigenous cultures 
differed from Bandelier and McClurg’s tendencies. Hewett used the comic frame to critique 
and reflect upon the role of science in political affairs. Varying between iconoclasm and 
hagiography, Hewett sometimes attacked the myth of scientific rationality while frequently 
advancing the myth of antimodern primitivism. Hewett’s combined works come across as a 
humanistic hagiography, in which he attempted to make the Ancestral Puebloans and the 
Puebloans more legible to his white audience. Yet, through the hagiographic component of 
the comic frame, Hewett often fetishized indigeneity. Indeed, by the end of his career, 
Hewett turned to Puebloan culture as the last great hope for modern civilization, which he 
believed that European cultures had doomed. In regarding Puebloan culture as the balm to 
white culture’s problems, Hewett understood indigenous heritage in terms of how Anglo-
American culture could use it. 
The accepting frames of the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy performed ideological 
harm in insidious ways, which the advocates likely never realized, enchanted as they were by 
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the myths of modernity. The tragedy allowed Bandelier to assume clinical distance when he 
interpreted Puebloan culture, and so instantiated his belief that Puebloans required the 
supposed benevolence of the federal government. McClurg’s adoption of the epic poetic 
category enlisted the scene of the American West and the Native nations who resided there as 
aspects in her own quest for self-actualization. By relegating indigenous stakeholders to an 
ancillary role in the narrative of indigenous heritage preservation, McClurg made the 
interests of white settlers like herself paramount throughout her works. Hewett’s comic frame 
emphasized humanism to a great extent, which made it the most satisfactory framing device 
in the context of white advocacy on behalf of indigenous heritage and rights. However, it was 
flawed in the sense that the dialectic of iconoclasm and hagiography often failed to reach a 
synthesis of comprehensive and reflexive critique. Hewett, alone, was able to discern myths 
within his professional context, but he advanced fetishistic interpretations of the Other and 
the success of white culture even as he challenged overt racism and some forms of scientific 
rationality.  
All of the frames that Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett adopted were both rhetorical 
enchantments and evidence of rhetorical enchantment. They were rhetorical enchantments 
because they attempted to influence publics through language, they appealed to myths, and 
they proceeded by way of poetic language—even, in this case, through engaging narrative 
styles like the tragedy, the epic, and the comedy. These frames were also evidence of 
rhetorical enchantment because of the expressions of collective poetry that they contained. 
Myths of modernity, like cultural evolution, scientific rationality, and acceptance of 
colonialism, characterized the narratives that these preservation advocates told. Bandelier, 
McClurg, and Hewett were infatuated with the places and people of the American Southwest, 
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and could only express that infatuation through poetic equipment that they had available to 
them in their day.  
Many of the problems that I have identified in the early practice of preservation 
advocacy in the American Southwest carried over into the earliest policies that affected the 
federal management of indigenous heritage places throughout the United States. The myths 
of scientific rationality and paternal benevolence gained an early and enduring foothold in 
preservation policy concerning Southwestern antiquities. The enchantment of the Other also 
carried through in those texts. Only lately have preservation policies concerning 
Southwestern antiquities attempted to renegotiate enchantment, scientism, and humanism in 
the context of the American Southwest. I discuss these and other features of preservation 
policy in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SCIENCE AS THE GOD TERM OF PRESERVATION POLICY 
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 
. . . ‘what hands have built hands can destroy,’ and these ruins, which have endured 
through many ages, are now in danger of destruction. Unless something is done to 
protect them, the vandals of modern civilization will destroy them. It is for this reason 
that Congress should provide for their preservation, or else turn them over to the State 
in order that it may preserve them.1 
The preservation advocates whose works I analyzed in the preceding chapter were 
part of a growing movement among the Anglo-American public to protect Southwestern 
antiquities. The culmination of the advocates’ efforts was the passage of a variety of 
preservation policies that criminalized amateur collecting at ancient places, while regulating 
and encouraging scientific inquiry as never before. The Antiquities Act of 1906 was the most 
significant victory for preservation advocates at the turn of the twentieth century. It enabled 
the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and War to guard ancient indigenous heritage 
places, to grant permits to authorized educational institutions for the study of those places, 
and to prosecute social actors who trespassed against antiquities on public lands. It also set 
precedents for over one hundred years of federal policy affecting Southwestern antiquities. 
These policies, often the result of advocacy campaigns, are the focus of this chapter. 
Federal preservation policies demonstrated rhetorical enchantment by calling upon 
cultural myths and appealing to wonder through poetic language, all while making claims 
that bore on the public interest. Rhetorical enchantments appeared somewhat differently in 
policy than in the accounts of excavations or interpretations of the Ancestral Puebloans 
                                                 
1 "The Mancos Ruins." Denver Tribune-Republican. 12 December 1886. pp. 12.  
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addressed heretofore. Even so, all of these government interventions demonstrated some of 
the same valuations of the past that the adventurers and archaeologists expressed, and they 
envisioned the purpose of preservation in similar ways. Like all of the texts that I have 
examined so far, these policies valued the preservation and pursuit of knowledge, typically 
described as some type of scientific inquiry.  
In this chapter, I analyze key themes within three categories of preservation policies, 
as well as the appearance of Science, the god term that orients the rhetoric of preservation 
policy as a whole. The three categories of preservation policies that I analyze are as follows: 
general federal preservation policies, which affect heritage management in the country at 
large; early twentieth century national park and monument designations for places like Mesa 
Verde and Chaco Canyon, which comprise the first generation site-specific policies; and late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century national monument designations for places like 
Bears Ears National Monument and Canyons of the Ancients, which comprise the second 
generation site-specific policies.  
There are many parallels between the nationwide and site-specific policies, as well as 
between the first and second generation of park and monument designations. The 
predominant similarity across these three categories of policies is that all are subject to the 
god term Science. By identifying the similarities between federal preservation policies and 
their specific iterations in the Southwest, the particularities of Southwestern antiquities, their 
management, and their preservation, can be viewed within a national context. The rhetorical 
analysis of preservation policies also brings the historical origins of preservation advocacy 
into conversation with its enduring implications. My thematic analysis of each category of 
preservation policy also demonstrates that there are stark differences among federal 
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preservation policies, first generation park and monument designations, and second 
generation monument designations. The themes present in each category differ dramatically, 
and orient towards Science differentially. Indeed, the various thematic contexts point towards 
different iterations of Science. This is significant for understanding how to advocate on 
behalf of ancient indigenous places in the present, given the scientific racism that often 
defined archaeology and advocacy on behalf of Southwestern antiquities historically. 
Contemporary site-specific policies attempt to disarticulate Science from racism, and 
advance new cultural myths in the process. 
The general federal preservation policies that I assess span from 1906 to 1990, and 
include: the Antiquities Act of 1906, the Organic Act of 1916, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, 
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974, the Archaeological 
Resources Protection Act of 1979, and the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act of 1990. Whereas the Antiquities Act emerged from lengthy discussions 
concerning the fate of Southwestern antiquities in particular, many of the other federal 
policies reflected public concern regarding Anglo-American historic sites, and those affected 
the federal management of antiquities in a more incidental way. Policies that emphasized 
indigenous heritage appealed to Science more often and more explicitly than those that 
prioritized Anglo-American heritage.  
Following my discussion of the poetics and myths present in the rhetoric of federal 
preservation policies, and the ways in which these orient towards the god term Science, I 
assess the language of several national monument or park designations on behalf of 
Southwestern antiquities, beginning in the late nineteenth century and ending in 2016. I have 
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identified twenty documents establishing Southwestern antiquities as new federally-protected 
locales.2 The majority of the documents I assess here are presidential proclamations, with the 
additional inclusion of a bill passed by Congress or implemented as an executive order. I 
have focused my analysis on the initial designation of each site as a protected territory, and I 
have divided my analysis into two broad historical periods: the first generation of site-
specific park and monument designations, ranging from 1892-1939, and the second 
generation of Southwestern national monument designations, ranging from 1990-2016.  
In the first generation of site-specific preservation policies particular to the American 
Southwest, I analyze Benjamin Harrison’s executive order “For the Protection of Casa 
Grande Ruin” (1892); the “Act Creating the Mesa Verde National Park” (1906); Theodore 
Roosevelt’s presidential proclamations in support of Montezuma Castle National Monument 
(1906), El Morro National Monument (1906), Chaco Canyon National Monument (1907), 
Gila Cliff-Dwellings National Monument (1907), and Tonto National Monument (1907); 
William Howard Taft’s proclamations in support of Navajo National Monument (1909) and 
Gran Quivira National Monument (1909); Woodrow Wilson’s proclamations of Walnut 
Canyon National Monument (1915) and Bandelier National Monument (1916); Warren G. 
Harding’s proclamations of Aztec Ruins National Monument (1923) and Hovenweep 
National Monument (1923); Calvin Coolidge’s proclamation on behalf of Wupatki National 
Monument (1924); Herbert Hoover’s proclamation of Canyon de Chelly National Monument 
(1931); and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proclamation of Tuzigoot National Monument (1939).  
                                                 
2 There have been numerous boundary adjustments and bureaucratic realignments concerning 
these twenty sites over the years. I did not include those documents in my analysis. 
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In my analysis of the second generation of preservation policies affecting 
Southwestern antiquities, I examine Public Law 101-313, passed during George H.W. Bush’s 
administration, concerning Petroglyph National Monument, Pecos National Historical Park, 
and Zuni-Cibola National Historical Park (1990); Bill Clinton’s proclamations of Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument (1996) and Canyons of the Ancients National 
Monument (2000); and, finally, Barack Obama’s proclamation of Bears Ears National 
Monument (2016). 
I adopt the dramatistic concept of the god term in order to analyze the ways in which 
these collections of texts intersected, and how, together, they valued Science as the primary 
rationale for setting aside public lands containing antiquities. Often, these policies promoted 
human sciences and history, but did so in a way that spoke to scientific rationality—a mythic 
mode of Science, rather than a denotative one. Yet, Science never appeared alone in these 
preservation policies; it appeared within discursive contexts that shifted the meaning of the 
god term, and indicated different valuations of heritage and antiquities. These contexts were 
the accompanying terms, myths, and poetics that pointed towards Science, and they varied 
among the federal preservation policies, the first generation of site-specific designations, and 
the second generation of site-specific designations. 
General federal policies discussed Science in terms of its service to the American 
people. Such policies appealed to the myth of benevolent paternalism routinely. General 
federal policies reinforced their emphasis on nationalism by describing it with vivid 
language, whereas Science appeared within less picturesque portions of these texts. The first 
generation of site-specific park and monument designations in the American Southwest 
paired Science with the idea of the Other. Indeed, these policies promoted a Science of the 
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Other, as they valued highly fields like ethnology and archaeology—and the supposed secrets 
about humanity and cross-cultural relationships that those fields of research would unlock. In 
those texts, references to the idea of the Other garnered the most colorful descriptions. The 
myth of scientific rationality persisted in these texts, and the myth of primitivism joined it. 
The second generation of site-specific park and monument designations in the American 
Southwest elevated Science within the discursive context of reverence for the environment 
and reverence for humanity. In a noteworthy difference from the other collections of texts, 
three out of four of these second-generation documents tended to adopt captivating language 
towards Science as well as towards different iterations of the American people and their 
landscape. While Science was the term-of-terms in preservation policy affecting 
Southwestern antiquities, the network of myths and poetics in which Science appeared was 
variable.  
Next, I expand upon the theory of the god term and its relation to rhetorical 
enchantments, before demonstrating the reign of Science in the federal preservation policies 
affecting Southwestern antiquities.  
God Terms and Rhetorical Enchantments 
Throughout this chapter, I build the argument that Science is the god term of 
preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities. Kenneth Burke’s god terms were the 
inspiration for my theoretical approach, though Richard Weaver also developed the 
theoretical concept.3 Weaver defined god terms as expressions “about which all other 
                                                 
3 Richard L. Johannesen, “Richard M. Weaver’s Uses of Kenneth Burke,” The Southern 
Speech Communication Journal 52, no. 2 (1987): 312-30. This article notes that Burke used 
the phrase “god term” in his Grammar of Motives, prior to Weaver’s publications on the 
topic. Furthermore, Weaver attended one of Burke’s seminars in 1949, during which Burke 
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expressions [were] ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and powers.”4 God terms 
granted force to the “ancillary terms” alongside which they appeared. Weaver identified the 
god term of the modern age as “progress” for its ability to “validate almost anything” 
rhetorically, and he located deference to progress in the discursive habits of his 
contemporaries.5 My findings are consistent with Weaver’s theory in the sense that the god 
term, Science, appeared repeatedly as a justification for government action. Science also 
appeared in a web of accompanying or ancillary terms with which it shared a power 
relationship. Throughout this chapter, I refer to the terms and themes that accompanied 
Science as the god term’s discursive context. In some of the texts that I address in this 
chapter, the networks of terms that accompanied Science characterized it according to the 
technological rationality that authors like Holmes and Nordenskiöld advanced; at other times, 
Science appeared among ancillary terms that reflected the academy’s reflexive turn, and 
which exhibited a rejection of scientific objectivity. By examining Science as a god term, its 
malleable meanings and associated values become clear.  
Both Richard Weaver and Kenneth Burke considered god terms as symbols that 
presided over the discourses in which they appeared. However, Burke discussed god terms 
less in the context of power, and more in the realm of symbolic transcendence. For Burke, a 
                                                 
theorized the god term. Johannesen argues that Weaver failed to attribute the term to Burke 
properly, though was influenced by him substantially. 
4 Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1953), 212, 
accessed March 13, 2018, Hathitrust Digital Library. 
5 Ibid. 
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god term was a “secular summarizing term,”6 or a “title of titles.”7 A god term was an 
orienting symbol, or the “universal title or all-inclusive epithet to which any less generalized 
terms would be related as parts to whole.”8 In a reductive sense, one might say that Burke’s 
god terms were descriptive categories into which the all of the main themes of a text might 
be clustered. However, such a summation would overlook the mythic capacities of god terms 
for Burke. In addition to categorizing discourses, Burke’s god terms contained worlds within 
themselves. God terms are a helpful lens for examining policies because, by their very 
design, policies nearly always contain such terms.  
Although Science dominated preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities, 
it always appeared within a discursive context that contained other themes and values. Most 
notably, preservation policies also appealed to themes of nationalism, indigeneity, and 
wonder. Weaver might have considered these the ancillary terms that accompanied Science 
in this discursive field, yet these terms also altered the meaning of Science when they 
appeared alongside it. For one thing, preservation policies appealed to nationalism, 
indigeneity, and wonder, with densely-connotative, poetic language. Science, though the god 
term of preservation policy, tended to rely on its discursive context for its poetry. It often 
appeared without the trappings of fanciful language. Whereas Science typically evoked the 
cultural myths of scientific rationality or the wonder of scientific discovery, the themes that 
bolstered Science appealed to a much broader range of cultural myths, including American 
                                                 
6 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1970), 25. 
7 Ibid., 33. 
8 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1955), 73. 
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exceptionalism, the primitivism of the Other, and the poetry of place in the American 
Southwest.  
The discursive contexts in which the god term, Science, appears are among the many 
sites of rhetorical enchantment I address in this dissertation, since the symbolic fields in 
which Science appears indicate the other myths that accompany and characterize the god 
term. To adapt somewhat liberally from Burke, myths are “less generalized terms” than god 
terms, but are “related as parts to whole” to the terms alongside which they appear.9 Cultural 
narratives about the quest for knowledge, or the power of reason, or the thrill of discovery are 
mythic parts of the whole of Science. These are also among the myths of modernity that 
researchers and advocates from the previous two chapters promoted through their rhetoric. 
Meanwhile, references to exotic or vanished peoples hailed the modern myth of primitivism, 
that belief that Native peoples existed outside of time and differed from Anglo-American 
populations in the extreme. Such myths defined the kind of Science that the first generation 
of national monument designations upheld as a god term. Language about the government 
caring for its people spoke in the myth of benevolent paternalism, and, when contextualizing 
Science, asserted that Science should only be practiced for the public benefit. All of the 
myths that I identify in federal preservation policies defined Science through a dense context 
of cultural myths, even as they oriented towards Science in the process. 
Notably, the sentences in which Science appeared often were devoid of poetry. The 
broader discursive contexts of the preservation policies compensated for Science’s lack. 
References to the nation spoke of enlightenment and trajectory for a unique people; 
references to indigeneity often appealed to the exotic; references to the landscape painted a 
                                                 
9 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 73. 
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strange and beautiful scene in the Southwestern United States. Whereas Science persisted as 
a defining term across nearly all of the preservation policies affecting Southwestern 
antiquities, the accompanying terms—and their poetics—skewed Science in multiple 
directions. Science was a nearly-hollow term, filled in or inflected with the values of its 
adjuncts. I shall elaborate upon these findings in the succeeding sections.  
Federal Preservation Policies 
In my rhetorical analysis of federal preservation policies, I refer to the Antiquities Act 
of 1906, the Organic Act of 1916, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Archeological 
and Historic Preservation Act of 1974, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 
and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990. I offer a brief 
summary of each of these acts before discussing the way in which their contextual emphasis 
on nationalism characterized the nature of the god term, Science. 
The Antiquities Act of 1906 was the first federal policy to grapple with the issue of 
historic or archaeological preservation. As such, it was the first inroad for establishing a 
formal rhetoric of preservation, as practiced by the federal government. It set up punitive 
measures against persons caught damaging or removing “historic or prehistoric” resources 
from federal lands: fines of not more than $500 and/or up to ninety days in prison.10 It 
enabled the president to establish new national monuments, and it provided that the tracts of 
land set aside were of “historic or scientific interest” and “the smallest area compatible with 
proper care and management” of the academically-relevant materials thereon. The act also 
                                                 
10 Antiquities Act of 1906, Public Law 59-209, 34 Stat. 225, 54 U.S. Code §§ 320301–
320303, enacted June 8, 1906. 
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positioned the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and War as the permit-granting 
authorities for the scholarly excavation or removal of objects from federal lands, supervising 
“reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized scientific or educational 
institutions” as they engaged in study, and stipulating that the outcomes of such study be 
preserved and displayed for the public benefit.11  
The Organic Act of 1916 established the National Park Service (NPS), and 
reorganized the management of protected federal lands within the United States, granting the 
Secretary of the Interior more authority in that arena and decreasing the involvement of the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and War. The Organic Act affected the institutional oversight of 
national parks monuments, including many Southwestern antiquities. However, its focus was 
not on research. 
The Historic Sites Act of 1935 (HSA) clarified some existing administrative protocols 
concerning the preservation of historic or archaeological sites in the United States and 
offered a governmental policy about the purpose of preservation. It established guidelines for 
attending to significant properties that were not under federal jurisdiction. Additionally, it 
expanded the Historic American Buildings Survey and created pathways for public 
participation in the designation of nationally-significant sites.12  
                                                 
11 Antiquities Act of 1906. 
12 Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in 
American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 471. Francis P. McManamon, “The 
Foundation for American Public Archaeology: Section 3 of the Antiquities Act of 1906,” in 
The Antiquities Act: A Century of American Archaeology, Historic Preservation, and Nature 
Conservation, ed. David Harmon, Francis P. McManamon, and Dwight T. Pitcaithley 
(Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2006), 168; Jerry L. Rogers, “The Antiquities Act 
and Historic Preservation,” in The Antiquities Act: A Century of American Archaeology, 
Historic Preservation, and Nature Conservation, ed. David Harmon, Francis P. 
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The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) helped to resolve some 
administrative problems that arose for the NPS in the wake of the HSA.13 In response to the 
ungainly growth of the Historic American Buildings Survey, and in light of increased 
demand for non-federally owned sites to receive national recognition, the NHPA established 
“a register of culturally significant sites at local, State and national levels,” known as the 
National Register of Historic Places.14 It also created the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation and established State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPOs). Later amendments 
to the NHPA built upon the organizational networks created by the act, to encourage 
grassroots preservation projects recognized by the federal government. Later amendments 
also facilitated American Indian participation in historic preservation, with the establishment 
of Tribal Historic Preservation Offices (THPOs), though these were not part of the original 
NHPA.15 
Similar to the manner in which the HSA established a federal policy towards historic 
sites, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 established such a policy regarding the 
nation’s obligations towards the environment. NEPA was significant for the preservation of 
                                                 
McManamon, and Dwight T. Pitcaithley (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2006), 
178. 
13 Thomas F. King, Cultural Resource Laws and Practice, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: AltaMira 
Press, 2008), 388. 
14 Laurajane Smith, Archaeological Theory and the Politics of Cultural Heritage (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 132. 
15 Joe E. Watkins, “The Antiquities Act at One Hundred Years: A Native American 
Perspective,” in The Antiquities Act: A Century of American Archaeology, Historic 
Preservation, and Nature Conservation, ed. David Harmon, Francis P. McManamon, and 
Dwight T. Pitcaithley (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Arizona Press, 2006), 196.   
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antiquities because it obligated all federal agencies to complete environmental impact 
statements prior to engaging in new construction or repair work. Because of NEPA, 
archaeologists working in cultural resource management joined interdisciplinary teams 
responsible for completing environmental impact statements, thus assuring that 
archaeological surveys would be completed prior to federal construction projects.16  
Although archaeologists working in cultural resource management had new authority 
to record sites of interest to them, professional archaeological associations pointed out that 
the NHPA and NEPA were not drafted to account for archaeological preservation, per se. 
Accordingly, the archaeological lobby campaigned for new legislation that would meet the 
needs of archaeologists, specifically. Archaeologists drafted the Archeological and Historic 
Preservation Act of 1974 (AHPA)17 to encourage the “preservation of scientific and 
archaeological data” amending earlier legislation in the process.18 
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 expanded further upon the new 
protections offered by the AHPA. While the AHPA increased awareness of archaeological 
resources that lay in the path of federal development projects, the Antiquities Act of 1906 
remained the primary line of defense against vandalism, looting, and other inappropriate 
conduct at ancient sites on federal land. Yet, as time passed, the Antiquities Act’s fines of not 
more than $500 were a decreasingly effective deterrent against pot-hunting, and advocates 
                                                 
16 Smith, Archaeological Theory, 132; Kathleen Sue Fine-Dare, Grave Injustice: The 
American Indian Repatriation Movement and NAGPRA (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2002), 72. 
17 In the United States context, “archeology” and “archaeology” are both accepted spellings 
for the term. “Archeology” is more common in the context of cultural resource management. 
18 Smith, Archaeological Theory, 133. 
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felt that something had to be done to “correc[t] more than seven decades of inadequate 
protection for archaeological sites and objects.”19 Archaeological organizations, still active 
following the passage of the AHPA, banded together once again to lobby for a change.20 The 
product of this lobbying was the enactment of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
of 1979 (ARPA). ARPA’s greatest practical contributions to preservation policy were its 
clearer definitions of the archaeological resources to be protected, and its more stringent 
policies regarding punishments for acts of vandalism or theft.  
ARPA was the first federal preservation policy to consider American Indian 
stakeholders in management decisions regarding ancient indigenous places. For instance, 
ARPA obligated researchers to obtain consent from Tribal governments prior to engaging in 
excavations on Tribal lands. However, ARPA went forward without any input from 
American Indian stakeholders, and it received criticism for “offering lip service only to 
American Indian concerns.”21 By comparison, the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) resulted directly from lobbying on the part of 
American Indian political collectives. Together with “museum professionals, archaeologists, 
and anthropologists,” American Indian representatives brought public attention to a number 
of problems with the ways in which American Indian cultural materials and human remains 
were treated by the federal government.22 For example, the Smithsonian Institution had in its 
                                                 
19 Lary M. Dilsaver, ed., America’s National Park System: The Critical Documents (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), 372. 
20 Smith, Archaeological Theory, 135. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 139. 
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collections many human remains, including the bodies and skulls of American Indian people, 
presumably gathered by the American Bureau of Ethnology during the nineteenth century.23 
Indigenous rights movements were successful in drawing this problematic condition to public 
attention, though the Smithsonian escaped a number of NAGPRA’s stipulations. Even so, 
NAGPRA asserted indigenous authority over indigenous heritage management, and 
heightened the requirements for consultation and consent among researchers, federal 
government agencies, and indigenous stakeholders.  
Because each of these acts accomplished different tasks within the legal environment, 
the rhetoric varied from document to document. In general, these acts presented nationalistic 
rationales for protecting Science (and scientific materials) in the United States. The myths 
that accompanied these were the modern narratives promoting scientific rationality and the 
sanctity and benevolence of the nation-state. The poetics of federal preservation policy were 
reserved, primarily, for the narratives of nation that appeared in these texts. I begin my 
discussion of federal preservation policy with reference to the presence of Science within 
nationwide policies affecting Southwestern antiquities. Then I discuss the nationalistic 
themes that inflected Science’s presence within all of these national policies, prior to 
commenting on the degree of consideration that these policies possessed with regard to 
indigenous rights.  
A Nationalistic Science in Federal Preservation Policies 
The Antiquities Act initiated federal preservation policy with reference to Science. 
The Antiquities Act was the first federal preservation policy that offered blanket protection 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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for places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, but it did so because it defined ancient 
indigenous heritage places as “objects of historic or scientific interest.” The act favored 
academic approaches to national heritage places explicitly, with particular emphasis on the 
“examination of ruins, the excavation of archaeological sites, and the gathering of objects of 
antiquity . . . for the benefit of reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized 
scientific or educational institutions.” The purpose of said research, according the Antiquities 
Act, was “increasing . . . knowledge.” 24 In this phrase, the Antiquities Act appealed to the 
myths of scientific discovery and the quest for new knowledge, while establishing a power 
dynamic that favored institutionally-sanctioned researchers. This act’s precedent has 
continued to inform contemporary legislation on the issue, not least of all because the 
Antiquities Act continues to enable presidents to declare new national monuments via 
executive order. 
The HSA picked up some of the themes that the Antiquities Act established by 
promoting “investigations and researches” in pursuit of “true and accurate . . . facts” about 
United States historic and archaeological properties. The act encouraged the Secretary of the 
Interior to liaise with “educational or scientific institution[s],” and obligated the Secretary of 
the Interior to manage the information content of historic and archaeological properties 
through formal documentation (surveys, photographs, drawings, maps), while managing and 
storing the results of such documentation in an appropriate manner. The act compelled the 
Secretary of the Interior to “[s]ecure, collate, and preserve . . . data” as an integral part of 
                                                 
24 Antiquities Act of 1906. 
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preserving historic and archaeological sites. 25 The HSA, like the Antiquities Act before it, 
valued heritage places on the basis of the knowledge content they contained. 
The AHPA, for which professional archaeological organizations lobbied, was 
transparent in its elevation of knowledge content. The AHPA paired Science with data, and 
was clear in its purpose to prevent “irreparable loss or destruction of significant scientific, 
prehistorical, historical, or archeological data.” The act emphasized the “recovery, protection, 
and preservation of such data” as might be threatened by the activities of federal agencies, 
and included “relics and specimens” among the “data” that federally-licensed activities might 
jeopardize.26 The AHPA demonstrated a regard for the objects that might emerge from 
ancient places, without demonstrating care for the places, themselves, or the contemporary 
cultural landscapes in which they were situated. Instead, the AHPA continued the precedents 
set by the researchers and advocates whom I have discussed already, in its emphasis on 
material possession. Moreover, it defined the materials at Southwestern antiquities as data, 
and so appealed to Science in the process. 
The Antiquities Act, the HSA, and the AHPA appealed to myths of scientific 
rationality and the value of new knowledge, but used relatively little poetic language in order 
to call upon those myths. That trend continued in ARPA, with the notable exception that 
ARPA recognized the “wealth of archaeological information” that private individuals might 
be able to offer “professional archaeologists and institutions.”27 Notably, the faint glimmer of 
                                                 
25 Historic Sites Act of 1935, Ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666, enacted August 21, 1935. 
26 The Archeological and Historic Preservation Act, Public Law 93-291, U.S. Code 469-
469c, enacted May 24, 1974. 
27 The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Public Law 96-95, 93 Stat. 721, 16 
U.S. Code §§ 470aa–470mm, enacted October 31, 1979, emphasis added. 
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lively language in ARPA, the “wealth” of knowledge, referred to use-value and scientific use 
simultaneously. ARPA’s emphasis on research continued when, like the Antiquities Act 
before it, ARPA privileged “suitable universities, museums, or other scientific or educational 
institutions.” Like the Antiquities Act, ARPA was intent on “furthering archaeological 
knowledge in the public interest.” Like the AHPA, ARPA also referred to the “data” that 
antiquities contained. ARPA focused on the careful treatment of “lands . . . likely to contain 
the most scientifically valuable archaeological resources,” and in so doing, continued to 
illustrate the values that the act promoted.28 While ARPA depicted knowledge and data as 
treasures, of a sort, the act shared its predecessors’ orientation towards scientific rationality, 
and therefore, towards Science.  
NAGPRA differed from the acts discussed so far in the sense that it referred to 
indigenous worldviews, specifically, and attempted to acknowledge indigenous collectives’ 
religious and cultural claims to cultural objects that other policies had viewed as data. 
NAGPRA’s focus on repatriation also set it apart from the other preservation policies, since, 
in many cases, the repatriation of materials to a Tribal government might result in the organic 
deterioration of those same materials upon reburial. Even so, NAGPRA acknowledged the 
power of Science, even in its efforts to sanction scientific behavior. For instance, the act 
clarified that it was not to be “construed as an authorization for . . . the initiation of new 
scientific studies,” and that it did not intend to encourage “other means of acquiring or 
preserving additional scientific information” from human remains and funerary objects. Even 
with its correctives to scientific comportment towards indigenous heritage, NAGPRA did 
continue to define the academic community as experts on indigenous heritage management, 
                                                 
28 The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. 
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and offered the “scientific community” a variety of concessions. For instance, NAGPRA 
demanded the return of human remains and funerary objects from museums and educational 
institutions, unless “such items [were] indispensable for completion of a specific scientific 
study,” in which case, the items had to be returned to their rightful owners “no later than 90 
days after the date on which the scientific study [was] completed.” NAGPRA raised the 
standard for engagement between the scientific community and American Indian 
constituencies, yet it maintained a privileged role for the Anglo-American scientific 
community. It recognized the reign of Science, even as it attempted to curtail scientific 
privileges.  
Among the policy texts that I analyze, NAGPRA was unique in its defense of 
American Indian peoples and their claims on indigenous heritage places and objects. In 
general, though, federal preservation policies demonstrated a Western-centric, materialistic 
approach to preservation and the management of indigenous heritage, viewing ancient places 
and their contents as a kind of property that could be owned and disputed.29 This attitude has 
informed federal preservation policy since before the passage of the Antiquities Act. In 
Senate hearings leading up to the passage of that act, advocates defined antiquities as the 
government’s property, and considered the Antiquities Act a part of the nation’s effort to 
look after its own things.30 Those collectors who were busy profiting from the ceramics that 
                                                 
29 Rodney Harrison describes the Western-centric emphasis on collecting material 
possessions in Heritage: Critical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2013). 
30 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Public Lands, Hearing before the Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Public Lands of the United States Senate, Consisting of Senators Fulton 
(Charman), Bard, and Newlands, on the Bill (S. 4127) for the Preservation of Aboriginal 
Monuments, Ruins, and Other Antiquities, and for Other Purposes, 58th Cong., 2nd sess., 
April 20, 1904, 1-30.   
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they scavenged from ancient indigenous places were robbing the United States federal 
government, and the academic and political elite at the time opposed pot-hunting on 
proprietary grounds as well as academic ones. This idea of ownership persisted for over 
seventy years, as ARPA echoed the Antiquities Act and its founding in its impetus to protect 
the “property of the United States.”31 Both the Antiquities Act and ARPA sought to suppress 
commercial trade in antiquities, in favor of a public benefit. In those acts, the public 
benefited through the pursuit of knowledge, and knowledge existed in material possessions. 
Science oriented the discourse. Nationalism motivated it. 
Although many of the federal preservation policies prioritized scientific rationality in 
their justificatory rhetoric, several of these policies discussed the value of heritage places in 
terms of their national significance, as well. Such patriotic rhetoric informed the broader 
discursive context in which the appeals to Science intervened. Indeed, sometimes these 
policies depicted research as auxiliary to national identity formation. Whereas the appeals to 
the importance of research seldom drifted into inspiring language, references to the American 
people often adopted a rousing tone. For instance, occasional references to the spirit and 
future of the nation illustrated the potency of the thematic context in which the god term of 
Science appeared. The presence of patriotic myths and nationalistic commonplaces 
throughout federal preservation policies transformed the kind of Science that those policies 
promoted into something uniquely American. 
The Antiquities Act had little explicit language about the character of the nation, 
though the hearings leading up to its passage included dramatic nationalistic rhetoric. 
However, the Antiquities Act did appeal to the myth of paternal benevolence, which had 
                                                 
31 The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. 
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nationalistic dimensions. The Antiquities Act advanced the conviction that only the 
“Government” could provide “proper management and care” for the objects of scientific 
interest that the act set aside. Meanwhile, though the Antiquities Act granted new authority to 
academic institutions and their researchers, such institutional actors nevertheless had to seek 
permission from government agencies to perform their research. Furthermore, whatever 
research the Antiquities Act supported, it was “for permanent preservation in public 
museums,” and in some sense, for the public benefit. 32 
A decade after the passage of the Antiquities Act, the Organic Act folded explicitly 
nationalistic ideals into federal preservation policy for the first time. The Organic Act, which 
founded the NPS, was the first of the policies that I discuss here that used poignant language 
to talk specifically about the ways in which the American public would benefit from federal 
preservation initiatives. The very purpose of the Organic Act was “to conserve the scenery 
and the natural and historic objects . . . and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 
manner and by such means as [to] leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.”33 By referring to scenery, enjoyment, and posterity, the Organic Act illustrated 
a different mode of engagement with American heritage than those policies that prioritized 
scientific rationality. Instead, the Organic Act depicted a nation that was invested in pleasure 
and legacy. It defended “natural curiosities, wonder, [and] objects of interest,” and “free 
access to them by the public.”34  
                                                 
32 The Antiquities Act of 1906. 
33 An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and For Other Purposes (Organic Act), 
Public Law 64-235, H.R. 15522, 39 Stat. 535, enacted August 25, 1916. 
34 The Organic Act of 1916. 
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The HSA appealed to both research and national identity, offering patriotic context 
for its appeals to Science. The purpose statement of the HSA asserted that it was “a national 
policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance 
for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States.”35 The HSA ranked 
properties that possessed “exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of 
the United States” as the most important sites to preserve, and instructed caretakers of such 
properties to mark and interpret each site for the edification of the public. With phrases like 
these, the HSA established that American heritage should enrich the lives of the American 
people. In fact, it could inspire them. The information content that “scientific institution[s]” 
contributed to their country enriched the lives of its citizens.36 
The HSA spoke to guided commemorative practices at least as much as it referred to 
more academic modes of cataloguing and learning. The commemorative practices instilled by 
the HSA had political force, as well. Writing in support of the HSA’s passage, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt showed his support for the bill by claiming that the “preservation of 
historic sites for the public benefit . . . tend[ed] to enhance the respect or love of the citizen 
for the institutions of his country, as well as strengthen[ed] his resolution to defend 
unselfishly the hallowed traditions and high ideals of America.”37 The structure and rhetoric 
of the HSA encouraged national pride as the United States moved from the crisis of the Great 
Depression and braced for a new world war. The national pride that the HSA cultivated was 
strategic. 
                                                 
35 Historic Sites Act of 1935. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Franklin D. Roosevelt, qtd. by Kammen, Mystic Chords, 460. 
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A little more than thirty years after the passage of the HSA, and in a much different 
sociohistorical context, the NHPA appealed to some of the same nationalistic commonplaces 
that the HSA utilized. The NHPA built upon the HSA in content and in tone, but intervened 
in an era of Civil Rights protests and other dramatic cultural changes. The HSA began with 
the claim that “the spirit and direction of the Nation [were] founded upon and reflected in its 
historic past,” and it went on to state “that the historical and cultural foundations of the 
Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order 
to give a sense of orientation to the American people.”38 In these statements, the NHPA made 
the tacit argument that the nation’s greatest strengths were its traditions. It also suggested that 
the nation was losing its way, and needed tools to find its original path again. The 
traditionalist tone of the NHPA continued in that act’s assertion that existing preservation 
programs were “inadequate to insure future generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate 
and enjoy the rich heritage of our Nation” because “ever-increasing” change threatened to 
erode that heritage.39 While the NHPA referred to federal development projects as the kind of 
change most detrimental to the preservation of heritage sites, the NHPA responded to cultural 
change—in general—by claiming that the future depended on the past. The NHPA was 
vague about the American past that it defended—or rather, whose past(s). The United States’ 
deep history was not the focus of this policy, though the NHPA’s stipulations provided for a 
wide array of heritage sites. 
                                                 
38 An Act to establish a program for the preservation of additional historical properties 
through-out the Nation, and for other purposes (National Historic Preservation Act), Public 
Law 89-665, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S. Code Ch. 1A, Subch. II § 470 et seq., enacted October 15, 
1966. 
39 National Historic Preservation Act. 
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Three years after the NHPA’s passage, NEPA also appealed to the needs of future 
generations of Americans as a basis for protecting both natural and cultural resources. NEPA 
prioritized the natural environment—and “science-based” research methods therein—as well 
as the nation’s enduring dependence on the flora and fauna of the United States. Like many 
of the acts that came before it, NEPA focused on posterity as a rationale for tending well to 
the natural and cultural resources of the country. The act expressed concern over the 
“requirements of present and future generations of Americans,” and named each generation 
“trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”40 NEPA drew on lofty language by 
referring to the myths of legacy, and by acknowledging the importance of having “pleasing” 
surroundings for the nation’s people. Of all of the preservation policies that I assess here, 
NEPA offered the most holistic description of the various public benefits of preservation. 
NEPA attempted to promote behavior and regulations that would be “conscious of and 
responsive to the scientific, economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and interests of the 
nation.” NEPA offered a comprehensive list of the reasons that the government might engage 
in preservation, and acknowledged Science within a diverse suite of American values. 
A decade later, ARPA returned federal preservation policy to a predominantly 
scientific rationale. The 1979 act defined archaeological resources as “an accessible and 
irreplaceable part of the Nation’s heritage.” Like many of the federal preservation policies 
before it, ARPA referred to the importance of posterity, and acknowledged its part in 
securing “for the present and future benefit of the American people, the protection of 
                                                 
40 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S. 
Code § 4321 et seq, enacted January 1, 1970. 
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archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands.”41 ARPA 
depicted a future in which the ongoing study of American antiquities would continue to 
enrich the nation’s people. In a novel way, ARPA defined archaeology as heritage. This 
maneuver blended scientific and humanistic values somewhat, while adopting nationalistic 
poetics. 
NAGPRA added diversity into American identities and deprioritized Anglo-American 
learning or enjoyment in its rhetoric. NAGPRA was distinct from the other preservation 
policies analyzed here because it was a corrective to precedent, rather than a continuation of 
it. Yet, even NAGPRA, which strove to define indigenous heritage places and materials as 
culturally-significant, returned to scientific or quasi-scientific definitions of indigenous 
heritage items through its emphasis on archaeology. As a general rule, federal preservation 
policies often neglected to include indigenous heritage places as national heritage, and 
considered them artifacts for study, instead. In NAGPRA, the avoidance of nationalism read 
more as a curtailing of United States imperialism than as a dismissal of indigenous cultures. 
In general, the nationalistic context for the god term of Science evoked the myths of 
scientific rationality and American exceptionalism. Strikingly, those federal preservation 
policies that pertained specifically to archaeological resources, rather than more generally to 
natural, historic, or Anglo-American cultural resources, were those that emphasized Science 
most extensively. The tensions among scientific rationality, Anglo-American national 
identity, and indigenous national identities also appeared in preservation policies that 
pertained specifically to Southwestern antiquities. Whereas many of the federal preservation 
policies could omit mention of indigenous peoples and their heritage when portraying 
                                                 
41 The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. 
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national identity, the national park and monument designations specific to Southwestern 
antiquities had to account more directly for the strange role of the federal government in 
stewarding indigenous histories. The first generation of site-specific policies, written from 
1892 to 1939, tended to depict indigenous histories as scientific artifacts and curiosities. 
These policies depicted the god term Science within a fetishistic discursive context that 
demonstrated a fascination with alterity. The second generation of site-specific policies, 
written from 1990 to 2016, imbued the landscape of the American Southwest with power as 
none of the other policies had, described an enchanted mode of scientific engagement, and 
offered textured descriptions of human histories. The second generation of site-specific 
policies contextualized Science within a scene of wonder and humanism, and differed 
dramatically from the other two collections of texts in this chapter. 
National Park and National Monument Designations for Southwestern Antiquities 
The preceding discussion of the nationalistic discursive context for Science in federal 
preservation policies serves as a background upon which to discuss the site-specific park and 
monument designations that have reserved portions of the Southwestern landscape as 
federally-protected areas. Federal preservation policies criminalized pot-hunting and 
vandalism while elevating academic engagement with ancient and historic places, and tied 
that scientific comportment to an expression of Anglo-American national identity. Themes 
about national identity and the value of knowledge emerged in site-specific park and 
monument designations, as well. However, unlike the majority of the federal policies 
concerning antiquities, park and monument designations specific to Southwestern antiquities 
also introduced indigeneity as a concept. In the first generation of site-specific policies, 
references to indigeneity influenced the kind of Science towards which those policies 
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oriented. The second generation of site-specific policies contextualized Science in the 
Southwest as a humanistic pursuit, rather than a fetishistic one.  
I have divided the national park and monument designations involving Southwestern 
antiquities into two historical periods: those that were written before World War II, and those 
that were written after. Between 1939 and 1990, there were no noteworthy designations of 
Southwestern antiquities, though there were several boundary adjustments. I do not claim any 
sort of causal relationship between World War II and national park/monument designations. 
It is simply the case that the four designations that were enacted between 1990 and 2016 
adopted a significantly different rhetorical tone than the sixteen that were enacted between 
1892 and 1939. I discuss the basic structure and claims of each collection of park and 
monument designations, along with their appeals to Science, alongside the other myths and 
poetics that contextualized the god term and inflected its meaning. 
First Generation Park and Monument Designations in the American Southwest 
The first generation of designations pertaining to Southwestern antiquities 
emphasized the need to protect Southwestern antiquities on the basis that it was in the public 
interest to do so, or that it would promote the public good. The key claim that these texts 
made was that antiquities were valuable, and most valuable when controlled and preserved 
by the government. They were valuable as data, as exemplars, and as American artifacts. 
These texts also defined Southwestern antiquities as inherently valuable, in some sense, 
because they belonged to the government. As such, the government had the right to secure 
them. These documents lingered on the various forms of harm that might come to 
Southwestern antiquities, and detailed the punitive measures that the government could take 
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against trespassers. They shared these attributes with early federal preservation policies 
affecting the country at large. 
The sixteen texts I analyze as the first generation of park and monument designations 
concerning Southwestern antiquities outlined the territories to be protected by the federal 
government, and the behaviors that would not be tolerated therein. In most cases, the 
documents themselves seldom contained more content than the boundaries of the new park or 
monument, a brief comment on the rationale for preserving the antiquities, and a list of 
newly-prohibited activities. Park and monument designations gave warning “not to 
appropriate, injure, or destroy”42 antiquities, or not to “willfully remove, disturb, destroy, or 
molest any of the ruins, mounds, buildings, graves, relics, or other evidences of an ancient 
civilization or other property” on the grounds.43 Certainly, the new prohibitions were 
intended “for the protection of the ruin[s].”44 Additionally, the first generation of park and 
monument designations also declared the values of those places and objects in the eyes of the 
government. They were valuable not just as Science, but as a Science of indigeneity.  
Most Southwestern antiquities were set aside for their ability to contribute to 
academic inquiries, and sometimes for their status as exemplary or unique. In general, the 
imaginative language within the first generation of park and monument designations 
                                                 
42 Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation, “Gila Cliff-Dwellings National Monument, N. Mex.,” 
(November 16, 1907): 3123, 3126; Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation, “Tonto National 
Monument, Ariz.,” (December 19, 1907). 
43 An Act Creating the Mesa Verde National Park, Public Law 353, 59th Cong., 1st sess., Ch. 
3607, enacted June 29, 1906, 616. 
44 Benjamin Harrison, Executive Order 28-A, “Reserving Land in Arizona for Protection of 
the Casa Grande Ruin,” in A. Berle Clemensen, Casa Grande Ruins National Monument, 
Arizona: A Centennial History of the First Prehistoric Reserve 1892-1992 (Casa Grande 
Ruins National Monument, AZ: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1992), 201.  
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reflected an infatuation with research, and a fascination with Native peoples. These 
references to phenomenal enchantment, in turn, alluded to the myths of scientific rationality 
and primitivism that were prevalent during the era that produced these park and monument 
designations.  Next, I describe the poetic language evident in the first sixteen national park 
and monument designations concerning Southwestern antiquities, while elaborating on the 
ways in which these texts supported the cultural myths just identified. 
Nearly every park and monument designation from the first fifty years of preserving 
Southwestern antiquities remarked that the preservation of those sites and artifacts promoted 
the public interest. In spite of the repeated emphasis on the public good, the nation itself 
figured relatively little in the texts concerning specific Southwestern sites. The relative 
absence of idealistic language concerning the nation or national identity differed from my 
early guesses regarding these texts, because I assumed that the park and monument 
designations would contain much of the same rhetorical tone as the hearings and reports that 
often culminated in government action and the federal policies that affected American 
heritage sites in general. One notable exception to the missing poetics of the nation was the 
proclamation of Aztec Ruin National Monument. In it, the text noted that the land and its 
structures had been donated “with a view to the preservation of said ruin for the 
enlightenment and culture of the nation.”45 The proclamation did not specify whether this 
goal was part of the donor’s vision, or whether it was crafted in Washington, DC. Though the 
other texts were not explicit in their references to the enlightenment and culture of the nation, 
the ideals of enlightenment and culture were somewhat implicit in the other park and 
                                                 
45 Warren G. Harding, Proclamation, “Establishing the Aztec Ruin National Monument, New 
Mexico, Proclamation 1650,” (January 24, 1923).  
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monument designations. They appeared as a devotion to academic pursuits and a fixation on 
indigenous culture.  
The grandiose language that appeared within the first generation of park and 
monument designations typically referred to superlative qualities of the structures found 
within the park or monument boundaries, and often paired a discussion of the unique or 
exemplary status of those structures with reference to the people who had built them.46 
Science also appeared within the majority of these pairings, whereas much of the alluring 
language that appeared in these texts occurred within the descriptions of the Ancestral 
Puebloan people. There are many examples of this pairing of the superlative (and its bearing 
on Science) with commentary on Native peoples. The Chaco Canyon designation posited that 
the site held “extraordinary interest” because of the “number and . . . great size” of the 
structures there, “and because of [its] innumerable and valuable relics of a prehistoric 
people.”47 The Gila Cliff Dwellings proclamation called that site “the best representative of 
the Cliff-Dwellers’ remains” in the region in which they were found, and concluded that they 
were “of exceptional scientific and educational interest.”48 The text protecting Navajo 
National Monument said that the site’s “prehistoric cliff dwellings and pueblo ruins” were 
“of the very greatest ethnological, scientific, and educational interest,” and that the site 
                                                 
46 Sophia Labadi identified superlatives in World Heritage dossiers, as well. In designation 
rhetoric, any superlative aspect of a site is likely to receive mention. See Sophia Labadi, 
UNESCO, Cultural Heritage, and Outstanding Universal Value: Value-Based Analyses of 
World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage Conventions (Lanham, MD, MD: 
AltaMira, 2013). 
47 Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation, “Chaco Canyon National Monument, N. Mex.,” 
(March 11, 1907). 
48 Roosevelt, “Gila Cliff-Dwellings National Monument, N. Mex.” 
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possessed “extraordinary ruins of an unknown people.”49 Bandelier National Monument, 
meanwhile, held “unusual ethnologic, scientific, and educational interest,” and its 
proclamation defined it as worthy of protection because of its “relics of a vanished people.”50 
The monument designation for Bandelier National Monument borrowed much of its 
language from the Tonto National Monument designation, passed seven years earlier.51 All of 
these monument designations expressed wonder about the Ancestral Puebloans or the 
structures that they built, and simultaneously cast those people and their material culture as 
outstanding specimens within the scientific paradigm. 
As these examples demonstrate, the notions of mystery and disappearance were 
prevalent in these texts’ descriptions of the Ancestral Puebloan peoples. The poetic 
references to relics and vanished people appealed to the cultural myth of primitivism that was 
popular during the nineteenth century, and which obviously persisted well past that era.52 In 
the presidential proclamation for Wupatki National Monument, the idealized descriptors of 
past peoples were paired with those of contemporaries. That text lauded the region of the new 
monument for its “prehistoric ruins built by the ancestors of a most picturesque tribe of 
Indians still surviving in the United States, the Hopi or People of Peace.”53 In this example, 
                                                 
49 William Howard Taft, Proclamation, “Establishment of the Navajo National Monument, 
Arizona, Proclamation 873,” (March 20, 1909).  
50 Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation, “Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico, 
Proclamation 1322,” (February 11, 1916).  
51 Roosevelt, “Tonto National Monument, Ariz.” 
52 Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
53 Calvin Coolidge, Proclamation, “Establishing the Wupatki National Monument, Arizona, 
Proclamation 1721,” (December 9, 1924).  
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the remark that the Hopi were “still surviving” subtly suggested a temporal displacement. 
Placed in its historical context alongside contemporaneous ethnological scholarship, this 
phrase suggested the idea that living indigenous peoples were remnants of a bygone era, 
rather than active participants in the present. 
The flamboyant language that park and monument designations used to describe 
American Indian peoples, whether in history or in contemporary times, essentialized them. 
Such descriptions focused on romantic notions of disappearance or the picturesque. In spite 
of these mythic portrayals of the Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants, the first 
generation of site-specific designations sometimes granted agency to contemporary 
indigenous collectives. In these monument and park descriptions, American Indian 
stakeholders appeared as treaty holders, and these texts made explicit Native “consent” to the 
establishment of new parks and monuments when the boundaries intersected with reservation 
lands.54 Whether the consent was enthusiastic or not, the monument and park designations 
bore witness to negotiations that took place between the federal and Tribal governments.  
In addition to their appearances as social actors with legal rights, indigenous peoples, 
their histories, and their heritage, appeared in these texts as academically-valuable. This was 
the final way in which American Indian peoples appeared in the park and monument 
designations from the first fifty years of preserving Southwestern antiquities. As indicated 
previously, there was a marked correlation between magnifying language and the realm of 
science and research. The poetics of academia typically were limited to the unique, unusual, 
or interesting qualities of each Southwestern site, and the language appealing to the myth of 
                                                 
54 Herbert Hoover, Proclamation, “Canyon de Chelly National Monument, Proclamation 
1945,” (April 1, 1931). See also An Act Creating the Mesa Verde National Park. 
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scientific rationality and the pursuit of knowledge was more subdued than the language that 
referred to Native peoples. Indeed, the research topic of indigenous cultures or histories 
seems to have imbued the appeals to scientific rationality in these texts with a glamorous 
quality that was absent in the references to Science in general preservation policy.  
In addition to expressing myths through poetic language, the park and monument 
designations adopted commonplaces about the academic value or values of the lands that 
they set aside. The exact configuration of academic values varied from text to text. For 
instance, the proclamation of Montezuma Castle National Monument proposed that the site 
was “of the greatest ethnological value and scientific interest.”55 In other texts, 
“educational”56 and “archaeological”57 interests joined these rationales, whereas others 
promoted the “historical” value or interest of Southwestern antiquities.58 However the park 
and monument designations defined the value(s) of Southwestern antiquities, they were sure 
to name what those values were. Throughout, the god term Science made frequent 
appearances, with some variation of “scientific interest” appearing as an explicit rationale for 
preservation in the following designations: Mesa Verde National Park, Montezuma Castle 
National Monument, Gila Cliff-Dwellings National Monument, Tonto National Monument, 
                                                 
55 Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation, “Montezuma Castle National Monument, Arizona,” 
(December 8, 1906). 
56 Theodore Roosevelt, “Tonto National Monument, Ariz.”  
57 Hoover “Canyon de Chelly National Monument, Proclamation 1945,” emphasis added. 
58 Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation, “El Morro National Monument, New Mexico,” 
(December 8, 1906); Warren G. Harding, Proclamation, “Establishing the Aztec Ruin 
National Monument, New Mexico, Proclamation 1650,” (January 24, 1923). Both 
designations included American Indian pasts within the histories preserved at each site, at 
least tacitly. 
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Navajo National Monument, Walnut Canyon National Monument, and Bandelier National 
Monument. In the absence of the exact phrase, “scientific interest,” ancillary terms such as 
archaeology or ethnology indicated that all of these park and monument designations 
advanced a scientific valuation for antiquities.  
Whether referencing science, ethnology, archaeology, or history, the notion that the 
Southwestern antiquities would contribute to knowledge was prevalent throughout these 
texts. For the most part, the texts implied that contributing to knowledge was the main reason 
for antiquities to be preserved. In some instances, the designations also concluded that the 
lands to be protected were useless for anything but study. For example, in some of the park 
and monument designations from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
authors of those texts clarified that the preservation of park and monument lands would not 
interfere with any more-pragmatic use of the territories. If the lands could not be used for 
grazing or farming, their apparent uselessness in that regard appeared in the monument 
designation. Often, protected lands remained open to use for timber extraction or other 
utilitarian purposes. In this way, their academic value did not interfere with their other uses. 
In the nation’s hierarchy of needs, knowledge and culture were ranked beneath activities 
more closely related to subsistence or profit. 
References to the use value of the park and monument lands, in addition to the 
acknowledgement of treaties with Native nations, showed that there were checks on the 
establishment of new preserves. The park and monument designations also demonstrated the 
privilege of the academy in preservation decisions. Broadly, these texts defined researchers 
as distinct from the general public, and permitted them to influence and benefit from park 
and monument designations. For example, Benjamin Harrison’s administration pursued the 
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protection of Casa Grande Ruin in 1892 at the behest of the Director of the Bureau of 
Ethnology, who “request[ed] that the reservation be made.”59 In 1906, the bill establishing 
Mesa Verde National Park prohibited the usual injury and appropriation that other 
preservation policies prohibited. It also allowed the Secretary of the Interior to grant permits 
for:  
. . . examinations, excavations, and other gathering of objects of interest within said 
park by any person or persons whom he may deem properly qualified to conduct such 
examinations . . .  
 
Provided always, that the examinations . . . are undertaken only for the benefit of 
some reputable museum, university, college, or other recognized scientific or 
educational institution, with a view to increasing the knowledge of such objects and 
aiding the general advancement of archaeological science.60 
In the Mesa Verde National Park bill, social actors from academic institutions were the 
exception to rules that otherwise affected the general population. They alone could trespass 
against Southwestern antiquities, provided that they advanced archaeological science in the 
process. Not all of the park and monument designations following the establishment of Mesa 
Verde National Park were as explicit as that bill in authorizing scientists to pursue their 
research on public lands, though the passage of the Antiquities Act on June 8, 1906 would 
have rendered such specifications somewhat superfluous. Notably, the Mesa Verde Park Bill 
and the Antiquities Act shared nearly identical language, as they shared advocates and 
authors, as well. 
Together, the first generation of park and monument designations concerning 
Southwestern antiquities spanned nearly fifty years and many topics. Although there was 
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variety from one text to the next, the majority of these documents made the case that the 
public good would be promoted through the preservation of ancient indigenous structures. 
These texts defined ancient indigenous structures by virtue of their academic values, and 
occasionally on account of the mysteries they contained. Some of the differences among 
these texts had to do with academic focus. For instance, after 1916, ethnological interest 
ceased to appear in park and monument designations, perhaps reflecting changes in the 
incipient field of anthropology, moving away from the study of ethnic minorities and 
beginning a study of cultures defined more broadly.61 Historic interest and regard for 
contemporary American Indian peoples began to emerge more prominently within 
preservation texts following World War I, suggesting an increasing interest in heritage in 
addition to Science. On the whole, all of these directives were short, businesslike texts that 
held little charismatic language, which was usually reserved for the supposedly vanished 
people who had left Southwestern antiquities behind. 
Science appeared as the term of terms in most of these texts, and the discursive 
context of the first generation park and monument designations demonstrated a persistent 
valuation of indigenous heritage places in their capacity to serve scientific interests. The 
designations’ references to various modes of study, examination, and measurement indicated 
the presence of the myth of scientific rationality, and oriented towards the god term, Science. 
The poetics of Science, and its pursuit, emphasized the value of learning and the superlative 
qualities of the sites that these designations preserved. The superlative qualities paired well 
with the myth of scientific rationality, because in recognizing the oldest, largest, or most 
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unique elements of ancient indigenous places, these texts appealed to something that could be 
measured or recorded.  
Whereas the nationwide policies affecting heritage preservation contextualized 
Science within a nationalistic mythos, the first generation of site-specific preservation 
policies contextualized Science within references to primitivism and difference. The first 
generation of park and monument designations in the American Southwest depicted not just 
Science, but a Science of indigeneity. When these texts discussed vanished races and 
peaceful peoples, they were appealing to biased Anglo-American notions about American 
Indian cultures. These policies relied on myths of primitivism for their poetics, which added 
mystique to the places that these texts preserved, and demonstrated an enchantment towards 
the idea of the Other. This trait marked the most significant difference between the first 
generation of site-specific policies and the nationwide federal policies that also affected 
Southwestern antiquities. It also indicated some recognition of the fact that Southwestern 
antiquities represented indigenous heritage, as well as Anglo-American Science. The second 
generation of site-specific policies developed the status of Southwestern antiquities as 
heritage more fully, and offered a third discursive context for the god term, Science. 
Second Generation Monument Designations in the American Southwest 
In this portion of my analysis, I assess four monument designations that were enacted 
between 1990 and 2016. These were Public Law 101-313 (PL 101-313), which was the 
Petroglyph National Monument Act of 1990, Bill Clinton’s presidential proclamations 
establishing Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument (1996) and Canyons of the 
Ancients National Monument (2000), and Barack Obama’s proclamation of Bears Ears 
National Monument (2016).  
290 
 
The second generation of monument and park designations differed from the first 
generation texts. All of the designations between 1990 and 2016 were lengthier by far than 
any of the first generation texts, and each of them detailed the aesthetic, academic, and 
cultural merits of the sites that the designations affected. Science was conspicuous in the 
designations for Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Canyons of the Ancients 
National Monument, Bears Ears National Monument, though apparent only in ancillary terms 
in the designation of Petroglyph National Monument. In general, the primary loci of poetic 
language in these texts were the scene of the American West, the research that people could 
undertake in the Southwest, and the people who made their lives there. These poetic 
expressions pointed to the myths of the Western frontier, which I interpret as a form of 
nationalism, as well as the myths of scientific discovery and universal humanism. I describe 
some of the differences among these four texts prior to discussing the poetry and myth of the 
second generation of national monument designations in fuller detail. 
In general, the bill establishing Petroglyph National Monument contained less poetic 
language than the other three national monument designations in the second generation of 
texts. Additionally, of these four texts, the Petroglyph National Monument Act of 1990 
offered rationales for its passage the most frequently. Given that George H. W. Bush did not 
use his executive authority simply to declare Petroglyph National Monument, and instead 
cautiously presided over the designation as a public law, I conclude that the difference in 
tone had something to do with the conservative administration’s effort not to alienate its 
constituencies.62 Conservative stakeholders often oppose national monument designations, as 
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they remove federal lands from most forms of commercial development.63 PL 101-313 
included rationales in defense of its existence, allaying the concerns that its conservative 
opponents might have raised. The text of PL 101-313 emphasized that the new monument 
filled a need that the government had not yet addressed, by creating a dedicated setting for 
the study and preservation of rock art—a nod to Science, though not an explicit appeal to it. 
The bill for Petroglyph National Monument also claimed that the site possessed “national 
significance.” It added urgency to the national monument designation by suggesting that 
“urbanization and vandalism” threatened the site.64 Eliminating threats and benefiting the 
nation were the primary rationales that the Petroglyph National Monument Act of 1990 
presented, with scientific gain more of a subsidiary goal. While the preservation of 
Petroglyph National Monument would “facilitate research activities,” it was not the entire 
purpose of preservation.65 PL 101-313 echoed federal preservation policies more than it 
imitated the first generation of site-specific designations. 
                                                 
to the writing of this dissertation) who did not use the Antiquities Act of 1906 to set aside 
public land. See Jimmy Tobias, “Trump’s Day of Doom for National Monuments 
Approaches,” The Guardian (August 20 2017), accessed March 21, 2018, 
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63 Hal Rothman, “Showdown at Jackson Hole: A Monumental Backlash against the 
Antiquities Act,” in The Antiquities Act: A Century of American Archaeology, Historic 
Preservation, and Nature Conservation, ed. David Harmon, Francis P. McManamon, and 
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64 Petroglyph National Monument Establishment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-313, 16 U.S. 
Code § 431, 104 Stat. 272 (1990), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-
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Like the Petroglyph National Monument Act of 1990, Obama’s proclamation of 
Bears Ears National Monument contained explicit rationale statements defending the new 
monument. Once again, the rationale statements seemed like a rhetorical strategy to counter 
criticism from conservative opponents. Bears Ears’ designation was extremely controversial, 
and conservative pundits and politicians lambasted Obama for removing so much land in 
Utah from commercial development. Yet, the Bears Ears National Monument proclamation 
echoed much of the language of a conservative draft bill that Republican congressmen 
presented on behalf of the Bears Ears landscape shortly prior to Obama’s proclamation.  
Both the Bears Ears proclamation and the draft bill considered Bears Ears culturally 
and naturally significant, though the Bears Ears proclamation emphasized the intellectual 
worth of the site to a much greater degree than the draft bill did. The Bears Ears proclamation 
noted that the site’s protection would “preserve its cultural, prehistoric, and historic legacy 
and maintain its diverse array of natural and scientific resources, ensuring that the 
prehistoric, historic, and scientific values of this area [would] remain for the benefit of all 
Americans.”66 The Bears Ears proclamation acknowledged that the site should be used for its 
resources, and appealed to patriotism in doing so. Yet, the Bears Ears proclamation defined 
the site’s resources as natural, scenic, and scientific. By contrast, the conservative draft bill 
expressed interest in mineral resources and other extractive commercial uses of the land. 
Rather than offering up the site for uranium mining, as many of its conservative stakeholders 
would have preferred, Obama’s proclamation of Bears Ears as a national monument 
suggested that economic gain could come from tourism, instead. Obama’s proclamation 
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emphasized the use of the site, and its adherence to the qualities for national monuments that 
the Antiquities Act established in 1906. Emphasizing use, profit, and conformity with a 
historic law should have made the Bears Ears designation more palatable to conservative 
opponents, but this rhetorical strategy failed to mollify the monument’s detractors. 
The Petroglyph National Monument Establishment Act of 1990 and Obama’s 
presidential proclamation establishing Bears Ears National Monument both made explicit 
statements about the rationales for preserving public lands, and the values that would be 
upheld through that preservation. Both of Clinton’s proclamations of new national 
monuments in the American Southwest expressed their rationales through implication more 
than through clear claims. The declarations for Clinton’s monuments defended the 
monuments’ preservation primarily for their ability to contribute to knowledge, and on the 
basis of the cultural and natural phenomena of the Southwest. Demonstrating its deference to 
Science, the proclamation of Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument acknowledged 
the “spectacular array of scientific and historic resources,” “scientific interest,” and 
“significant scientific and historic value” of the new monument.67 The proclamation for 
Canyons of the Ancients National Monument offered similar language, emphasizing “the 
protection of [the monument’s] scientific and historic objects,” and “scientific interest.”68 
The enchanting language of Clinton’s two proclamations supported the god term, Science, 
often demonstrating an infatuation with knowledge and learning. In this way, Clinton’s 
                                                 
67 William J. Clinton, Proclamation, “Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
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proclamations appealed to an elite and predominantly liberal constituency. I discuss the 
poetic language in all four of these national monument designations, next. 
The second generation of monument designations in the American Southwest differed 
significantly from the first generation texts by their inclusion of the Southwestern landscape 
as a powerful entity that influenced history, humanity, and research activities. In this way, the 
discursive context for Science also emphasized the spatial context of Southwestern 
antiquities: the scene of the American southwest, and its poetry. I refer to the Southwest as a 
“scene” in the Burkean sense, “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred,” 
in order to underline the fact that these monument designations occasionally gave the scene 
of the Southwest a deterministic power over the people who participated in that environment, 
whether Ancestral Puebloans, Mormon settlers, or Anglo-American archaeologists.69 
Although the second generation of monument designations avoided the trap of environmental 
determinism that authors such as Bandelier fell into, still the “scene-agent ratio” sometimes 
favored the power of the scene, and imposed decisions on the agents in the Southwest.70 
Whatever individuals accomplished in the Southwest, according to these designations, it was 
in spite of the environment’s challenges, or in response to its force. In these texts, all of the 
people of the Southwest, whether Ancestral Puebloans or Mormon settlers, had to respond to 
the challenges that the scene posed. Meanwhile, the policies defending them demonstrated 
their authors’ enchantment with those scenes, as well. 
The proclamations’ portrayals of the scene of the American West imbued the 
landscape with force. This scene acted on people, in the present, past, and distant past. For 
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instance, in the Canyons of the Ancients proclamation, the “natural resources and spectacular 
land forms of the monument help[ed] explain why past and present cultures [had] chosen to 
live in the area.” 71 These people responded to an invitation given to them by the 
environment. The Grand Staircase-Escalante proclamation described the site’s “relict areas” 
as “witnesses to the past” that could serve as a “baseline” against which to measure “human 
activity.”72 In general, these declarations spoke of the rugged aridity of the Southwest, and 
the interrelationships between the people and their environment. While the people were 
remarkable for succeeding in their scene, they were portrayed as products of it, as well. 
The scene of the Western frontier featured dramatically within the monument 
designations written on behalf of Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears. Both of these 
proclamations lingered on the diverse or spectacular “array” of natural and cultural 
phenomena within the monument boundaries, unique to the American Southwest. The Bears 
Ears proclamation called the landscape “a milieu of the accessible and observable together 
with the inaccessible and hidden.”73 In what I consider the most picturesque description in 
any of these monument designations, the Bears Ears proclamation claimed: 
From earth to sky, the region is unsurpassed in wonders. The star-filled nights and 
natural quiet of the Bears Ears area transport visitors to an earlier eon. Against an 
absolutely black night sky, our galaxy and others more distant leap into view. . . . 
Bears Ears has that rare and arresting quality of deafening silence.74 
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The Bears Ears proclamation expressed an explicit appeal to wonder, and portrayed the 
landscape in nearly spiritual terms. The depth and magnitude of the night sky, its 
transportation of visitors through time, and the region’s apparent remoteness from 
civilization all cast the Bears Ears landscape within the poetic realm. These sentences were 
an attempt to enchant their audience with the magic of the Bears Ears landscape. These 
contributed to a discursive context that focused on wonder, and shifted the meaning of 
Science when it appeared in this text—away from rationality, and into enchantments of its 
own. 
In addition to offering appealing descriptions of the landscape, sometimes these 
monument designations enhanced the splendor of Southwestern antiquities through allusion 
to their place within the nation’s story. The Petroglyph National Monument Establishment 
Act of 1990 called the protected territory “nationally significant,” and claimed that the 
protection, preservation, and interpretation of the site was “for the benefit and enjoyment of 
present and future generations.”75 In this, the Petroglyph National Monument designation 
referenced the Organic Act of 1916, and called upon some of the same patriotic 
commonplaces established in that text and in other federal preservation policies.  
Clinton’s monument designations also paid some deference to the patriotic rationales 
for setting aside land, but only when paired with the wonder of the West, itself. For instance, 
the Grand Staircase-Escalante proclamation called the area to be preserved a “vast and 
austere landscape,” and the “last place in the continental United States to be mapped.”76 
Clinton’s proclamation evoked the myth of the Western frontier more than American 
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identity. Even the somewhat more subdued proclamation for Canyons of the Ancients 
National Monument declared that the site’s geology “evoke[d] the very essence of the 
American Southwest.”77 In these quotations, the monument declarations emphasized that the 
unique territories that the monument designations set aside were American. The second 
generation of national monument designations brought the myth of the Western frontier 
together with myths pertaining to national identity and American ingenuity.  
Science intertwined with the Southwestern landscape in many of the texts’ 
descriptions of the resources they would preserve. Indeed, the second generation of national 
monument proclamations often discussed the striking qualities of the new national 
monuments as part of their ability to contribute to Science. For instance, the Grand Staircase-
Escalante proclamation called that site “an outstanding biological resource.”78 The Grand 
Staircase-Escalante designation linked the natural features of the monument with its utility 
for research purposes, noting that the “unspoiled natural area remain[ed] a frontier, a quality 
that greatly enhance[d] the monument’s value for scientific study.”79 The proclamation for 
Grand Staircase-Escalante called it a “geologic treasure” with “world class paleontological 
sites,” which presented “exemplary opportunities for geologists, paleontologists, 
archaeologists, historians, and biologists.”80 The Bears Ears National Monument 
proclamation also paired research and poetry extensively. The proclamation claimed that 
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“[t]he area’s stunning geology, from sharp pinnacles to broad mesas, labyrinthine canyons to 
solitary hoodoos, and verdant hanging gardens . . . , provide[d] vital insights to geologists.” 
Bears Ears had “among the richest and most significant” paleontological resources in the 
United States, and its “protection . . . [would] provide important opportunities for further 
archaeological and paleontological study.”81 Based on these tandem appeals to wonder and to 
research affordances, I conclude that the poetry of these national monument proclamations 
often supported the myth of scientific discovery—though not rationality. They also placed 
poetry of place in service to Science. A noteworthy distinction between the first and second 
generation of site-specific monument designations is that the Science in these later 
designations minimized human sciences, and emphasized natural ones. 
As these examples have shown, the descriptions of the natural resources in the 
American Southwest evoked an infatuation with Science. The writer(s) of the Petroglyph 
National Monument Act of 1990 resisted this tendency, and addressed the research benefits 
of the national monument primarily through discussions of the new Rock Art Research 
Center established concurrently with the national monument. That text avoided poetic 
adjectives and adverbs, and described fairly clinically that the Center would “provide for a 
broad program of research including ethnographic studies, resource management techniques, 
and comparative studies of rock art forms and styles.”82 Whereas the national monument 
proclamations that liberal presidents advanced used expressive language in a manner that 
elevated Science, the Petroglyph National Monument Act favored national gain and the 
protection of the government’s property in its few powerful phrases. 
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In the preceding discussion of the scientific attributes of the Southwestern antiquities 
that gained federal protection between 1990 and 2016, both archaeology and history 
appeared as modes of research that were relevant to each site. These texts valued 
archaeological and historical knowledge alongside paleontology, geology, and other research 
fields, and used all of these types of research to validate the preservation of Southwestern 
antiquities. As in the first generation of monument designations, the fields of archaeology 
and history mediated between the scientific interest of Southwestern antiquities and their 
human interest. Both scientific discovery and humanism were focal points for impassioned 
language within these monument designations. Humanism joined the scene of the American 
Southwest as a powerful element of Science’s discursive context. Together, humanism and 
the landscape inflected the Science of the second generation of national monument 
designations with wonder and poetic enchantment in a manner that was absent from the other 
categories of preservation policy.  
In general, the second generation of monument designations in the American 
Southwest omitted the kind of fetishistic language about American Indian peoples that I 
identified in the first generation of designations. Yet, the second generation of designations 
maintained poetic symbolism regarding humanity. The poetic language that these 
designations applied to human history pointed towards a myth of universal humanism. For 
instance, these texts spoke of a general human history, or human ingenuity, without tying 
these traits to a particular cultural tradition. As one example, the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
designation portrayed the American West as a place in which “nature shape[d] human 
endeavors . . . where distance and aridity ha[d] been pitted against our dreams and 
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courage.”83 The “our” of this passage implied all of humanity, or at least, all United States 
Americans.  
Some of these monument designations expressed an interest in the Anglo-American 
occupation of the lands, as well. In so doing, they incorporated all of the peoples of the 
Southwest into a universal American people, somewhat disconnected from time, and largely 
disconnected from conflicting cultural traditions. The Canyons of the Ancients designation 
interpellated “Ancestral Puebloan farmers . . . the Ute, Navajo, and European settlers whose 
descendants” continued to live in the region into one collective. In the language of this 
designation, all of these diverse peoples claimed the landscapes as “home.” These were all 
the people to whom the landscape belonged, who had endured its trials.84  
Continuing the attention to Anglo-American histories, both the Bears Ears 
designation and the Grand Staircase-Escalante designation lingered on the history of the 
Mormon people who entered Utah in the nineteenth century. Whereas the Bears Ears text 
held the “Mormon settlers” up for historical scrutiny, alongside “ranchers, prospectors, and 
early archaeologists,”85 the Grand Staircase-Escalante text wrote of the “Mormon pioneers” 
and their “epic colonization efforts.”86 The Bears Ears designation made Mormon settlers 
into historical case studies; the Grand Staircase-Escalante designation aggrandized them. 
Both of these texts blurred distinctions among the long Native presence in the Four Corners 
region and the later, sometimes hostile, occupation of the land by Anglo-Americans. This 
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was a universalizing maneuver. It avoided the primitivism that the first generation of texts 
expressed towards American Indian peoples, but it elided the more enduring relationships 
that many American Indian peoples had and have with areas that were set aside as 
monuments. 
The proclamation of Bears Ears National Monument differed from the others by 
acknowledging Native knowledge of the Bears Ears landscape in a variety of ways, 
emphasizing both cultural and ecological expertise. First, the proclamation listed the Native 
names for Bears Ears prominently. Throughout the text, the proclamation referred to the 
“area’s cultural importance to Native American tribes,” their extensive knowledge of the land 
and its resources, and the importance of the Bears Ears landscape within oral histories and as 
the location of “sacred sites.”87 In the Bears Ears National Monument proclamation, the text 
humanized the Ancestral Puebloans and their descendants by putting their histories in a more 
equitable relationship with Western knowledge. The text also encouraged readers to think 
about “the story of the people who lived” at Bears Ears, and the “early people’s ingenuity 
and perseverance.”88 Stories of human ingenuity and perseverance in the Bears Ears 
proclamation differed in tone from the supposedly-vanished and mysterious people who 
featured in the first generation of monument designations. The Bears Ears designation 
emphasized the Ancestral Puebloans as people, rather than as research subjects or spectacles.  
On the whole, the second generation of monument designations in the American 
Southwest avoided some of the fetishistic language of the first generation of texts, though 
maintained an infatuation with Science. Science garnered poetic enchantment in the second 
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generation of national monument designations largely by virtue of the majestic scene in 
which it was practiced, and its capacity to enlighten humankind. Meanwhile, the poetic 
humanism that these texts displayed emphasized human ingenuity and talent, rather than 
difference. However, avoiding recognition of difference sometimes resulted in the promotion 
of a generic American identity.  
The representations of American Indian people within these texts were much more 
nuanced than those in the preceding national monument designations. The political 
representation of American Indian stakeholders in guiding the management and care of each 
national monument also increased substantially in the second generation of monument 
designations. For instance, both the Petroglyph National Monument Act and the Bears Ears 
National Monument proclamation explicitly established consulting positions within their 
advisory boards for American Indian representatives. Scientists and landowners maintained 
their influence, but Native perspectives were considered more fully than before. The 
inflections of landscape and humanism oriented Science in new and meaningfully-different 
directions in the second generation of national monument designations. 
In the second generation of site-specific policies, poetic ideals about the landscape, 
learning, and humanity intermingled. This final body of texts alluded to an ineffable quality 
of the new national monuments, which contributed to the rationale for preserving them. The 
land became vital. Science became majestic. Humanity gained dignity. Enchantment became 
a reason for preservation. The second generation of monument designations acknowledged 
the myths and poetics of preservation, and the final three policies began to detach themselves 
from myths of modernity that motivated the other texts. 
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Conclusion  
Overall, Science has appeared as the god term of preservation policy for over a 
century. This may come as little surprise, given the emphasis on “objects of . . . scientific 
interest” in the Antiquities Act, and given that policy’s enduring influence on the federal 
management of indigenous heritage places across the country. Since all presidentially-
declared national monument designations draw on the Antiquities Act for their authority, the 
rhetorical inheritance of Science as a god term is understandable. The way in which 
Science’s variable discursive contexts alter the meaning of the god term is of more interest. 
This chapter has demonstrated that Science can be proposed in service to the nation, can 
fetishize difference, and can admit to its own enchantments. The god term relies on myths 
and poetics for its meaning. 
The myths and poetics that have accompanied Science have shown shifting values 
over time and over political scope. The federal policies concerning the preservation of 
ancient and historic sites emphasized nationalism as they advanced the Science of heritage 
management. Narratives about the quest for knowledge and the inherent value of scientific 
inquiry were the myths that supported the ideal of Science. The prominence of researchers in 
decision-making also indicated the importance of Science for this body of texts. Yet, these 
were joined by myths of American exceptionalism and benevolent paternalism. These texts 
promoted a nationalistic Science as they sought to care for the nation’s people and its 
resources. In these federal preservation policies, the nation was the site for poetic language, 
and it influenced the value and purpose of Science in these texts. The nationalistic poetics in 
the general federal preservation policies included extensive references to the future of the 
American people, their inspiration, and their enlightenment, all of which were to be provided 
by the government for its people, through the preservation of American heritage. Federal 
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policies reserved their poetic enchantment for the people, while perpetuating myths of 
modernity that promoted both reason and the nation-state. 
The first generation of site-specific monument designations also oriented towards 
Science as a god term. Once again, references to research and a variety of intellectual 
“interests” attracted little in the way of dramatic language. References to the Ancestral 
Puebloans and their descendants offered the most beguiling language in these policies, with 
discussion of their supposed vanishing, their supposed mysteries, and their supposed 
character. The first generation of monument designations drew on the myths of scientific 
rationality and primitivism. Once again, both of these were myths of modernity. Whereas the 
former resisted poetic enchantment—except when identifying superlative qualities of parks 
and monuments—the latter garnered it. Early park and monument designations oriented 
towards an exemplary Science of indigeneity. 
The second generation of monument designations concerning Southwestern 
antiquities were unique in the sense that the god term, Science, attracted its own poetic 
language in the majority of these texts. The majestic scenery of the West particularly 
inflected the texts’ descriptions of both research and humanity. The texts that Clinton and 
Obama signed were far more titillating than the public law over which George H. W. Bush 
presided. Whereas the Petroglyph National Monument Act offered little in the way of poetic 
enchantment, the other three texts, concerning Grand Staircase-Escalante, Canyons of the 
Ancients, and Bears Ears, contained powerful imagery and mythic descriptions of their 
subjects throughout. These texts admitted to an enchantment with the American Southwest 
and humanity in a way that informed and influenced the Science that each text promoted. 
These texts were more transparent than any others in the various enchantments with which 
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they engaged. Science oriented towards myths of knowledge and learning, less than to 
scientific rationality. The West was enchanting on its own, and the landscape gained 
recognition as never before, through its appearance as a force with which people had 
relationships. All of humanity garnered interest, not as scientific curiosities, but simply for 
being human and having endured various challenges in an environment. 
Clinton and Obama’s national monument proclamations were imperfect texts, but 
indicated productive paths forward for the rhetoric of preservation advocacy. Science is 
unlikely to lose its role as an orienting term in federal preservation policy, but its articulation 
to myths like the beauty and wonder of the natural world, rather than primitivism or scientific 
rationality, is an important ideological shift, and consistent with the reflexive turn that 
influenced the entirety of academy beginning, roughly, in the 1970s. The self-conscious 
enchantment of Science also seems like an equalizing rhetorical maneuver, for if Science is 
openly enchanted, then it does not claim the absolute authority that modern myths once 
attributed to it. The deference to the scene in which Science takes place, in Clinton and 
Obama’s national monument proclamations, also comes across as an important change in 
tone. Instead of emphasizing Anglo-Ameican national identity, these three monument 
designations prioritized places that had witnessed the histories of several nations. Praising the 
shared locality of diverse histories is more inclusive than promoting a universal history of an 
American people, as some of the earlier policies attempted to do. Finally, the emphasis on 
humanism in the Clinton and Obama monument designations marked a parsing of Science 
and indigeneity, which minimized the authority of archaeologists and anthropologists over 
indigenous histories. It also offered guidance in how to shift the conversation away from 
spectacle and into shared concerns. Universal humanism, certainly, is a cultural myth. 
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However, of all of the myths that preservation policy promoted, it might tell the kindest 
story.    
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
A forwardlooking people can know the way forward only by being intelligently 
backwardlooking. There is no other light upon the future, save that of history, and the 
future can only reap from what was planted in the past.1 
Over the course of this dissertation, I have claimed that the history of preservation 
advocacy on behalf of Southwestern antiquities demonstrates the communication patterns of 
rhetorical enchantment. I have defined rhetorical enchantment as an appeal to a cultural 
myth, often indicated or enhanced by the presence of poetic language. The main myths that 
rhetors in my study prevailed upon in their works were myths of modernity such as scientific 
rationality, the theory of cultural evolution, white superiority, and primitivism. Other, more 
literary myths also appeared in the rhetoric of the adventurers, archaeologists, advocates, and 
policymakers whose works I analyzed. For instance, these rhetors painted the American 
Southwest as a magical, beautiful, bleak landscape, with a vitality of its own. They elevated 
the disused structures that they found there to the status of New World ruins. They attempted, 
often clumsily, to humanize the people who once built places like Mesa Verde and Chaco 
Canyon. In these ways, they advanced myths about the poetry of place and the ingenuity of 
humankind. While these more poetic myths often articulated to the myths of modernity that I 
have critiqued throughout this dissertation, they demonstrated a capacity for alternative, less 
utilitarian modes of thinking about Southwestern antiquities than the narratives that portrayed 
those sites as primarily scientific specimens.   
                                                 
1 Edgar Lee Hewett, “The Southwest: Yesterday and Tomorrow,” Papers of the School of 
American Research 2 (1921): 3. 
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In this concluding chapter, I overview the major claims that I advanced in this study. I 
then examine this dissertation’s contributions to rhetorical criticism and humanistic research. 
In the overview of this dissertation’s main claims, I integrate elements of my interviews with 
contemporary heritage practitioners of the American Southwest. In this way, I comment upon 
some similarities in the rhetoric of preservation advocacy during the turn of the twentieth 
century, and contemporary discourse about protecting ancient indigenous places. I close the 
chapter by discussing enduring threats to the ongoing, ethical care of ancient indigenous 
places in the Southwestern United States, and the ways in which rhetorical enchantment may 
continue to influence that endeavor. 
Primary Claims 
Chapters Two through Four of this dissertation demonstrated how non-American 
Indian social actors determined the uses and values of ancient indigenous places, and framed 
Southwestern antiquities within mythic narratives. The proposed uses of ancient structures 
typically had to do with intellectual pursuits, whereas their values ranged from their utility 
for learning to the ways in which people enjoyed being co-present with them. 
The authors whose works I studied in Chapter Two used language in ways that 
demonstrated both the technological and poetic psychoses. While these psychoses coexisted, 
they complicated one another. Speaking from the vantage of the technological psychosis, 
Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld appealed to the myth of scientific 
rationality, and other myths about the status of science. These rhetorical traits appeared in the 
authors’ works through their classifications of all that they saw, and by their self-
representations as scientific heroes. Their conviction in the myths of science turned 
everything they observed into a specimen for study, including contemporary American 
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Indian people. The technological psychosis also screened these adventurers and 
archaeologists from a full understanding, or at least acknowledgement, of their actions, 
obfuscating the extent of the physical harm they caused to Mesa Verde. To them, all of the 
damage was in the name of advancing knowledge, and not worthy of reform. Their belief in 
myths that privileged scientific inquiry at the expense of all other considerations encouraged 
in these five authors a sense of entitlement to the materials that they scrutinized at Mesa 
Verde. Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld presumed that they had the 
right to damage Mesa Verde in the name of science. Their attitude of presumption to the 
materials at Mesa Verde transformed into presumptuous interpretations about the living 
Native peoples, which displayed their prejudicial beliefs. 
At the same time that they dehumanized Native peoples through their research 
practices, Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld described a vitality of place 
at Mesa Verde. Through the poetic psychosis, they turned heritage into fantasy, and they cast 
old walls as romantic ruins. Once again, the authors’ disposition towards the place within a 
literary imaginary skewed the ways in which they described indigeneity. Either American 
Indian people, past or present, were specimens (per the technological psychosis), or they 
were tragic figures out of legend (per the poetic psychosis). Both attitudes dehumanized 
American Indian people. The technological psychosis reduced them to data, and the poetic 
psychosis displaced them into the realm of fantasy. Both interpretations were steeped 
exclusively in Anglo-American cultural mores.  
My rhetorical analysis of the adventurers and archaeologists in Chapter Two extends 
both Philip Deloria’s conclusions about social actors at the turn of the twentieth century and 
Jason Josephson-Storm’s claims about the myths of disenchantment. Deloria suggests that 
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white public figures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often advanced either racist 
theories or “antimodern primitivism.”2 Deloria identifies romanticism and racism as two 
polar features of modernity, and the people who advocated for each position as ideological 
foils. What differs in my argument is that the same social actors who expressed antimodern 
primitivism also advanced claims pertaining to scientific racism. While the technological 
psychosis featured prominently throughout the works of these adventurers and 
archaeologists, the presence of the poetic psychosis undermined the authors’ claims to 
objectivity. This echoes Josephson-Storm’s observations about Enlightenment thinkers who 
used their version of reason in order to discuss magic, alchemy, and other mysteries.3 
Just as Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld blended poetry and 
science, so too did the advocates from Chapter Three rationalize their actions through poetic 
framing, marking a continued relationship between reason and reverence in nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Anglo-American discourse about Southwestern antiquities. Whereas 
Bandelier and Hewett considered themselves to be professional anthropological researchers, 
McClurg pursued knowledge for its own sake, as well as for the glory that accompanied 
adventure and advocacy. What most distinguished these early preservation advocates from 
the authors considered in Chapter Two was the way in which they mingled their defense of 
ancient indigenous places with defenses of indigeneity. They did so in a manner that favored 
the intellectual utility of both, and in a manner that privileged white social actors and the 
                                                 
2 Philip Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 102. 
3 Jason A. Josephson-Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth 
of the Human Sciences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017). 
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United States government, while infantilizing contemporary indigenous people and 
fetishizing the Ancestral Puebloans.  
Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett all rejected vandalism and profit-driven pot-hunting 
at and among Southwestern antiquities. Whereas they accepted the pursuit of knowledge and 
its incidental damage to antiquities, they all chastised individuals who went about engaging 
with Southwestern antiquities in ways they deemed to be inappropriate. Bandelier and 
McClurg both abhorred vandals who pursued immortality by carving their names onto the 
walls of Southwestern antiquities. Pot-hunting for profit was the issue Hewett most strongly 
opposed. Hewett, alone, critiqued fellow researchers for their destruction of antiquities. 
In addition to their critiques of vandals and pot-hunters, Bandelier, McClurg, and 
Hewett all complained of the federal government’s inadequate treatment and respect for 
American Indian people. Bandelier and Hewett both favored a paternalistic approach to 
liaising with American Indian peoples. McClurg judged the United States’ bureaucracy a 
preposterous vehicle for negotiating with the Weeminuche Ute people with whom she 
engaged. The advocacy on behalf of indigenous rights that these three individuals advanced 
had elements of self-interest, pertaining to professional success and personal glory. Bandelier 
and Hewett wanted to learn from and about Puebloan peoples, whom Bandelier portrayed as 
children and whom Hewett wanted to place on human game preserves. McClurg wanted to 
purchase Mesa Verde from the Weeminuche Ute people, and seemed perturbed that it was so 
difficult to buy it. In spite of their skewed interpretations of the appropriate ways in which to 
interact with American Indian people, it is significant that Bandelier, Hewett, and McClurg 
paired the protection of Southwestern antiquities with the well-being of the American Indian 
people who later lived on the same lands. They demonstrated some comprehension that 
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Southwestern antiquities were indigenous heritage places in addition to being the spectacular 
remnants of America’s deep past that they painted them to be. 
The advocacy that Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett advanced on behalf of 
Southwestern antiquities and indigenous rights exhibited modern myths, such as scientific 
rationality, scientific heroism, the theory of cultural evolution, and primitivism. Like the 
adventurers and archaeologists of chapter two, the advocates in chapter three expressed an 
infatuation with the antiquities and peoples with whom they engaged. For all of their 
similarities, however, Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett adopted diverse framing techniques to 
approach the same historical situation. Bandelier positioned himself as an all-knowing 
narrator, describing the tragic fate of America’s indigenous peoples. McClurg positioned 
herself as the trailblazing heroine in an epic frontier saga, charting her personal success 
alongside the success of white settlers in the American Southwest. Hewett presented himself 
as a sharp critic of his professional peers, and an acolyte of the Ancestral Puebloan people, 
demonstrating an iteration of the comic frame. All of these frames of acceptance portrayed 
Anglo-American culture as exceptional, and portrayed Native cultures as radically Other. 
Fetishization and racism were two intertwined aspects of Anglo-American 
engagement with indigenous culture at the turn of the twentieth century. In interviews with 
heritage practitioners in the Four Corners region of the United States in the spring of 2017, I 
came to the conclusion that these themes remain prevalent features of the cross-cultural 
exchanges that happen in and about places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon. Park rangers 
whom I interviewed referred to the questions that members of the public asked them as 
evidence of persistent racism and ill-informed reverence. Interview participants commented 
wryly on the prejudice of site visitors who marveled “that Indians had built something so 
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incredible,” or on the inappropriate fetishization of those who fixated on “ritual functions” of 
various aspects of Ancestral Puebloan architecture. Heritage practitioners working at a non-
profit organization involved with preservation advocacy described ongoing scientific racism 
among some archaeologists in the Southwest, including continued attachment to teleological 
thinking when considering technologies, and an insistence on excavating in ancestral places 
in a manner that most Native peoples consider a form of desecration. Based on the content of 
these interviews, it appears that the communication patterns that social actors like those in 
Chapters Two and Three established, along with their cultural myths and poetic tendencies, 
persist even now.  
Preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities also display a number of 
myths that were prevalent in the early history of Anglo-American comportment towards 
indigenous heritage. In Chapter Four, I identified the influence of early preservation 
advocacy on preservation policy, and some of the ways in which the rhetoric of preservation 
policy has shifted over time. The general federal policies concerning Southwestern 
antiquities, such as the Antiquities Act and the Historic Sites Act, typically focused on the 
value of the sites to the American people and their edification, privileging scientists as 
authorities or intermediaries who might render decisions about American heritage sites. The 
first generation of site-specific park and monument designations in the American Southwest, 
such as the national monument declaration on behalf of Chaco Canyon, minimized the 
significance of patriotism, which had been a prevalent theme in general federal policies. 
Rather, site-specific texts emphasized Native cultures and their unique “interests” for various 
forms of science, including ethnology. The second generation of site-specific national 
monument designations also emphasized indigeneity and research, though distinguished 
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between the two more carefully. Instead of discussing a science of indigeneity, the second 
generation of site-specific monument designations appealed to research interests in 
paleontology, geology, and ecology, while more clearly recognizing the Ancestral Puebloan 
structures—and the landscape—as enduring elements of contemporary indigenous heritage 
practices.  
The majority of the preservation policies affecting Southwestern antiquities oriented 
towards Science as their god term. Yet, the discursive contexts in which Science appeared 
varied over time and according to their focus. These variable discursive networks imbued 
Science with meanings that were context-specific. In the general federal policies concerning 
preservation, Science appeared as the primary rationale of the Antiquities Act of 1906, an 
organizing feature of the Historic Sites Act of 1935, and even a mediating force in the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990. General federal policies also 
hailed myths such as the spirit and direction of the American people. The Science that 
nationwide preservation policies promoted was a nationalistic one. Meanwhile, the first 
generation of site-specific park and monument designations in the American Southwest 
advanced a version of Science that emphasized indigeneity as both specimen and spectacle.  
These designations claimed tacitly that studying American Indian people and their pasts 
would benefit the Anglo-American public. Finally, the second generation of monument 
designations for Southwestern antiquities largely disarticulated indigeneity from science. 
Instead, the most recent national monument designations concerning Southwestern 
antiquities have portrayed an openly-enchanted form of Science, contextualizing scientific 
practices within the realm of awe and beauty. The power relationships established in the 
nineteenth century, typically placing Anglo-American scientists as stewards of ancient 
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indigenous places, remain. Yet, these texts suggest that the myths surrounding Science have 
changed somewhat over time. 
Altogether, this dissertation demonstrates that science, indigeneity, and enchantment 
have been persistent themes within Anglo-American preservation advocacy since it was first 
practiced on behalf of ancient structures in the American Southwest, and in the general 
practices of archaeology and exploration that laid the foundation for advocacy, as well. These 
three themes animated one another in these collections of texts, as adventurers, advocates, 
and policymakers attempted to rationalize Anglo-American engagement with Ancestral 
Puebloan pasts. For the adventurers of Chapter Two, technological and poetic interests 
intertwined, in regard to structures and the Other alike. For the advocates of Chapter Three, 
poetic language was a rhetorical device, used in the attempt to enchant others into believing 
that Ancestral Puebloan structures—and the people descended from those who built them—
deserved to be preserved. Yet, the advocates demonstrated a commitment to scientific inquiry 
and the United States federal government, at the same time that they promoted the success of 
white settlers in the American Southwest. Preservation policies varied in their attention to a 
science of indigeneity, and in their recognition of indigenous heritage as heritage. They 
demonstrated infatuation with American Indian peoples and pasts, as well as a reverence for 
the American people, and the American landscape. The enchantments that I identified in 
these three collections of texts varied in the myths that they promoted, sometimes presenting 
indigeneity as a spectacle, and sometimes humanizing the experiences of American Indian 
social actors, but always attuned to the ways in which members of the Anglo-American 
public might use Southwestern antiquities. Enchantment and utility formed the main dialectic 
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of Anglo-American preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places in the 
American Southwest, beginning in the nineteenth century. 
I proceed, next, with a discussion of rhetorical enchantment and the theoretical 
contributions of this study, before examining the necessity of an intentional form of 
rhetorical enchantment within the context of preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient 
indigenous places in the American Southwest. 
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to rhetorical theory by developing the concept of 
rhetorical enchantment. Rhetorical enchantment is the public, persuasive, and often poetic 
expression of cultural myth. By communicating densely-connotative narratives about the 
values and experiences associated with Southwestern antiquities, the adventurers, advocates, 
and policymakers whose texts I studied in this dissertation demonstrated their own 
enchantment with the places of the Southwest and with the cultural myths pertaining to them. 
They also had the potential to enchant their publics with the same stories and phenomena. 
I developed the concept of rhetorical enchantment by attending to the texts 
themselves, and the Southwestern antiquities to which they referred. I also drew inspiration 
from a variety of concepts derived from dramatism, particularly the technological psychosis, 
poetic categories, frames of rejection and acceptance, and god terms. Dramatism’s steady 
engagement with myth, magic, and mystery in language use also shaped my theory. 
Although dramatism inspired many features of my analysis, I extended Burke’s 
concepts in order to adapt to the particular rhetorical contexts that I studied. In Chapter Two, 
I paired the technological psychosis with the poetic psychosis. Typically, Burke portrayed 
science or technology as antithetical to poetry. Burke’s position contradicted my observations 
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in Chapter Two, which is why I introduced the notion of a poetic psychosis as a counterpart 
to the technological psychosis. The authors in Chapter Two wrote in alternating tones of 
scrutiny and awe. While the two psychoses were common aspects of modern thinking, the 
appearance of both within the same texts contradicted my expectations about the rhetoric of 
social actors like Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and Nordenskiöld. Chapter Two 
illustrated how the rhetoric of science, as practiced in the nineteenth century, could be both 
persuasive and poetic while upholding generic conventions.  
Chapter Three’s most significant revision of dramatism had to do with a variety of 
definitions that I advanced for the poetic categories about which Burke wrote. For instance, 
in Attitudes Toward History, Burke left the category of the plaint nearly undefined. I 
interpreted the plaint as a formal critique, in which rhetors might offer suggestions to remedy 
that which they find unacceptable. Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett all rejected what they 
viewed as the government’s inadequate oversight of antiquities, and its inept or damaging 
treatment of Native peoples. These plaints called attention to a social problem, and 
sometimes listed the ways in which the problems could be rectified. The authors’ expressions 
of rejection were subsumed within their variable frames of acceptance, however. Bandelier’s 
tragedy of the Other demonstrated the resignation that dramatism supposes to be present 
within such a poetic category. McClurg’s use of the epic illustrated that poetic category’s 
applicability in many conflict-ridden situations, not just the supposedly primitive era that 
Burke theorized. Hewett’s iteration of the comic frame paired iconoclasm and hagiography, 
but failed to resolve into a humanistic synthesis, as Burke theorized such a dialectic might. 
These poetic expressions of cultural myths demonstrated the interplay between form and 
content, and the appearance of many of the same cultural myths across poetic frames.   
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In Chapter Four, I identified Science as the god term of preservation policy as a 
whole, and examined a broad collection of texts in order to arrive at that claim. I divided 
preservation policies according to the discursive contexts in which they appeared, and 
concluded that the contexts informed—and nearly constituted—the meaning of Science. 
While the term-of-terms itself connoted a number of cultural myths, the poetry that 
contextualized it imbued it with its historical moment, its politics, and its ethics. Importantly, 
the meaning of the god term changed over time. The worlds within Science are not static, and 
recent preservation policies suggest that Science is open to acknowledging its own 
enchantments.  
For all that my analysis owes an intellectual debt to dramatism, its emphasis on the 
relationships among cultural myths, enchanting experiences, and poetic language is novel. 
The places about which the rhetors in my study spoke necessitated such a novel critical 
approach. Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, among other antiquities of the Southwestern 
United States, inspire wonder. They provoke discourse. They challenged ready placement 
within existing cultural narratives when they were encountered initially, and new conventions 
sprang up to meet the rhetorical problem posed by Southwestern antiquities. For the rhetors 
in my dissertation, familiar cultural myths served as one solution to integrating Southwestern 
antiquities into public discourse, and these myths gained power through the poetry by which 
they were expressed. The rhetoric of preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous 
places in the American Southwest always reminded its audiences of the enchanting character 
of those places. Through myths and imagery, the adventurers, advocates, and policymakers 
who publicized and secured the ancient places of the Southwest also succeeded in enchanting 
others, while establishing that those places had value. In the midst of that enchantment, they 
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established what the primary values of Southwestern antiquities were: a means to 
enlightenment, either through scientific engagement or through communion with the past and 
the landscape. As these values were framed typically through an Anglo-American rendering 
of the myths of modernity, the adventurers, advocates, and policymakers whose rhetoric I 
evaluated throughout this dissertation often appropriated that which they found enchanting.   
In addition to this dissertation’s unique engagement with enchantments, poetic 
language, and cultural myth, the project makes other contributions to humanistic research. 
My dissertation differs from most rhetorical projects of which I am aware because of its 
focus on antiquities and the rhetoric pertaining to them, because it primarily concerns a 
historical period, and because it examines preservation policies as rhetorical texts. 
Additionally, through archival work and interviews, the dissertation pieces together a 
rhetorical history of a social problem and its previous remedies. The approach that I used 
when crafting this dissertation enabled me to highlight a number of the lasting consequences 
of a historical discourse. 
As I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, there have been two pieces of 
rhetorical criticism to date that have addressed the rhetoric of ancient places in the United 
States. These are Thomas Patin’s analysis of a visit to Chaco Culture National Historical 
Park and Casey Schmitt’s examination of Native American Effigy Mounds near Madison, 
Wisconsin.4 My project is a contribution to the field because it increases the body of 
literature that addresses the rhetoricity of ancient places in the United States. All of these 
                                                 
4 Thomas Patin, “America in Ruins: Parks, Poetics, and Politics,” in Observation Points: The 
Visual Poetics of National Parks, ed. Thomas Patin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2012), 267–89; Casey R. Schmitt, “Contours of the Land: Place-as-Rhetoric and 
Native American Effigy Mounds,” Western Journal of Communication 79, no. 3 (2015): 
307–26, doi:10.1080/10570314.2015.1041651. 
323 
 
projects, including my dissertation, take seriously the premise that ancient places are 
rhetorical, and that their rhetorical framing illustrates problematics that are prevalent in 
settler societies. Whereas Patin and Schmitt were concerned with the on-site framing devices 
produced by heritage practitioners, my dissertation engaged with the ways in which 
enthusiasts of places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon conveyed their impressions in 
public discourse. Schmitt and Patin examined didactic signs and the atmospheres of their 
respective field sites. I examined books, magazine and journal articles, speeches, and policies 
as elements of public discourse. 
Numerous projects in material rhetoric or the rhetorics of place and space engage 
with the poetry of place, as I have referred to the imaginative and connotative descriptions of 
Southwestern antiquities that appeared regularly in my dissertation. Acknowledgements of 
the poetry of place include Schmitt and Patin’s analyses, which offered rich descriptions of 
the antiquities each author considered, and detailed analyses of the didactic signs that 
accompanied and framed them. Indeed, Patin referred to poetics explicitly in his 
interpretation of Chaco Culture NHP. There are also several works of rhetorical criticism that 
examine what I consider to be mythic representations of Anglo-American national identity as 
it appears in museum spaces and at other heritage sites. Rhetorical critics have observed that 
museums such as those at the Buffalo Bill Historical Center in Cody, Wyoming,5 or the 
                                                 
5 Brian L. Ott, Eric Aoki, and Greg Dickinson, “Ways of (Not) Seeing Guns: Presence and 
Absence at the Cody Firearms Museum,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 8, 
no. March 2015 (2011): 215–39, doi:10.1080/14791420.2011.594068; Greg Dickinson, Brian 
L. Ott, and Eric Aoki, “Spaces of Remembering and Forgetting: The Reverent Eye/I at the 
Plains Indian Museum,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3, no. 1 (March 
2006): 27–47, doi:10.1080/14791420500505619; Greg Dickinson, Brian L. Ott, and Eric 
Aoki, “Memory and Myth at the Buffalo Bill Museum,” Western Journal of Communication 
69, no. 2 (April 2005): 85–108, doi:10.1080/10570310500076684. 
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Homestead National Monument of America in Beatrice, Nebraska,6 tend to mythologize 
settler identities and the conquest of the West, rather than troubling them. The compelling 
symbols within and pertaining to such places, alongside the powerful experience of physical 
embodiment at and within such memory places, support the myths that such heritage places 
advance. I observed that poetic descriptions could energize cultural myths in the texts that I 
analyzed in this dissertation; rhetorical critics who attend explicitly to the experiences of 
place have observed the power of embodied poetics.  
While I do not describe the rhetorical experience of a site-visit at length, the 
experience of place featured prominently in the rhetoric of the adventurers and advocates 
whose works I assessed. Following examples set by other rhetorical critics, I understood the 
rhetors in my study as both influenced and influential, as both “audience” and “speaker.” The 
accounts of the adventurers, archaeologists, and advocates who populated Chapters Two and 
Three were records of enchantment, as well as of the poetry of place as they understood it. 
There is a precedent within rhetorical criticism for understanding reactions to texts as, 
themselves, rhetorical, and for attempting to understand a wide range of effects of rhetoric on 
its audiences.7 Ceccarelli, for example, observed that audiences make meanings 
                                                 
6 Joshua Ewalt, “A Colonialist Celebration of National <Heritage>: Verbal, Visual, and 
Landscape Ideographs at Homestead National Monument of America.,” Western Journal of 
Communication 75, no. 4 (2011): 367–85, doi:10.1080/10570314.2011.586970. 
7 Roger C. Aden et al., “Re-Collection: A Proposal for Refining the Study of Collective 
Memory and Its Places,” Communication Theory 19, no. 3 (August 2009): 311–36, 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2009.01345.x; Amos Kiewe and Davis W. Houck, eds., The Effects 
of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Effects: Past, Present, Future (Columbia, SC: The University 
of South Carolina Press, 2015). 
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differentially, sometimes engaging in “resistive reading.”8 In developing that argument, 
Ceccarelli identified examples of resistive reading in the newspaper coverage following 
Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address. She studied journalistic responses to the 
address as a metric by which rhetorical scholars might understand polysemy, polyvalent 
interpretations of a text, and audience responses to a text. I engaged in a parallel sort of 
analysis by examining how adventurers, researchers, and advocates framed their own 
responses to Southwestern antiquities. Obviously, the rhetors whose works I examined in my 
dissertation were not wholly representative of the era in which they wrote. Yet, they offered a 
glimpse of the poetry of place through their words, and presented evidence of audience 
response to Southwestern antiquities. Contemporary visitors to places like Mesa Verde and 
Chaco Canyon likely would recognize some of these rhetors’ expressions of wonder in their 
own astonishment at the scale and beauty of such places. 
In addition to its recognition of the poetry of place, and its attempt to acknowledge 
the active rhetorical practices of rhetoric’s audiences, my dissertation offers new insights 
about rhetorics of and about indigeneity.9 The dissertation is a contribution to inquiries in 
Native rhetorics and rhetoric pertaining to indigenous rights because of its emphasis on the 
enduring political implications of North America’s deep past, its attention to disputes over 
the uses and ownership of public lands, and its critique of numerous federal interventions in 
                                                 
8 Leah Ceccarelli, “Polysemy: Multiple Meanings in Rhetorical Criticism,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 396, doi: 10.1080/00335639809384229. 
9 E.g., Jason Edward Black, “Remembrances of Removal: Native Resistance to Allotment 
and the Unmasking of Paternal Benevolence.,” Southern Communication Journal 72, no. 2 
(2007): 185–203, doi:10.1080/10417940701316690; e.g., John Sanchez and Mary E. 
Stuckey, “The Rhetoric of American Indian Activism in the 1960s and 1970s,” 
Communication Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2000): 120–36, doi:10.1080/01463370009385586. 
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the management of indigenous heritage, with an emphasis on institutions such as the NPS 
and legislation such as the Antiquities Act of 1906. The project’s unique emphasis on 
indigenous heritage as a disputed cultural artifact differs somewhat from efforts to 
understand representations of indigeneity in museum spaces, because it attends to the 
ownership and appropriation of, not just images and stories, but vast cultural landscapes. It 
raises new questions about rhetoric’s role in establishing and eroding indigenous sovereignty, 
because some of the rhetoric in this study had the material effect of transforming Native 
landscapes into national monuments. 
 My dissertation’s focus on the politicization of indigenous heritage places also makes 
the analysis relevant to scholars concerned with anthropological or archaeological ethics in 
settler societies, such as those working within the realm of critical heritage studies.10 
Throughout this dissertation, I have problematized the Anglo-American tendency to view 
Southwestern antiquities as data instead of as heritage, and I have also problematized more 
recent attempts to gloss over indigenous heritage places as national heritage. Contention over 
the definition of heritage, the appropriate applications for heritage materials, and the 
appropriate stewards for various forms of heritage, marked this analysis. There are no easy 
resolutions to these matters, but there are numerous valuable perspectives from the academy 
on the issues of archaeological ethics and representations of indigeneity in settler societies.11  
                                                 
10 Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2013); Laurajane 
Smith, Archaeological Theory and the Politics of Cultural Heritage (New York: Routledge, 
2004). 
11 Miranda J. Brady, “Subjectivity Through Self-Education: Media and the Multicultural 
Citizen at the National Museum of the American Indian,” Television & New Media 12, no. 5 
(December 31, 2010): 441–59, doi:10.1177/1527476410385478; Roberta Chevrette and 
Aaron Hess, “Unearthing the Native Past: Citizen Archaeology and Modern (Non)Belonging 
at the Pueblo Grande Museum,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 12, no. 2 
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My dissertation challenges many aspects of the federal management of indigenous 
heritage, particularly through its focus on federal policies and the enduring authority of white 
anthropological researchers in the realm of indigenous heritage management. By examining 
how researchers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries used rhetoric in order to establish 
themselves as modern heroes, I have exposed the mutability of scientific reputations and the 
ways in which institutional structures continue to maintain a privileged status for 
anthropologists in the particular context of the Southwest. In this, I have joined Leah 
Ceccarelli in another capacity, as she examines representations of scientists as mythic heroes 
of the American frontier in the early twentieth-century.12 I have joined, also, rhetoricians 
such as Marsha Solomon, who examine other contexts of rhetorically-produced scientific 
heroism as it dovetails with scientific racism.13 Although I do not seek to undermine the 
value of research, I do seek to demonstrate how research is enchanted, biased, and politically 
influential. 
My dissertation has addressed a number of enduring concerns within the humanities. 
Through rhetorical analysis, this dissertation has probed the values and rationales of 
modernity, and the contradictory ways in which various features of modernity have been 
expressed. The status of science, the poetics of reason, and the consequences of colonialism 
                                                 
(2015): 139–58, doi:10.1080/14791420.2015.1012214; Lisa Slater, “Enchantment and 
Disenchantment : Indigenous Australian Cultural Festivals and an Ethics of Uncertainty,” At 
the Interface / Probing the Boundaries 73 (2010): 87–107. 
12 Leah Ceccarelli, On the Frontier of Science: An American Rhetoric of Exploration and 
Exploitation, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2013). 
13 Martha Solomon, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization : An Analysis of Medical Reports of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Project,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 49, no. 4 (1985): 
233–47. 
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all have featured in my examination of the history of preservation advocacy on behalf of 
Southwestern antiquities. The questions of what to do with Southwestern antiquities, and 
how to value them, have appeared within Anglo-American public discourse since the end of 
the nineteenth century. Whereas the conclusion to treat them like scholarly artifacts once 
satisfied the majority of the Anglo-American public, this attitude has shifted in the last thirty 
years. For the better, American Indian social actors have more power to participate in the 
definition and treatment of indigenous heritage than ever before. Of course, the fact remains 
that the federal management of American Indian heritage is likely to fall short of 
decolonizing places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon.14 This dissertation has examined 
the historical conditions that gave rise to a number of enduring challenges to indigenous 
sovereignty in the United States. It also raises questions about the ways in which social actors 
in the twenty-first century continue to grapple with the myths of modernity and the unjust 
social structures that those myths promoted. Namely, in what ways are social actors today 
perpetuating the racial biases that characterized nineteenth and twentieth century advocacy 
on behalf of indigenous heritage? What are the politics of enchantment? 
Because of the questions that it poses, this dissertation has the potential to affect 
preservation advocacy as it is practiced in the future. The fate of places like Mesa Verde and 
Chaco Canyon increasingly connects to concerns regarding indigenous rights, environmental 
conservation, resource extraction, and the legislation of business practices. Advocates would 
do well to deploy cultural myths to their advantage, provided that they avoid some of the 
ideological missteps that their forebears exhibited. Anglo-American advocates, in particular, 
                                                 
14 I draw my understanding of decolonial studies from Walter D. Mignolo, The Darker Side 
of Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2011).  
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should avoid fetishizing indigeneity, and should accept that archaeologists and 
anthropologists do not have a right to examine indigenous heritage. In the future, it is worth 
asking, as well, whether or not the public has a right to access places like Mesa Verde and 
Chaco Canyon.  
These concerns are important. They are important, particularly, because they have the 
potential to influence a number of the political issues that continue to affect the ongoing, 
ethical care of ancient indigenous places in the American Southwest adversely. Rhetorical 
enchantment—practiced in a way that avoids the dehumanizing tendencies that I found in the 
history of preservation advocacy on behalf of Ancestral Puebloan places—will remain an 
important part of the strategy for protecting places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon from 
harm. These harms, also, bear further scrutiny, for their sources are many.  
Current Problems  
Despite the historical bent of this dissertation, its contributions are pertinent to the 
contemporary moment. Members of the public, as well as politicians, are in the midst of 
redefining the values of places like Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon, and Bears Ears. In every 
instance, the ways in which contemporary social actors attempt to reevaluate these ancient 
places reflect the federal government’s attitude towards contemporary American Indian 
peoples and their sovereignty. The way that the federal government manages places like 
Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon, and Bears Ears is analogous to the way that the federal 
government treats indigenous peoples. At a minimum, treating indigenous heritage places 
better would be a gesture of good faith towards recognizing indigenous sovereignty more 
fully. Yet, the preservation concerns at Mesa Verde, Chaco Canyon, and Bears Ears 
330 
 
demonstrate many of the mismatches in values between Anglo-American cultural practices 
and the heritage management policies currently proposed by American Indian social actors.  
At Mesa Verde National Park, there are three issues that negatively affect the ongoing 
material preservation of the ancient structures contained within the park. These are the threat 
of wildfires, the harm caused by tourist traffic, and the imminent collapse of one of the site’s 
most famous alcove dwellings. Park management at Mesa Verde defines fire as a threat to 
“park infrastructure, cultural and natural resources, and human safety,” and in interviews, 
park personnel identified climate change as a factor that contributes to increased fire risk.15 
Park personnel also acknowledged the harm to “resources” caused by tourist traffic, and 
various strategies for mitigating the degradation of the site caused by the wear and tear of 
being open to the public. While some park personnel proposed closing more of the site to the 
public, interview participants generally viewed such a move as unlikely due to the National 
Park Service’s mandates, which were established by the Organic Act. While park rangers 
were aware of the paradox of protecting resources and providing for the enjoyment of the 
same, most viewed some loss of the site as collateral damage, and worthwhile because of the 
educational benefits provided to the public. In some sense, they claimed that the cultural and 
natural resources were meant to be used. They justified the damage to parts of the site with 
the knowledge that the vast majority of Mesa Verde National Park remained closed to public 
access. 
Mismatches between Anglo-American attitudes towards antiquities and the attitudes 
of the Tribes and Pueblos affiliated with Mesa Verde came to the fore in 2015. At that time, 
                                                 
15 NPS, “Fire Management,” Mesa Verde National Park, 
https://www.nps.gov/meve/learn/management/firemanagement.htm, accessed May 14, 2018.  
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the “third largest and best preserved cliff dwelling in the park,” called Spruce Tree House, 
experienced a rock fall. While no one was injured by the collapse, management at Mesa 
Verde National Park decided to close the Spruce Tree House to foot traffic for reasons of 
safety. Park management held a Tribal Consultation Meeting in April 2016 in order to 
consult with Tribal representatives about the best course of action. Tribal representatives 
were divided about whether or not to conduct repairs to the structure. Those in favor of doing 
the repairs acknowledged that Spruce Tree House was an effective teaching tool for sharing 
Ancestral Puebloan culture with site visitors. Those opposed to repairing Spruce Tree House 
felt that nature should be allowed to take its course, no matter the effect on the architecture 
below. 
While most of the participants at the meeting agreed that the collapsing arch at Spruce 
Tree House posed a risk to the safety of people in the park, the Tribal representatives 
expressed mistrust about the NPS’s next courses of action. In particular, individuals at the 
meeting raised concern that the NPS would excavate a new site in order to replace the lost 
tourist experience at Spruce Tree House. As a representative from the Santa Clara Pueblo put 
it, “There is a lack of respect at sites that are open[,] and maybe that is why they are 
deteriorating.”16 The implication of this statement, in context, was that Spruce Tree House 
sought to be closed, and that the rock fall was an indication of this wish.  
While the NPS never proposed to excavate a new site in order to compensate for the 
park’s putative loss of Spruce Tree House, the Tribal representatives’ shared concern that the 
                                                 
16 Ben Chavarria (Santa Clara Pueblo), “AZRU, CHCU, MEVE Tribal Consultation Meeting 
Notes,” San Juan County Fire Department, Aztec, NM, April 6, 2016, notes recorded by Lori 
S. Reed and Dana Hawkins, acquired via e-mail correspondence with Mesa Verde park 
personnel.  
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NPS might do something so disagreeable demonstrated their ongoing mistrust of the federal 
management of indigenous heritage. No Tribal representatives supported the idea of further 
excavations within the park for the sake of tourism. Mesa Verde’s management practices 
raised concern for Tribal representatives at the Tribal Consultation Meeting in April 2016. 
Mesa Verde faces the risk of fire damage, exacerbated by climate change, as well as 
deterioration caused by tourism and natural geological processes. While Mesa Verde suffers 
from longstanding problems and processes, the concerns at Chaco Canyon and at Bears Ears 
are of a more pressing variety, and pertain to industrial mineral extraction.  
At Chaco Culture National Historical Park, the ancient structures’ far remove from 
roads and development largely protects them from sudden destruction. However, the problem 
of tourist foot-traffic exists at Chaco Canyon, as well, where decades of curious onlookers 
have worn away at material features of the site, and numerous individuals have marked their 
names upon the ancient structures. Other problems also confront the site. First, non-
American Indian social actors have taken to scattering both new age crystals and cremated 
human remains at the site. These are actions that some of the affiliated Tribes and Pueblos 
view as a defilement of ancestral places.17 Second, hydraulic fracturing approaches towards 
the park boundaries.  
Chaco Culture National Historical Park is safe from oil and gas drilling within the 
park boundaries. However, the Chacoan culture existed throughout a much broader 
                                                 
17 Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh and T.J. Ferguson, “Memory Pieces and Footprints: 
Multivocality and the Meanings of Ancient Times and Ancestral Places among the Zuni and 
Hopi,” American Anthropologist 108, no. 1 (2006): 148–62, doi:10.1525/aa.2006.108.1.148; 
C Finn, “‘Leaving More than Footprints’: Modern Votive Offerings at Chaco Canyon 
Prehistoric Site,” Antiquity 71, no. 271 (1997): 169–78; information also obtained through 
interviews. 
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geographical region than that which the park designation protects. There is an extensive 
culturally-significant landscape at risk in recent decisions that have enabled leasing close to 
the park boundaries, and throughout the Four Corners region. Indigenous activists have been 
central to a recent movement against oil and gas drilling near Chaco Canyon, and these 
activists were urged to action following a dramatic fire near “newly drilled oil wells” in the 
“Greater Chaco Region.”18  
A coalition of the Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment, the San Juan 
Citizens Alliance, WildEarth Guardians, and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
submitted a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management’s decision to lease land 
surrounding Chaco Canyon for oil and gas drilling.19 As of April 2018, United States District 
Court Judge James Browning ruled that drilling could proceed, provided that the Bureau of 
Land Management constructed a barrier around the cultural resources in the path of the 
drilling. When justifying this decision, Browning remarked that there were two concerns that 
affected his decision: Whether there would be “irreparable harm or even serious harm to the 
historic property,” and whether or not “individuals who visit . . . historic sites might be 
inconvenienced.” Ultimately, Browning found that those forms of “harm [did] not outweigh 
the potential hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars of economic harm the operators 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Thompson, “Resistance to Drilling Grows on the Navajo Nation,” High Country 
News, March 2, 2018, https://www.hcn.org/issues/50.4/tribal-affairs-resistance-to-drilling-
grows-on-the-navajo-nation, accessed May 14, 2018.   
19 Paul Rauber, “Legal Setback for Defenders of Chaco,” Sierra, April 28, 2018, n. pag., 
https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/legal-setback-for-defenders-chaco, accessed May 14, 2018. 
Sierra, the publication of the Sierra Club, is admittedly a biased source. However, the Sierra 
Club is a key example of a largely Anglo-American advocacy group that works on behalf of 
the preservation of the Southwestern landscape.  
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[would] endure” if drilling were not allowed.20 Nowhere in Browning’s decision was the 
cultural importance of the Chacoan landscape to descendant populations taken into account. 
Browning’s primary concern was the loss of revenue for drilling companies. 
In spite of Browning’s frustrating decision in favor of oil and gas development in the 
Greater Chaco Region, Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke, declared a deferral of leasing 
activity in the Chaco region until further “exploration” could take place about the cultural 
resources outside of the park boundaries. Zinke claimed that the decision to postpone leases 
and sales was the result of input from “tribes, [Democratic] Senators Udall and Heinrich, 
historic preservation experts and other stakeholders.”21 While Zinke acted on behalf of the 
Chaco landscape in this instance, his actions on behalf of Bears Ears National Monument—
which I will discuss shortly—were not similarly conscientious. Indeed, Chaco may have 
benefited temporarily from a public backlash against Zinke’s earlier mishandling of Bears 
Ears. In his role as the Secretary of the Interior, Zinke is the new face of stewardship for 
America’s public lands. This is cause for concern, postponements of leases or not. 
Of relevance to this dissertation, many of the twenty-first century non-American 
Indian advocates on behalf of Chaco Canyon appealed to some of the same cultural myths 
that social actors at the turn of the twentieth century used. The New York Time remarked that 
Chaco Canyon’s “treasures” were “threatened by drilling,” and that the region had “mysteries 
                                                 
20 Judge James Browning, quoted by Rauber, “Legal Setback,” n. pag. 
21 Juliet Eilperin, “Zinke Abruptly Postpones Lease Sale Near New Mexico’s Chaco 
Canyon,” The Washington Post, March 2, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/03/02/zinke-abruptly-
postpones-lease-sale-near-new-mexicos-chaco-
canyon/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.492aeb5f1124, accessed May 14, 2018.   
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. . . waiting to be revealed.”22 The Guardian called Chaco Canyon “as close as the US gets to 
Egypt’s pyramids and Peru’s Machu Picchu,” while asserting that “developments could spell 
the end of a myriad of clues archaeologists and anthropologists are still unraveling about 
Chacoans’ way of life.”23 Throughout the publications that opposed oil and gas drilling in the 
Greater Chaco Region, rhetors spoke of the intellectual and recreational enjoyments of the 
landscape. While these argumentative commonplaces likely resonated with the Anglo-
American readership they were designed to influence, they obfuscated the cultural toll borne 
disproportionately by the Tribes and Pueblos affiliated with Chaco Canyon. Given the 
pollution, fires, and other risks associated with oil and gas drilling, there are bodily risks to 
which these populations are exposed disproportionately. The environmental racism that 
advocates have been opposing at Chaco Canyon is also at play in recent decisions regarding 
the boundaries and leasing rights available in the Bears Ears landscape, in Utah, and across 
the United States. 
Beginning in the 1930s, Anglo-American social actors campaigned to set aside Bears 
Ears as a protected landscape. While many parcels of the landscape gained protection as 
holdings of the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, the 
landscape as a whole remained neglected by the federal government, and suffered from its 
lack of adequate protection. Like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, Bears Ears was subject to 
                                                 
22 Richard Moe, “The Treasures of Chaco Canyon are Threatened by Drilling,” The New 
York Times, December 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/opinion/chaco-
canyon-new-mexico-drilling.html, accessed May 15, 2018.   
23 Elizabeth Miller, “‘As Close as the US Gets to Egypt’s Pyramids’: How Chaco Canyon is 
Endangered by Drilling,” The Guardian, November 8, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/08/chaco-canyon-national-park-new-
mexico-drilling, accessed May 15, 2018.  
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graffiti and pot-hunting. Like Chaco Canyon, Bears Ears also has been in the path of so-
called progress, in the form of mineral extraction.  
The Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition (BEITC), representing the Hopi Tribe, the 
Navajo Nation, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, the Pueblo of Zuni, and the Ute Indian Tribe, 
formed in 2015 in order to petition for the Bears Ears landscape to gain national monument 
status. Only as a national park or monument could Bears Ears gain the highest level of 
protection available to a heritage site in the United States, helping to assure that the land 
would not be used for industrial foresting, mineral extraction, or other deleterious industrial 
practices. The BEITC addressed a version of their petition to President Barack Obama in the 
fall of 2016. With a month left in office, Obama designated Bears Ears a national monument 
1.35 million acres in size.  
There were a number of disappointing aspects of Obama’s proclamation of Bears 
Ears National Monument (BENM). Rhetorically, the BENM proclamation also fell short of 
fulfilling its lauded role as a victory for indigenous rights. Recall from chapter four that 
Obama’s presidential proclamation on behalf of the new monument appealed to many 
modern commonplaces. The proclamation of BENM privileged Science, foregrounding the 
ways in which paleontologists, geologists and ecologists could learn from the protected 
landscape. While Obama’s proclamation paid deference to indigenous histories of Bears 
Ears, it incorporated indigenous pasts and Anglo-American pasts into a homogenizing 
narrative about American identity. Furthermore, the monument that Obama designated was 
smaller than the 1.9 million acres that the BEITC requested, and failed to protect a uranium-
rich parcel of land known as Red Canyon. Obama’s proclamation for BENM also failed to 
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establish a true collaboration between federal agencies and Tribal governments, which had 
been a significant component of the BEITC proposal.  
In their proposal of the BENM, the BEITC requested full participation in all 
management considerations concerning Bears Ears. Instead, Obama’s BENM proclamation 
created a Bears Ears Commission consisting of “one elected officer each from the Hopi 
Nation, Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, and 
Zuni Tribe.” The Commission would “partner with . . . Federal agencies by making 
continuing contributions to inform decisions regarding the management of the Monument.” 
While the agencies were instructed to “meaningfully engage the Commission,” they were not 
required to adhere to the Commission’s counsel. Though the agencies were advised to 
“carefully and fully consider integrating the traditional and historical knowledge and special 
expertise of the Commission” they could choose not to do so. The only guard against such a 
decision was that, in the event the federal agencies might ignore the Commission’s wishes, 
the federal managers of Bears Ears would need to “provide the Commission . . . with a 
written explanation of their reasoning.” This was the extent of the “meaningful engagement” 
that Obama’s BENM proclamation required, beyond general adherence to federal laws such 
as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Native American Religious 
Freedom Act.24 
From this discussion, it is clear that Obama’s proclamation of BENM failed to realign 
problematic power dynamics that have been present for decades in the federal management 
                                                 
24 Barack Obama, Proclamation, “Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, 
Proclamation 9558,” 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (December 28, 2016), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201600875/pdf/DCPD-201600875.pdf. 
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of indigenous heritage in the American Southwest. However, the flaws in Obama’s 
proclamation of BENM seemed acceptable to many at the time of the monument’s 
establishment. At long last, most of the Bears Ears landscape seemed as if it was safe from 
commercial development. Moreover, as the authors of the BEITC stated in the proposal that 
they addressed to Obama, requesting the monument, “no action under the Antiquities Act 
[had] ever been overturned by the courts.”25 The majority of the Bears Ears landscape finally 
should have been safe from uranium mining. However, the Trump administration did not 
wait for any court’s permission before dismantling Obama’s protection of the new national 
monument. If there is a lesson to be taken from Bears Ears’ reduction, perhaps it is this: 
Allies are imperfect, but adversaries are worse. Furthermore, while Science has a poor 
history of representing indigenous interests well, industry appears to disregard them 
completely. 
Whereas Obama’s proclamation of BENM praised Science, the landscape, and Native 
histories, Trump’s presidential discourse pertaining to Bears Ears never wavered from its 
praise for capital. Shortly after entering office, Trump issued an executive order in which he 
called for a review of the national monuments that his three presidential predecessors 
established. Trump’s executive order held up “American workers and the American 
economy” as victims of executive overreach and misuse of the Antiquities Act. According to 
Trump’s executive order, expansionist uses of the Antiquities Act—such as the Obama’s 
designation of BENM, said the document—could “create barriers to achieving energy 
                                                 
25  BEITC, “Proposal to President Barack Obama for the Creation of Bears Ears National 
Monument” (Utah Diné Bikéyah, October 15, 2015), 23, http://utahdinebikeyah.org//wp-
content/documents/Bears-Ears-Inter-Tribal-Coalition-Proposal-10-15-15.pdf. 
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independence, restrict public access to and use of Federal lands, burden State, tribal, and 
local governments, and otherwise curtail economic growth.”26 Using economic 
commonplaces and a partisan representation of American identity, Trump claimed that Bears 
Ears was a financial burden. Seven months after ordering a review of monument 
designations, the Trump administration released a presidential proclamation in which it 
presented Bears Ears’ new, reduced boundaries, an eighty-five percent reduction from the 
original 1.35 million acres that Obama designated.  
Trump’s presidential proclamation redefined many of the ambiguous terms of the 
Antiquities Act, in every instance reshaping them in favor of the economy, and accusing 
Obama of using the Antiquities Act inappropriately. The proclamation claimed that Bears 
Ears’ reduction was necessary on the grounds that Obama failed to confine the monument “to 
the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects of historic 
or scientific interest to be protected.” The presidential proclamation asserted that the majority 
of Bears Ears was not “of significant scientific or historic interest,” was no longer “under 
threat of damage or destruction,” and was “already being managed” adequately. Furthermore, 
said this presidential proclamation, other laws already provided “specific protection for 
archaeological, historic, cultural, paleontological, and plant and animal resources.” The 
proclamation willfully ignored the symbolic power of the vast Bears Ears region for the 
                                                 
26 Donald Trump, Exec. Order no. 13792, “Review of Designations Under the Antiquities 
Act,” 82 Fed. Reg. 20429 (April 26, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-05-
01/pdf/2017-08908.pdf 
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Tribal governments who requested its protection, and fractured the landscape by deeming 
only part of it worthy of protection.27 
Preservation advocacy on behalf of Southwestern antiquities is in the midst of a new 
moment of crisis, confronting not vandalism, but the federal government itself. The example 
of Bears Ears, with which I began this dissertation, serves as an emblem of the most 
concerning problems facing preservation advocacy on behalf of Ancestral Puebloan places, 
today. It demonstrates the bureaucratic and ideological shortcomings of progressive allies, 
and the significant material threats posed by both industry and reactionary politics. While 
science and industry both make use of ancestral landscapes, the latter is a much more 
pressing concern—both for preservation advocacy, and for its allied social issues, such as 
indigenous rights and environmental conservation. 
Limitations, Biases, and Further Enchantments 
On the whole, this dissertation has attended to occlusions and injustices present in the 
historical discourses of archaeologists and preservation advocates, as well as the power 
imbalances that persist in contemporary preservation policies as a result of the actions of 
these historical figures. Because of my dissertation’s emphasis on these imbalances, it is 
fitting to comment on the ways in which numerous choices that I made throughout the 
research process biased this project, as well. After all, the ways in which “we as researchers 
                                                 
27 Donald J. Trump, Proclamation, “Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument,” 82 Fed. 
Reg. 58081 (December 4, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-12-08/pdf/2017-
26709.pdf. 
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create our texts” reflect the politics and ethics of our own positionality towards that which we 
study.28  
Some of the choices that I made foreclosed the possibilities for “open[ing] new 
frames for intellectual and political theory and practice,” because the project focused 
explicitly on the various dominant frames (poetic and otherwise) that have become 
sedimented in the context of preservation advocacy on behalf of Southwestern antiquities.29 
My choices produced a conspicuous absence in terms representing the views of the 
indigenous social actors to whom Southwestern antiquities most rightly belong. While the 
dissertation cites indigenous scholarship and refers occasionally to a variety of indigenous 
perspectives, at base, this is a study of whiteness and its institutions. 
In terms of methodological choices, I focused my research on the narratives of white 
social actors, retrieved a number of their narratives from both digital and brick-and-mortar 
archives, and interviewed thirty heritage practitioners in the American Southwest, only three 
of whom self-identified as possessing American Indian heritage, and twenty-seven of whom 
worked for the National Park Service. I selected Jackson, Holmes, Ingersoll, Chapin, and 
Nordenskiöld for study because of their influence in establishing Anglo-American discourses 
about Southwestern Antiquities. I selected Bandelier, McClurg, and Hewett for study because 
of their participation in the same discourses, and because of the ways in which their attitudes 
were embedded in law. I selected federal policies governing Southwestern antiquities for 
                                                 
28 Michelle Fine, “Dis-Stance and Other Stances: Negotiations of Power Inside Feminist 
Research,” in Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research, ed. Andrew 
Gitlin (Routledge, 1994), 14. 
29 Fine, 23. 
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study because of their influence on the management and care of the same places. Influence 
was the rationale for the choices that I made, but this resulted in “studying up,” or examining 
the production of power, rather than challenges to it.30 
There are benefits to examining the production of power. For one thing, it enables 
those who wish to challenge current power dynamics to understand what it is that they 
confront, its history, and its methods. When studies of power avoid hagiography, they can 
critique and subvert the authority that those in power traditionally have possessed. Yet, in 
studying discursive colonization, I have not adopted a decolonizing methodology 
consistently. Linda Tuhiwai Smith considers a decolonizing methodology one that 
emphasizes indigenous agendas, integrates “political and international frameworks[s],” and 
demonstrates a willingness “to upset the status quo.” 31 While I sought to include dimensions 
of Smith’s recommendations in my dissertation, still I participated in some of the scholarly 
traditions that decolonizing methodologies seek to disrupt.  
While I troubled unjust power dynamics as they stand now, and as they came to be, I 
relied on the Western canon. I interviewed individuals who work within a state apparatus that 
maintains federal and Anglo-American control over indigenous heritage. I depended on 
archives, which are sites at which scholars like myself produce knowledge, and sites that 
traditionally have acted as instruments of colonial power. Archives are political, and the 
materials that arrive in archives most often reflect and perpetuate dominant perspectives. 
                                                 
30 Laura Nader, “Up the Anthropologist,” ERIC, 1972, 1, 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED065375.pdf. 
31 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples 
(Zed Books, 2013), 343–44. 
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Bias present within the archives to which we have access is little excuse for failing to pursue 
alternate sources that would tell histories other than those we have come to expect.32  While a 
study about the production and maintenance of power has useful attributes, it comes at the 
expense of other projects that would privilege indigenous voices instead of amplifying the 
voices of white historical figures and policymakers, who already have been heard well. My 
hope is that this study of power and its production can complement and serve future work 
that will honor Native perspectives, instead.  
On the topic of voice and representation, I acknowledge that I am speaking from a 
privileged position as a white Anglo-American who is rather familiar with archaeological 
practices, having completed a master’s degree in archaeological science at the University of 
Cambridge, and having learned initially about Southwestern antiquities through 
archaeological coursework. While I have rejected or problematized much of what white 
social actors like myself have done in the Southwestern United States historically, still I take 
part in the appropriation of ancient indigenous heritage. For instance, I benefit from 
indigenous heritage simply by virtue of writing a dissertation about it. Indeed, I have written 
about Southwestern antiquities within the poetic valence, in the attempt to inspire 
enchantment in my readers. I have advanced the myths of universal humanism and 
coalitional politics, among others. I have identified as a preservation advocate, and I have 
proposed that a rhetorical history of preservation advocacy can influence coalitional politics 
positively now and in the future. This implies that white social actors like myself can have a 
place in advocating on behalf of indigenous heritage, and perhaps risks the perpetuation of 
                                                 
32 Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Art of Governance,” Archival Science, no. 2 
(2002): 87–109; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of 
History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 
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the appropriative discourses that I have challenged throughout this work. Yet, my privilege 
also allows me to educate would-be Anglo-American allies about “our” history of 
appropriation and ignorance in the context of preservation advocacy on behalf of indigenous 
heritage.  
Preservation advocacy on behalf of indigenous heritage places often has been 
dominated by white social actors. While indigenous advocates gained a greater platform 
through the American Indian Movement in the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently, through 
social movements such as #NoDAPL, white social actors who advocate on behalf of 
indigenous rights in any of these movements have not always performed well as appropriate 
allies. This dissertation seeks, in part, to educate non-indigenous allies about the history of 
appropriation of indigenous heritage by its white advocates. When I suggest that this 
rhetorical history can influence coalitional politics (and specifically, social movements that 
include Native and non-Native participants) on behalf of indigenous rights, environmental 
justice, and the ongoing, ethical care of ancient indigenous places, I mean to say that these 
social issues always should be coalitional, rather than the domain of white social actors, and 
that they can be coalitional without white social actors, as well. Historically, white 
archaeologists, preservation advocates, and policymakers representing the United States 
federal government have made decisions for Native nations, and have imposed values on 
indigenous peoples and their heritage sites that have undermined Native sovereignty. If white 
social actors can play a part, at all, it should be a subordinate one, or at least an equitable one, 
rather than the paternalistic role that the social actors in this dissertation assumed most 
regularly. This dissertation demonstrated how discourse helped to naturalize the Anglo-
American control of Southwestern antiquities. By showing the rhetorical contrivances in the 
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status quo, I hope to illustrate that it, too, is an enchantment, and it need not be a permanent 
one. In this, I mean to attach “what is” to “what could be.”33 
Discourse is a realm in which all people invested in supporting indigenous 
sovereignty, advancing environmental justice, and respecting indigenous heritage places may 
begin to reframe the century-old tradition of Anglo-American control over indigenous 
heritage places. As this dissertation has shown, discourses have the potential to influence 
both policy and comportment, now and in the future. In addition to problematizing 
teleological thinking, fetishistic descriptions of indigeneity, and the pervasive utilitarian 
rationality towards indigenous heritage places, allies can propose new narratives that subvert 
the power imbalances that persist in the federal management of indigenous heritage. 
As a parting thought, I wish to propose a new narrative that might disrupt the 
naturalization of Anglo-American dominance over indigenous heritage. It is this: Going to 
the American Southwest is a form of international travel. The Southwestern United States is 
host to many Native nations, including the Navajo Nation in Colorado, Arizona, and New 
Mexico; the Hopi Tribe in Arizona; the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe in Colorado; the Southern 
Ute in Colorado; the Northern Ute in Utah; the Jicarilla Apache Nation in New Mexico; the 
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo in Texas; and nineteen Pueblos in New Mexico, including Taos, 
Picuris, Isleta, Ohkay Owingeh, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Nambe, Tesuque, Jemez, 
Cochiti, Pojoaque, Santo Domingo, San Felipe, Santa Ana, Zia, Laguna, Acoma, and Zuni.34 
Each of these Native nations has its own government, its own land, its own traditions, and its 
                                                 
33 Fine, 26. 
34 “The 26 Associated Tribes of Mesa Verde,” National Park Service, accessed June 21, 
2018, 
https://www.nps.gov/meve/learn/historyculture/upload/26meve_associated_tribes_508.pdf. 
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own investments in the representation and management of Southwestern antiquities. If 
Anglo-American social actors could learn to recognize the sovereignty of these Native 
nations more fully (for instance, by calling movement across the Southwest “international 
travel,” or through other novel discursive habits), then perhaps the necessity of true 
government-to-government negotiations between Native nations and the United States 
federal government would be clearer. The need to respect the sovereignty and expertise of 
these Native nations when visiting their land also would be clearer. This is but one 
suggestion for disrupting the injustices that persist in the American Southwest. Consider it a 
proposed enchantment.  
Because the United States has so established its position as steward of Southwestern 
antiquities, it is sensible for the United States government to join negotiations with the 
twenty-six other governments who have an investment in Ancestral Puebloan places. It is not 
sensible for the United States government to dominate those negotiations, nor to seek 
“consultation” from Tribal and Pueblo governments in lieu of “consent” when determining 
the management, care, and ownership of Ancestral Puebloan places. The United States 
government currently holds Ancestral Puebloan places in trust on behalf of other 
governments, but it is necessary for the United States to seek ongoing consent from the 
governments on whose behalf it purports to act, and to accept a subsidiary and service-
oriented role instead of a dominant one. 
Future Directions 
This dissertation charted key moments in the historical development of Anglo-
American discourses of preservation advocacy on behalf of ancient indigenous places in the 
American Southwest. It focused primarily on the works of adventurers, archaeologists, and 
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advocates who were active in the American Southwest between the 1870s and the 1930s. It 
examined legislation that Anglo-American social actors advanced during roughly the same 
historical period, and it also assessed four more recent examples of preservation policy 
affecting Southwestern antiquities. These were the boundaries of my dissertation, and they 
indicated to me a number of beneficial directions in which to move forward, while 
attempting to understand better the federal management of indigenous heritage places in the 
United States, the status of science, and the rhetoric of antiquities.  
Over the course of writing this dissertation, I collected archival materials from the 
Tutt Library Special Collections at Colorado College in Colorado Springs, Colorado; the 
Chaco Culture National Historical Park archives housed at the University of New Mexico in 
Albuquerque; the Mesa Verde National Park archives located on-site in Cortez, Colorado; 
and the Fort Lewis College Center for Southwestern Studies archives in Durango, Colorado. 
While some of the information that I learned at these archives made its way into the 
dissertation, I have now in my possession a substantial body of archival content regarding the 
founding, management, and presentation of Mesa Verde National Park and Chaco Culture 
National Historical Park. I plan to integrate these materials into future projects that examine 
the organization of heritage practice within the National Park Service, and the decision-
making that goes into public displays in parks like these. 
I also had the opportunity to interview thirty heritage practitioners working in the 
Four Corners region of the United States. The majority of these individuals worked within 
the National Park Service, stationed either at Mesa Verde or at Chaco Canyon, though some 
worked with a non-profit organization called Crow Canyon Archaeological Center. In 
moving forward with this area of research, I plan to examine more closely the views of 
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heritage practitioners who interact with Southwestern antiquities. Interview participants 
shared their perspectives on issues such as the proper role of the federal government in 
stewarding ancient indigenous places, the impact of new technologies on park management, 
the Trump administration, white guilt, climate change, and enlightenment through 
communing with nature. These interviews deserve a manuscript to themselves, so that the 
perspectives of my collaborators can receive their due credit, in addition to informing this 
rhetorical history of preservation advocacy. 
Finally, while the dissertation demonstrated links between historical precedents and 
contemporary practices, I plan to focus more extensively on contemporary preservation 
advocacy on behalf of indigenous heritage places in future research. This project serves as a 
necessary foundation for understanding how the contemporary discourse came to be as it is, 
and will enrich my future engagement with the study of preservation advocacy, as it is 
practiced in the present moment.  
Summary 
The primary claim in my dissertation is that scientific authority always has dominated 
Anglo-American engagement with ancient indigenous places in the Southwestern United 
States. In spite of Anglo-American social actors’ outspoken deference to Science, this 
rhetorical history of exploration, archaeology, advocacy, and policy demonstrates that 
researchers, advocates, and policymakers always have exhibited a poetic demeanor towards 
Southwestern antiquities, as well. Scientific rationality always has been accompanied by the 
supposedly irrational in this context. 
The presence of poetry within rhetorical appeals to scientific rationality helps to 
emphasize that scientific rationality is a myth. It is one of several myths of modernity that 
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writers, researchers, advocates, and policymakers expressed in the rhetoric about 
Southwestern antiquities. Other myths that rhetors in my study advanced related to the 
tensions present within a settler society at the turn of the twentieth century. Explorers, 
researchers, and advocates understood indigeneity primarily through the lens of Science, the 
exotic, or paternal benevolence. Their interpretations of the Ancestral Puebloans were 
influenced by and influenced their understandings of contemporary intercultural relationships 
with American Indian peoples. Because of the high social standing of many of the rhetors 
whose works I have studied, their attitudes towards indigeneity also likely had an effect on 
the attitudes of their readerships, and entered into preservation policy in enduring ways. The 
Anglo-American individuals whose rhetoric I study also understood indigeneity through 
myths of difference, primitivism, and the exotic, which romanticized American Indian people 
from the past or present. Often, the adventurers and advocates who wrote about the American 
Southwest portrayed indigenous people as childlike, peculiar, or noble. While the claims that 
American Indian people were noble certainly were more flattering than the claims that 
scrutinized the Other as a scientific specimen, all of these attitudes caricaturized indigeneity.   
In addition to advancing Science as an orienting force in society, and using Science to 
support racist policies and actions, the adventurers, advocates, and policymakers whose 
rhetoric I studied in this dissertation exhibited evidence of enchantment—not just with 
cultural myths, but with the places, themselves. Places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon 
are, indeed, enchanting. The striking impression that these places make on the people who 
observe them contributes to the fact that myths and wonder always have been part of Anglo-
American engagement with Southwestern antiquities, and likely will remain in that 
discursive context. The question that I would urge any would-be advocate to ask of himself 
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or herself is simply this: By what, precisely, are you enchanted? The answer to this question 
demonstrates the rationale for one’s engagement with an ancient place, and may reveal 
whether or not there are problematic cultural myths also at play.  
When standing in front of a massive sandstone alcove with a steep drop into a ravine 
behind you, looking up at Mesa Verdean architecture and artwork, it is difficult not to feel 
awe. When feeling the wind whipping across the plains as you stand within a town in Chaco 
Canyon that no one has lived in permanently for over seven hundred years, it is expected for 
one to feel inspired. Places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon encourage a contemplative 
mood. They provoke comparisons between past and present, and between the way you or I 
do things, and the way the Ancestral Puebloans did things. They prompt admiration at the 
ingenuity that the Ancestral Puebloans possessed, and perhaps relief that many of us do not 
require the skills that once were necessary to thrive in the American Southwest, as the 
Ancestral Puebloans did. These types of enchantment, these stirrings of emotion and 
existential thinking, likely will endure as long as places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon 
still stand. I would not wish for these enchantments to go away. 
Yet, such sensory and cerebral enchantments catalyze myth, and the myths that we 
choose to tell about Southwestern antiquities are what is at stake in this dissertation. We may 
not be able to choose whether or not we feel enchanted, but certainly we can make 
intentional choices about the language we use to convey that enchantment. Social norms 
produce the cultural myths that are most accessible when we confront things that are new, or 
strange, or interesting. It is comfortable to appeal to such myths when we describe what we 
find enchanting to those who have not yet seen it, or who do not yet care. Those same myths 
advance new social norms, and new ideologies. They are rhetorical, and have the potential to 
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influence public attitudes in enduring ways. The myths that white social actors have told 
about places like Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon historically have elevated science, white 
superiority, the fantastical nature of indigenous culture, and the Anglo-American right to 
interact with indigenous heritage. However, it is unnecessary to express enchantment by way 
of these myths. While no myth can reflect reality accurately, we can select narratives that are 
closer to the reality that we desire. Unabashedly, this is a rhetorical maneuver—yet why not 
select our myths intentionally?  
Within contemporary discourses in favor of the preservation of Southwestern 
antiquities, there are new myths that promote humanism, the value of contemplation, and the 
vitalism of the landscape. Such myths appeared in the most recent national monument 
designation on behalf of a Southwestern antiquity, Bears Ears National Monument. Such 
myths are novel alternatives to those that I have critiqued over the course of this dissertation. 
I choose to be enchanted by myths such as these, partial though they are. I also choose to 
enchant with myths such as these, for the ongoing, ethical care of Southwestern antiquities is 
far from secure. Defining what that ethical care looks like, and how to ensure it, are problems 
that preservation advocates operating today must consider. Understanding rhetorical 
enchantment in this discursive context may be key to resolving some of the enduring tensions 
contained in efforts to preserve knowledge of the deep past in this settler society. 
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